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1 
"An Act to promote improved performance in respect of GoverN1U!nl trading activities 
and, to this end, to -
(a) Specify principles governing the operation of State enzerprises; and 
(b) Authorise the forma1ion of companies to carry on certain Governmenz 
activities and control the ownership thereof; and 
(c) Establish requirements about the accounzability of State enterprises, and the 
responsibility of Ministers" 
-Long title, State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The reform of state-owned enterprises (S0Es) is a hot topic in New Zealand legal, 
economic, political, accounting and business circles. It marks a new stage in the 
development of New Zealand's constitution and economy. Large state trading 
organisations were previously operated as government departments subject to direct and 
complete ministerial control. Waste, decline, stagnation and inefficiency were the 
perceived results. The fourth Labour Government have undertaken a comprehensive 
search for a more appropriate balance between public accountability and financial 
efficiency. This is the fundamental tension at the heart of the SOE issue. The second 
half of 1987 sees a consolidation in the reform process. The State-Owned Enterprises 
Act 1986 (S0Es Act) is in force. It has already been amended by Parliament and 
actions under it have been challenged in the Court of Appeal. Nine new SOEs and four 
established SOEs are operating under it. With the re-election of the Labour Government 
the process of reform continues. More institutions are to become candidates for 
corporatisation, some for privatisation. 1 
Proponents of the reforms claim advantages such as enhanced efficiency and 
accountability in state activity. Critics claim a loss of accountability and social 
objectives and decry a failure to privatise. All agree that the issue is of primary 
importance: how should the state organise the management of its enterprises that have 
commercial functions? As the process of reform temporarily draws breath it is time to 
examine the reformed structure in the light of the fundamental issues it addresses. What 
is it? How does it work? Is it "adequate"? Where does the future lie? 
This paper examines the new SOEs that have been created. It examines the 
accountability structure that governs their activities. This refers to the framework of 
mechanisms which surrounds all the actors involved in the operation of an SOE. The 
Hon. Stan Rodger, Speech to the Institute of Policy Studies, 3 September 1987, Wellington. 
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impact of these mechanisms on the behaviour of the actors, as motivated by their 
incentives, determines the shape of the practical operation of the SOEs. That operation 
constitutes the outcome of the reform process that will be judged as a success or failure. 
In this way it is the accountability structure and process of the SOEs that is pivotal to the 
success of this "bold new experiment" .2 
Much of the substance of the paper is descriptive; inherently so as the aim is to 
understand the accountability structure. Yet the economic method of analysis used to 
present the accountability structure illuminates and clarifies the issues and relationships 
and suggests policy implications. 
Part II outlines the methodological and conceptual approach of the paper and some 
background information about SOEs. Part ill describes and analyses the accountability 
structure of S0Es in terms of four key , complex elements that together constitute its 
essence. An economic approach is applied to each to examine the effect of specific 
mechanisms that, combined with motive incentives, determine the process of 
accountability. Part IV analyses the overall effect of the elements and incentives 
analysed in Part III to formulate a broad picture of the accountability process. Part V 
draws brief conclusions about policy implications of the analysis and, more broadly, 
about the methodological approach used 
2 Geoffrey Palmer, Unbridled Power: An Interpretation of New 'Zealand's Constitution and Governmenl, (2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Auckland) 90. 
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II. ECONOMICS, ACCOUNT ABILITY AND THE GREAT EXPERIMENT 
A. ECONOMICS AND ACCOUNT ABILITY 
The approach and structure of the paper are heavily influenced by economics;as 
has been much of the fundamental analysis behind the development of the SOEs.3 The 
"economic approach" is used throughout.4 This way of thinking about issues 
emphasises the incentives faced by individuals, especially as modified by law and by 
practical impediments to behaviour. It need not involve money or finance, nor 
mathematics, nor need it exhibit a "right wing" bias. Instead the application of 
economic analysis will often seem to the reader to be applied common sense; which is 
the essence of economics. 
The basic economic tools used in the paper are straightforward. Together they 
lead to a particular view of human behaviour. Economics expects humans to act 
rationally; or least to act rationally enough for overall behaviour patterns to approximate 
rationality. Concommitant to this, economics expects humans to maximise their utility. 
We behave in ways that we hope will increase our happiness and minimise our misery. 
The economic concept of "cost" is important. Cost is not confined to money but 
includes any expenditure of a valuable resource. For example the time and difficulty 
involved in passing legislation represents a cost. Cost also includes the value of 
alternative uses of a resource: the opportunity cost. The value of the alternative 
activities that could be undertaken by the people and resources engaged in passing 
legislation is the opportunity cost of their deployment Note that transactions may be 
costly - this is important to the paper. Law also plays a vital role in influencing 
activities. It defines the property rights framework within which market activity is to 
occur. Its mechanisms can be used to channel behaviour into desired patterns. For 
example it can economise on transaction costs or raise the costs of undesirable activities. 
3 
4 
For example: The Treasury, Economic Management, (Government Printer, Wellington, 1984) Ch. 13; R.L. Cameron & PJ. Duignan "Government Owned Enterprises: Theory, Performance and Efficiency" Paper to the New Zealand Association of Economists Conference, 8 February 1984, (Wellington). 
Further explicated by the writer in "The economics of law: The Sharebrokers Act 1908" (1986) 16 V.U.W.L.R. 277. Also, see Gary S. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1976); Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, (Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1986); C.G. Veljanovski The New I.Aw-and-Economics: A Research Review (Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, Oxford, 1982); and infra n.5. 
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The application of economics to SOEs is vitally concerned with the behaviour of 
the actors involved in the SOE process. It is concerned with the incentives they face 
and the relevant mechanisms which channel their behaviour. From a full account of 
those incentives and mechanisms the behaviour of the actors and thus the dynamics of 
their interrelationships overall can be predicted. It is in this way that the paper uses the 
term "accountability". Accountability emphasises the relationship between actors 
concerning matters over which they have influence. An accountability structure 
determines and describes the loci of power. It may include a framework of formal or 
informal rules. It takes account of the effects of incentives on, and perceptions of the 
actors. An accountability structure is a constitution, broadly defined. The paper 
examines the constitution of SOEs in that sense. 
The paper is written in the belief that economics alone does not provide answers. 
Conclusions are always reached and decisions made on the basis of judgement, 
philosophy and personal values. Yet economics may clarify causal relationships and 
improve the basis on which debate may occur and informed decisions may be made. 
Interrelationships may be clarified, influences identified, problems pinpointed. The 
value of the approach lies in the logical, systematic and thorough discipline that is 
imposed on policy analysis by its proper use. For these reasons and others, "Law and 
Economics" is acquiring increasing influence as an almost discrete discipline.5 
B. SOES: THE TENSION OF POLITICS AND PROFIT 
The essence of the accountability structure of SOEs is examined in Part ill. It 
consists of a number of mechanisms that channel the behaviour of actors involved in the 
SOE process: ministerial responsibility; Parliamentary scrutiny; company law; judicial 
review; and other elements. Logically prior to this analysis is an account of the motive 
incentives which drive the behaviour of the actors. The two basic motive incentives 
most relevant to SOEs are the exercise of political power and the attainment of financial 
profit Each represents a fundamental way in which humans can increase their utility in 
New Zealand society, through the political and commercial systems respectively. Both 
of these systems can be characterised in similar terms, using a key concept relevant to 
the paper as a whole: transaction cost and agency cost theory of the principal - agent 
relationship. 
5 See: The Journal of Law and Economics (Chicago); The Journal of Legal Studies (Chicago); The International Review of Law and Economics (pan-atlantic); The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization (Yale). 
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1. Profit and Production 
The world of production, distribution and exchange of goods and services in New 
Zealand relics on the profit motive. Generally, the price mechanism adjusts the 
incentives of producers and consumers to allocate resources to their best use - as 
evidenced by willingness to pay for them. Actors in the production process generally 
behave so as to maximise their profit. Usually this is achieved by operation of firms, 
often companies. Economic analysis provides insights into the raison d'etre of such 
organisations. If transactions were costless, individuals would transact with each other 
in the production of a good. There would be no reason for a company to exist. 6 In 
reality, though, there are significant problems in all the participants in a production 
process transacting with each other and with the final buyer of the product. The 
transaction costs would be prohibitive in a modem economy. 
Since transactions are costly, there is an incentive to set up an organisational 
alternative to market transactions. A company, (or any other form of corporate body) 
governs arrangements for the production of the good. It internalises transaction costs. 
Consider the functions that a company may perform. The company itself is a central 
body with which people can directly transact. Employees can be hired. Third parties -
involved in input or output transactions - can contract with the company. Different 
organisational entities have different legal characteristics which may be advantageous 
for different activities. The utility of the company as a form of organisation emanates 
from its distinctive legal characteristics. 
Yet the utility of any organisational alternative to atomistic market transactions 
may be limited by other costs. The owner of a company has a specific goal, usually 
profit maximisation. How is it to be achieved? Typically, different sets of individuals 
perform different functions in an organisation. In a company shareholders, as owners, 
delegate some power of management to directors as their agents. There is likely to be 
difficulty, a cost, involved in ensuring that the directors behave so as to further the aim 
of the shareholders. These are termed "agency costs". Significant economic analysis 
has focussed on the agency costs of this relationship. In 1932 Berle and Means 
published a seminal work which ruminated on the "divergence of interest between 
ownership and control". 7 This was developed significantly in the 1970s and 1980s by 
6 
7 
R.H. Coase "The Nature of the Finn" (1937) 4 Economica 386. Also, Steven Cheung "The 
Contractual Nature of the Firm" (1983) 26 Journal of Law and Economics 1. 
Adolf A. Berte and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (revised 
ed., Harcourt Brace & World Inc., New York, 1967) especially 112 - 116. 
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writers such as Fama and Jensen.8 Agency costs arc important to this paper in several 
contexts. 
In the commercial context there are several methods of economising on agency 
costs.9 Other actors may be important. Competition within the framework of market 
laws is intense for the acquisition of profit. The potential of a company takeover may 
result in replacement as director which provides an incentive to avoid inefficiency which 
would induce a takeover. Monitoring mechanisms are highly important in informing 
both the principal and other actors of divergence in interests (resulting in inefficiency) 
and providing the basis on which remedial action may be taken. 
2. Power and Politics 
Transactions costs and agency theory are also relevant in the world of politics. A 
government is characterised by this paper as an agent for New Zealand society as a 
whole - or the electorate. The power and influence attached, by the structure of the 
political system, to positions in a government is considerable. It must be expected to be 
keenly desired; whether for selfish or altruistic reasons. The primary incentive that 
members of a government face is to exercise power to achieve whatever are their aims. 
Theoretically subsidiary to this is the retention or acquisition of power in order to 
achieve those aims. This is the world of politics. Political costs and benefits constitute 
incentives. It is on this basis that ministers' aims are primarily political. As actors in 
the political marketplace they behave by responding to the incentives facing them, as 
actors do in other markets. 
The discretion of government is absolute. Agency cost analysis stresses, indeed 
assumes, the need to align an agent's interests with the principal's interests to produce 
the behaviour desired by the principal. The potential agency costs to the electorate are 
enormous. In the political context, as in the commercial context, there are several 
methods of economising on agency costs. Other actors may be important. Competition 
within the framework of the political system is intense both for the exercise of and 
8 
9 
Eugene F. Fama" Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm" (1980) 88 Journal of Political Economy 288; Fama & Michael C. Jensen "Separation of Ownership and Control" (1983) 26 Journal of Law and Economics 26; Jensen & W .H. Meckling "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure" (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305; Jensen & Richard Ruback. "The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence" (1983) 11 Journal of Financial Economics 11; Jensen & Jerold L Zimmerman "Symposium on Management Compensation and the Managerial Labor Market in Honor of William H. Mec.k.ling" (1985) 7 Journal of Accounting and Economics; and also the Corporations and Private Property Conference (1983) 26 Journal of Law and Economics 235. 
Ibid 
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retention of power. The potential of takeover (of government) by another party 
provides an incentive to avoid unpopular actions which would induce a takeover. 
Again, monitoring mechanisms are highly important in informing both the principal and 
other actors of divergence in interests (resulting in unpopularity) and providing the basis 
on which remedial action may be taken. 
3. SOEs: The Great Experiment 
In both the commercial and political spheres the identification of agency costs is a 
matter of examining actors' incentives. Responses to agency costs are an inherent and 
fundamental part of the accountability structure of an organisation. They constitute the 
mechanisms by which one set of actors controls another. In the SOE context both 
spheres meet in several senses. The aims of an SOE may be both commercial and 
political. The behaviour of an SOE is relevant both commercially and politically. And 
the structure of the new SOEs now draws from both spheres. The mechanisms that 
control agency costs in each sphere are relevant to SOEs. 
SOEs are inherently public~ nature. They are part of government and may be 
used to achieve governmental purposes. Yet as trading enterprises they have another 
purpose - to operate commercially. This basic tension is at the heart of the SOE 
problem that lead to the present experiment and accountability structure. 10 Politics and 
profit in New Zealand have not sat well together. The reasons for the new SOE reform 
are perceptions of enormous wastage by the pre-existing departmental trading 
organisations. Continuous and increasing losses, excess output and investment in some 
areas, and waiting lists for services in others, contrary management decisions: all were 
cited as products of an inadequate management system. 11 The new SOE structure is 
attempts to remedy that situation. It is based on four essential principles:12 
10 
11 
12 
(a) Responsibility for non commercial functions will be separated from major trading SOEs. 
R.C. Mascarenhas Public Enterprise in New 'Zealand (New Zealand Institute of Public Administration, Wellington, 1982) 128. 
Palmer, supra n. 2, 82 - 90; Roger Douglas and Louise Callen, Toward Prosperity • (David Bateman, Auckland, 1987) Ch. 12: "Polishing the Family Silver" 224. On the factual development of SOEs generally see: Peter McK.inlay Corporatisation: The Solution for Stale Owned Enterprise? (Victoria University Press for the Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 1987); and Institute of Policy Studies, Politicians, Public Servants and Public Enterprise: Revolution in Executive Power, Papers Presented at the Seminar on 18 June 1987, (Victoria University of Wellington, 1987). 
Hon. R.O. Douglas, Economic Statement to the House of Representatives, 12 December 1985, (Government Printer, Wellington, 1985) 12. 
,. 
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(b) Managers of SOEs will be given a principal objective of running 
them as successful business cntcrpnscs. 
(c) Managers will be given responsibility for decisions on the use of 
inputs and on pricing and marketing of their output within the 
performance objectives agreed with Ministers so that the 
managers can be held accountable to Ministers and Parliament for 
their results. 
(d) The advantages and disadvantages which SOEs have, including 
unnecessary barriers to competition, will be removed so that 
commercial criteria will provide a fair assessment of managerial 
performance. 
An SOE is a limited liability company formed under the Companies Act 1955 and 
subject to an overlay of public accountability mechanisms through the SOEs Act 1986. 
Nine new SOEs have been created from what were departments, or parts of 
departments. The departmental comparison is a useful one to return to throughout the 
paper, as is the ordinary company. The nine new SOEs are: 
Airways Corporation of New Zealand Ltd. 
Coal Corporation of New Zealand Ltd 
Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd. 
Government Property Services Ltd. 
Land Corporation Ltd. 
New Zealand Forestry Corporation Ltd. 
New Zealand Post Ltd. 
Post Office Bank Ltd. 
Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd. 
(Aircorp.) 
(Coalcorp) 
(Electricorp) 
(GPS) 
(Landcorp) 
(Forestcorp) 
(NZ Post) 
(Postbank) 
(I'elecom) 
Four existing enterprises are also brought within most aspects of the S0Es Act: 
Air New Zealand Ltd; New Zealand Railways Corporation; Tourist Hotel Corporation ; 
and The Shipping Corporation.13 This paper is concerned only with the new SOEs. 
Certain public regulatory functions, powers and duties are also conferred on new 
SOEs by legislation specific to each: the 18 Acts passed in June and July 1987 that were 
the State Enterprises Restructuring Bill. 14 For example the Telecommunications Act 
1987 confers powers and duties on Telecom in relation to Telecommunication Networks 
and the Licensing and Regulation of Radio Apparatus. This paper does not deal with the 
SOE specific legislation. 
13 
14 
Petrocorp was removed from the list by the SOEs Amendment Act 1987. 
These became the following 1987 Acts: the Civil Aviation Amendment (No.2) Act; Electricity Amendment Act; Electricity Operators Act; Ministry of Energy Amendment (No.2) Act; Public Works Amendment Act; Post Office Bank Act; Postal Services Act; Post Office Act Repeal Act; Telecommunications Act; State-Owned Enterprises Amendment Act; Forests Amendment Act; Forest and Rural Fires Amendment Act; Fire Service Amendment (No.5) Act; Health Service Personnel Act; New Zealand Railways Corporation Amendment Act; State Services Conditions of Employment Amendment (No.3) Act; State Service Amendment Act; and the Police Amendment (No.3) AcL 
9 
III. ELEMENTS OF THE ACCOUNT ABILITY STRUCTURE 
A. MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
1. Introduction 
The doctrine of ministerial responsibility is the logical starting point of Part m. 15 
It lies at the heart of the accountability structure in the Westminster system of 
Government as an essential link in the chain that is supposed to join democratic will to 
government administration. Ministerial Responsibility focusses on the members of 
Cabinet; the body that has the most concentrated power in our political system. It links 
Cabinet to Parliament and to the electorate. Ministerial responsibility performs an 
integral role in the new accountability structure of SOEs. Furthermore, almost unaided, 
it was the core element of the unsatisfactory departmental accountability structure of 
previous state trading enterprises. Ministerial responsibility thus serves doubly as a 
basis for comparison with the previous structure as well as an important element in the 
new system. 
Debate surrounds the concept of ministerial responsibility. Some of this is 
inevitable due to the often highly charged political implications of its application. In 
addition, though, there is confusion over the nature and content of the concept. Some 
question its definition, some its effectiveness, others its utility. This paper will explore 
the concept of ministerial responsibility through economic analysis . Its application to 
SOEs will reveal the effect of ministerial responsibility on the incentives of SOE actors. 
2. Ministerial Responsibility and Economics 
The character of the doctrine of individual ministerial responsibility is important. 
It belongs to that most ubiquitous feature of any constitution - conventions. The 
consequences of this are significant and lie predominantly in enforceability and 
susceptibility to change. Almost by definition, a convention is incapable of enforcement 
by the courts. 16 Its power lies in the tradition of its observance, how appropriate it is to 
15 
16 
Individual ministerial responsibility is most directly relevant to this paper though collective responsibility is important - infra p. 15-16. 
Per, e.g. Madzimbamuto v. l..Ardner-Buru [1969) 1 A.C. 645, 723. Though a convention may be: recognised by statute; enacted into law; incorporated into a constitutional document; or recognised and relied on by the courts. 
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contemporary circumstances; it rests on public opinion and the political systcm. 17 The 
price of breaching the convention is political cost The substance of a convention may 
be changed or even negated simply by a (reasonably consistcnt)l8 change in practice; 
without a conscious decision being necessary on anyone's part. During the period of a 
gradual shift however, the substance of the convention may be uncertain. 
The substance of the doctrine of Ministerial Responsibility has been likened to the 
procreation of eels; with an accordingly slippery explanation : 19 
"Ministers offer their individual resignations if serious errors are made in their Departments (except when they retain their posts or 
are given peerages)" and "Every act of a civil servant is, legally speaking, the act of a Minister (except those that are, legally speaking, his own)." 
Sir Ivor Jennings' description conveys the essence of the concept, but begs more 
questions than it answers:2° "Each minister is responsible to Parliament for the conduct 
of his [or her] department". This paper presents ministerial responsibility in terms of 
two fundamental facets: the requirement to answer; and the consequences of 
answering.21 The first describes what it is that ministerial responsibility requires of a 
minister. The second describes the sanctions available for use against the minister. 
Both are presented in terms of economics. 
(a) The requirement ro answer 
The requirement to answer is relatively clear. Ministerial responsibility requires 
that ministers must answer to Parliament in relation to the conduct of their departments 
and other matters over which they acquire (by law or convention) functions, powers or 
duties. The matters for which a minister has responsibility are examined later with 
respect to SOEs. Requirements to act are also seen as elements or corollaries of the 
requirement to answer: to investigate, remedy and report back. This paper treats most 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
This paper does not delve into the question of why conventions are enforced. It should be noted though that a wide view of what constitutes a convention is taken. 
A convention may be breached occasionally without ceasing to exist or changing significantly. Geoffrey Marshall Constitutional Conventions: The Rules and Forms of Political Accou.nlability (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984) 55. 
Sir Ivor Jennings, The lAw and the Constitution (5th ed., University of London Press Ltd., London, 1959), 207-208. Professor Finer noted that issues may be raised about the meaning of "minister", "responsible" and "department"! S.E. Finer, "The Individual Responsibility of Ministers" (1956) 34 Public Administration 377. 
This broadly corresponds to Professor Finer's two senses of "responsibility": "answerable to" and "answerable for". Ibid., 379. His labels can cause confusion, for example see Avigdor K.lagsbald, in "The Kahan Commission of Inquiry: Jurisdiction and Standards in Determining Questions of Ministerial Responsibilty" (1983) Public Law 376, 381, for a different interpretation of their meaning. 
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of these as consequences of the requirement to answer that arc induced by political 
incentives. 
The ways in which a minister answers to Parliament arc several. They include, 
for example: the charge a minister has in Parliament of a departmental Bill; the role of 
the minister in debates on any aspect of the department; the response by a minister to 
requests by Members of Parliament in relation to the department; Parliamentary 
Questions of the minister in relation to the department; the role of officials as servants 
of their minister at select committee hearings.22 A more detailed examination of 
Parliamentary accountability mechanisms is presented in Part III.B. Within the self 
imposed limits of parliamentary procedure ministerial responsibility theoretically enables 
Parliament to hold ministers to account by obtaining information, monitoring and 
scrutinising. The existence of ministerial responsibility in many ways permeates the 
whole context and flavour of Parliamentary behaviour. 
An important corollary to this part of the convention of ministerial responsibility 
concerns officials.23 Strictly, officials are anonymous. They are responsible only to 
their ministers who are bound to protect and defend them, but they are directed by the 
minister.24 This derives from the same theoretical basis as the convention proper, viz. 
that, responsibility is channelled totally through the minister. Increasingly, there has 
been confusion over the exact extent and force of the corollary - perhaps evidence of a 
change in the convention? Officials are sometimes not defended in Parliament or in 
public.25 There have even been instances of public attacks on officials by their own 
ministers.26 There are increasingly important implications in these trends for the duty 
of loyalty owed by officials.27 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
In relation to the last point, and unlike almost any other context, officials also have a duty to the committee. M.C. Probine, "The Public Service and Ministers" Management Leaflet No 6, (State Services Commission, Wellington, 1983). See also David McGee Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand (Government Printer, Wellington, 1985) 208 about official loyalty being overriden by direct accountability to Parliament in this way. 
Generally, see John Roberts Polilicians, Public Servants&: Public Enterprise: Restructwing the New Zealand Government Executive (Victoria University Press for the Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 1987). 
And regulated by the State Services Commission. 
RJ. Polaschek Government Administration in New Zealand (Oxford University Press, London, 1958). 
John Roberts supra n. 23, 48-50. 
See generally: Roberts supra n. 23, Maurice Wright "Ministers and Civil Servants: Relations and Responsibilities" (1977) 30 Parliamentary Affairs 293; David Butler "Ministerial Responsibility in Australia and Britain" (1973) 26 Parliamentary Affairs 403; J L. Roberts "The Public Service and Ministers" (1983) 6 Public Sector 25. 
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This requirement of ministerial responsibility governs the relationships between 
Parliament, ministers and officials. It can be characterised in economic terms.28 
# Prohibitive transaction costs would occur from Parliament being responsible for the 
administration of the legislation it makes. A bureaucracy of officials is necessary to 
carry out that function. Yet, as explained in relation to organisations generally, there 
would be significant agency costs to Parliament in supervising such a bureaucracy. A 
narrower agency relationship substitutes: ministers are the agents of the "sovereign" 
Parliament.29 They control and direct officials who in turn are answerable mainly to 
ministers. In the same way that directors are responsible to shareholders in a company, 
ministers are responsible to Parliament in a principal - agent relationship. The 
doctrine of ministerial responsibility controls the agency costs that still exist in the 
Parliament - minister - officials relationships. Ministerial responsibility is essentially a 
broad reporting requirement. Parliament may require a report from a minister on any 
matter over which the minister has "responsibility". This provides an incentive for 
ministers to take into account Parliament's wishes. 
(b) The consequences of answering 
A description of the consequences of answering is more contentious. Yet it is 
essential to the efficacy of ministerial responsibility as a agency cost control device. It 
constitutes the sanction for breach of the rules of the agency relationship. Attention 
usually focusses on whether the convention requires resignation and whether 
resignation actually occurs . This paper treats that focus as unbalanced and as merely 
part of the more significant overall view of the incentives provided by political cost 
The most obvious and notorious sanction against ministerial misbehaviour is 
resignation. When must a minister resign ?30 Sir lvor Jenning's identification of three 
requirements in establishing the existence and content of a convention is convincing and 
was adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1981.31 The elements are: precedents; 
the beliefs of the actors; and the reason for the rule. These may be applied first to the 
necessary conditions, then the sufficient conditions for resignation. Note that an 
28 
29 
30 
31 
No previous economic analysis of ministerial responsibility has been discovered by the writer. Advice of the its existence would be appreciated. 
The implications for this of an assumption of a certain amount of sovereignty by the courts is not examined. 
Note that in law, a minister's warrant is held at the pleasure of the Crown. A dismissal could occur at any time and a resignation may not be accepted. The legal theory does not accord with convention or reality. 
Jennings supra n. 20, 136. Referena Re Ameru:lment of the Constitution of Canada 125 D.L.R. (3d) 1, 89. 
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interesting question is raised by a possible distinction between an offer to resign and an 
acceptance of that resignation.32 Docs the convention govern one or both? The 
question is not relevant for the purposes of the paper. 
Professor Finer talks of the "folklore" that expects a minister to resign whenever 
anything in his or her department goes wrong. More recently Dr Ovendcn has opined 
that this is indeed the misunderstanding that New Zealanders have of ministerial 
responsibility; to the extent that "the process of atrophy has more or less killed the 
convention completely"33 Academic commentators, officials and Ministers themselves 
often seem to share this wide view of the convention.34 Viewed as such the concept, 
of course, seems impractically wide, naive, and unworkable. 
It is the contention of this paper that certain necessary conditions must be fulfilled 
for resignation to occur. First the matter must be of a certain critical magnitude for the 
issue to be raised at all. A trivial matter will not invoke ministerial responsibility. To 
some extent the evaluation of magnitude will be influenced by the way in which the 
second condition is fulfilled. Dishonesty, negligence, incompetence or some other like 
fault must be present in certain circumstances. The main circumstance is where the 
minister may be personally at fault. Most resignations on true ministerial responsibility 
grounds involve personal fault. British cases, for some reason, often seem to involve 
sex.35 A New Zealand example was the resignation in 1934 of Sir Apirana Ngata. It 
is possible that the fault may be that of the policy or instructions of the minister or the 
minister may reasonably be expected to know of and prevent the fault. This situation is 
rarer and the invocation of collective responsibility often confuses matters. 36 
These circumstances are not to be rigidly interpreted. Other circumstances may 
give rise to resignation. However, where the minister did not and could not reasonably 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
There has been a growing tendency for ministers to offer resignation but for the offer not to be accepted. E.g. Mr Nott in the Falklands crisis, the Minister of Finance in 1986, and the Minister of Maori Affairs in 1987. (though as a MP) . 
Keith Ovenden "Commentary on Sir John Marshall, 'Administration and the Changing Constitution'" in State Servants and the Public in the 1980s ed. R.M. Alley, (NZIPA, Wellington, 1980) 94. 
For example, Finer supra n. 19. S. Encel, in Cabinet Governml!nl in Australia, (2nd ed.) (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1974) 123 describes the Hon J.M Fraser being derided by other speakers after stating a slightly less strict position. 
Marshall supra n.19. This does not seem to constitute part of a minister's responsibility to the House. Sex alone (by itself), though, isn't enough - see "Personal Ministerial Responsibility" (1983) Public Law 519. It has often become relevant when a minister has misled Parliament. Also see Geoffrey Marshall "Cabinet Government and the Westland Affair" (1986) Public Law 184, 190 re Leon Brittan's resignation. 
Lord Carrington's resigation in 1982 seems to constitute an example. E.C.S. Wade & A.W. Bradley, Constitutional and Administrative Law ( 10th ed., Longman, London, 1985) 117. 
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have been expected to know of or prevent the error, resignation cannot be expected. It 
is these situations around which much "folklore" exists. The fact is that resignation has 
not occured in such circumstances in modem Britain, nor in Australia or New 
Zealand. 37 The persistence of commentators in believing in such a penalty can be 
substantiated neither in reason, precedent nor authoritative belief. Perhaps it is due to 
confusion with the first clement of ministerial responsibility. The requirement to 
answer covers all matters for which a minister is responsible. Perhaps it is due to 
confusion with the sanction of resignation for breach of collective responsibility. 
Perhaps there is difficulty in comprehending the dynamic clement of constitutional 
conventions combined with reliance on previously misled commentators and "public 
misunderstanding". 
The most unresolved issue surrounding ministerial resignation is whether the 
convention requires resignation or whether it leaves that simply as a matter for politics. 
Are the circumstances outlined above sufficient as well as necessary conditions for 
resignation? Some writers recognise the inherent political element to ministerial 
repsonsibility and believe that resignation is always, and should always be, left up to 
the politcal process.38 Many writers obviously believe that resignation should occur in 
the circumstances outlined though most suspect that in practice it can only depend on the 
politics of the situation: as perceived by the minister, Prime Minister, opposition, 
colleagues, department, party, media and electors. 39 They thus believe that resignation 
is not prescribed by the convention of ministerial reponsibility. Most commentators 
seem to reach their conclusions with significant help from normative belief. 
It is at this point that the convention of ministerial responsibility should be placed 
in a political context. Reference to economic analysis clarifies that context. As seen 
above one facet of ministerial responsibility can be characterised as a reporting 
requirement: the requirement to answer. This reduces agency costs. Presently under 
examination are the circumstances in which, and if, a particular sanction for ministerial 
37 
38 
39 
Marshall supra n.19., 65. David Butler supra n. 27. Note that Dugdale's resignation over Crichel 
Down, sometimes cited as a counter example of (especially in 1954) was not so: KJ. Scott, 
"Ministerial Responsibility for Crichel Down" (1955) 17 New Zealand Journal of Public 
Administration 1, 13-20; Hon B.M. Snedden "Ministerial Responsibility in Modem 
Parliamentary Government" Third Commonwealth and Empire Law Conference, (Law Book 
Co. Ltd, Sydney, 1965) 3, 8. 
But remember that it is difficult to correctly categorise the facts of instances of ministerial 
resignation or non-resignation. Reasons for resignation are often not what they seem to be, or 
are stated to be. Marshall supra n. 19. 
E.g. Ovendon supra n. 33; Klagsbald supra n. 22. 
E.g. Finer, supra n. 19; AB. Birch "Representative and Responsible Government An Essay on 
the British Constitution" (George Allen & Unwin, London, 1964); J.P. Mackintosh The British 
Cabinet (3rd ed., Stevens & Sons Ltd., London, 1977); Wright supra n. 27; P. Nonon, The 
Constitution in Flwt (Martin Robinson, Oxford, 1982); Marshall supra n. 19. 
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misbehaviour exists: resignation. In economic terms the sanction of resignation is 
merely the cost of certain behaviour. If there arc perceived benefits that outweigh the 
potential cost, the behaviour will still occur. Yet cost accompanies much political 
behaviour. Good politicians arc the most adept at assessing the political costs and 
benefits of various alternative courses of action. An account of the costs and benefits 
depends on the political climate at any particular time - it is political analysis. To isolate 
one such cost is to confer on it an unjustifiedly artificial status. This economic 
assessment of the role of resignation implies that it should properly be regarded as 
merely the extreme option of a graduated range of costs associated with a corresponding 
range of political behaviour. 
This explains why the convention of ministerial responsibility in terms of 
consequences has been so difficult to separate from politics. Political considerations are 
inherently determinative of whether and in what circumstances resignation is required. 
Status as a constitutional convention adds force to (raises the cost of ignoring) a norm. 
Such status is not necessary or, perhaps, desirable in relation to a political cost The 
status is justified and desirable in relation to the first facet discussed: the requirement to 
answer. In this political context only appropriate political costs will encourage an 
alignment of agent ministers' incentives with principal Parliament's wishes. A 
constitutional convention is an effective instrument for that purpose. 
(c) Collective ResporLSibility 
Collective ministerial responsibility is also important though the discussion of it 
here is brief.40 It is a convention which governs Cabinet as a whole. Its substance is 
that Cabinet ministers are collectively responsible for the actions of the Cabinet 
Cabinet decisions must be publicly supported by all Cabinet Ministers. If such support 
is not forthcoming, resignation is required.41 
In economic terms Cabinet may be seen as the agent of the government caucus 
and ultimately of the electorate at large. When a group acts as an agent, there tends to 
be a diffusion of responsibility. Each member is able to blame the group for costly 
decisions thereby avoiding personal cost. If all ministers can do this the focus of 
accountability is diluted and lost in confusion. This can occur with Cabinet which may 
provide a shield to individual ministerial responsibility. In relation to policy, though not 
personal, matters ministers can claim that faults should be ascribed to Cabinet as a 
40 
41 
Generally, see P.A. Joseph "The Honourable D.F. Quigley's Resignation: Strictly Political • Not Constitutional" (1981) 1 Canterbury Law Review 429. 
E.g. the resignation of the Hon. D.F. Quigley in June 1982. 
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whole. The convention of collective responsibility docs not remove this ability which is 
often exercised. It docs however ameliorate the effect and incentives. It provides a 
specific alternative body to take responsibility. No minister may be totally exempted 
from rcsponsibilty. It increases the incentives of each minister to work to achieve cost 
minimising decisions. Also collective responsibility identifies a focus for responsibility 
for the overall direction and behaviour of government. In this sense it reduces agency 
costs to some extent. Note again that the behaviour of Cabinet is affected by the 
incentives of the political climate at any given time. 
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3. Ministerial Responsibility and SOEs 
The application of the principles of ministerial responsibility to SOEs is primarily 
a matter of determining for what a minister is responsible in relation to SOEs.42 The 
way in which a minister is held responsible is through Parliamentary mechanisms which 
are discussed in Part m.B. 
(a) Responsibility as Shareholders 
The most direct and significant source of ministerial responsibility in respect of 
SOEs derives from the shareholding ministers' general function as shareholders. They 
are the Minister of Finance and, since the 1987 General Election, the one minister 
responsible for SOEs.43 The scope of the responsibility is indicated broadly by the 
S0Es Act in an explicit legislative reference to the convention of ministerial 
responsibility but the practical implications are not immediately clear. The broad 
"Principles" stated in these sections are designed to reflect a policy decision in 
establishing the S0Es to remove ministers from matters of day to day management but 
to accentuate their responsibility for the broader directions and management 
performance of SOEs. Section 5 of the Act provides that operational decisions are to be 
made under the board of directors ' authority in accordance with the Statement of 
Corporate Intent (SCI) and that the board is accountable to the shareholding ministers in -accordance with Part III of the Act and the rules of the SOE. Section 6 provides that 
"the shareholding ministers are responsible to the House of Representatives for the 
performance of the functions given to them by this Act or the rules of the [SOE]" . What 
are these functions? They can be categorised in terms of management and monitoring. 
They are found in the Act and the articles. 
(i) Mana2ement 
The forms of potential working relationships between shareholders and directors, 
constitute a broad continuum. As discussed in Part m.C the relationship may be that 
found in a closely held private company or a widely held publicly listed company. The 
shareholders' functions, and in this context therefore the scope of ministerial 
responsibility, may differ according to that relationship. 
42 
43 
Generally (and briefly) see Dr Jonathan Boston, Paper Presented at the Institute of Policy Studies Seminar on 18 June 1987 supra n. 11, 40 
Presently the Hon. R.O. Douglas and the Hon. R.W. Prebble. 
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Section 22(3) of the S0Es Act provides broadly that a shareholding minister "may 
exercise all the rights and powers attaching to the shares in an [SOE] held by that 
minister". The specific statutory responsibilities relating to the shareholder management 
of SOEs arc detailed in Table 1. They relate to the ownership of SOE shares and equity 
bonds, and direction as to dividend in Part Il of the Act. Otherwise, the Act is 
consistent with a wide range of shareholder - director relationships varying in 
closeness. There is little in the Act to prevent shareholding ministers from involvement 
in management. Whether such changes occur will depend on the effect of political 
incentives and changes in the overall political climate. 
TABLE 1: STATUTORY MANAGEMENT POWERS OF 
SHAREHOLDERS 
Section Duty, Power, Function 
Part JI: F ormalion and OwMrship of New Suue En1erprises 
s.10 Ministers 
s.11 Ministers 
may, on behalf of the Crown, acquire shares er equity bonds in 
the new SOEs (in equal shares) using money appropriated by 
Parliament for the purpose. 
must not dispose of shares or permit shares to be allotted to any 
other person. 
s.13(1 ),(2) Ministers may: 
(b) determine the dividend; 
but, in doing so, must: 
(a) have regard to Part I; and 
(b) consult the board. 
The articles of association offer a more detailed guide to ministers' functions. As 
analysed more fully in Part m.C, they allocate the power of management between 
shareholders and directors.44 Most power is conferred on the directors. Apart from 
certain important residuary functions connected with the shares, directors, dividend and 
sale of the main undertaking,45 the articles prevent the shareholding ministers from 
exercising signific~t power in company management They may, by special resolution, 
change any article.46 The cost of changing this relationship is not prohibitive though it 
is significantly higher than the cost of political intervention in departments. 
Departmental administration is designed to facilitate political decisionmaking. 
44 
45 
46 
Infra Part III.C (Company Law). Company Law is vital to defining the relationship between shareholders and directors and therefore in defining the scope of ministerial responsibility. Ibid, Table 8. 
Section 24 of the Companies Act 1955 and the disclosure requirements of s. 17(1) of the SOEs Act. 
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(ii) Monitorio& 
To control the agency costs of the allocation of most management powers to the 
directors shareholders may monitor directors' activities. The ability to monitor derives 
mainly from the SOEs Act and also from the Companies Act 47 Part ID is important 
It governs the laying before Parliament of documents for accountability.48 In addition, 
by placing the directors under certain duties, the Act implies that other monitoring 
functions are assumed by ministers. These functions are detailed in Table 2. 
TABLE 2: SHAREHOLDER MONITORING PROVISIONS IN THE SOEs ACT. 
Express: 
Part Ill: AccoWllability 
s.13(1 ),(2) Ministers 
s.13(3) • Minister 
s.17(1) • Minister 
s.17(2) • Minister 
s.17(3)* Minister 
s.17(4) • Minister 
s.22(3) Minister 
Implied: 
Part Ill: AccoWtJability 
s.14(1) 
s.14(3) 
Ministers 
Ministers 
may: 
(a) direct a new SOE to include/omit certain provisions in/from 
its SCI; 
but, in doing so, must: 
(a) have regard to Part I; and 
(b) consult the board . 
must lay before Parliament Notices of direction re SCI, dividend 
(per 13(1)) . 
must lay before Parliament the rules and changes to rules of 
SOEs . 
must lay before Parliament the SCI, annual report, audited 
financial statements, and auditor's report of an SOE. 
must lay before Parliament a modification (per 14(4)) of an SCI. 
must lay before Parliament the half yearly report of an SOE. 
may exercise all the rights and powers attaching to SOE shares 
held by that minister. 
receive a draft SCI within one month of commencement of 
financial year (comprising certain provisions per 14(2). 
comment on draft SCis within 2 months of commencement of 
financial year; and 
receive completed SCI to ministers within 3 months of 
commencement of financial year. 
47 
48 
• 
Infra Part m.c (Company Law) for discussion of the disclosure requirements of Company Law. 
For a more detailed account of the powers and duties conferred by the SOEs Act, infra Tables 9 and 10, Part m.n, (Judicial Review) . 
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TABLE l CTD: SHAREHOLDER MONITORING PROVISIONS IN THE SOEs ACT 
s.14(4) 
s.15 
s.16 
s.18 
s.19 
Ministers 
Ministers 
Ministers 
Ministers 
Ministers 
receive a written proposal to modify an SCI by written notice and 
comment in 1 month. 
receive: annual repon; audited financial statements; auditors' 
rep<Xt; 
which must cootain such inf onnation ~ is necessary to enable 
informed assessment of the operations; and state the dividend 
payable. 
receive half yearly repcxtS within 2 months after the end of the 
first half of the financial year. 
may request infcxmation relating to affairs of the SOE after 
consultation with the board (except for information on any 
identifiable individual). 
prescribe the rates of fees f <X' the Audit Office as auditor; and 
approval the appointment of an additional auditor. 
[• Re laying documents before Parliament., see Table 9 infra Part illD.] 
Most of the provisions in Table 2 concern Parliamentary and public monitoring. 
Section 18 is directed at exclusively shareholder monitoring. Overall, the S0Es Act 
provides ample scope for any sort of shareholder monitoring regime to be instituted. It 
is in the process of development at the time of writing. 49 The monitoring regime is vital 
to the shareholder-director relationship. It provides for scrutiny of decisionmaking. It 
determines the level of detail of management and the time in the decisionmaking process 
at which the ministers will become involved. The expressed intention of the present 
Government is that it will adhere to the separation of operational management and policy 
direction mentioned above. The proposed monitoring regime involves a significant 
level of contact between monitoring unit and S0Es. Of course the regime could be 
changed for the price of developing a new one - it is not legislated for. 
(b) Other Ministers' Individual Responsibility 
Other ministers may have responsibility for matters which touch more indirectly 
on SOEs. The most obvious is where the Crown negotiates with an SOE for the 
undertaking of transparent non-commercial activity under section 7 of the SOEs Act A 
minister in charge of that area of activity will be partly responsible for the negotiation 
with the SOE. Also a minister may be in charge of administering general regulatory law 
that applies to SOEs - for example the Minister of Trade and Industry and the 
Commerce Act 1986. Ministerial decisions taken under a specific regulatory regime 
also involve ministerial responsibility. The 18 separate Acts deriving from the State 
49 The Treasury, Commercial Performance of State-Owned Enterprises: Principles for Shareholder Monitoring. (Wellington, 1987). Infra ill.C (Company Law) about the Shareholder monitoring regime. 
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Enterprises Restructuring Bill are relevant here.SO To the extent that officials are 
involved in the administration of these regimes, ministers arc responsible for them. 
(c) Collective Responsibility 
There are few SOE-specific implications of collective responsibility. Cabinet may 
involve itself in the development and extension of the SOE programme if it wishes. The 
present Cabinet does so wish. This is evidenced by the post election creation of one of 
the nine standing cabinet committees as the State Owned Enterprises Committee, to meet 
every week. Its terms of reference are:51 
(i) to plan and co-ordinate SOE policies which ensure they operate in the national interest but with the maximum possible commercial independ-ence and competitive neutrality; 
(ii) to review SOE legislation and regulations; 
(iii) to examine public investment in particular SOEs; 
(iv) to review state departments and agencies as candidates to become SOEs; 
(v) to consider employment in SOEs; and 
(vi) to approve appointment to Boards. 
4. Incentives 
As explained, the agency costs of the electorate - minister relationship are 
controlled by appointing Parliament as a monitor. Ministerial responsibility provides the 
substantial reporting requirement: ministers must answer to Parliament according to the 
procedure adopted by Parliament. The sanction for breaking the convention is political 
cost The information that may be disclosed by ministerial responsibility may also 
result in political costs. The potential for disclosure provides an incentive for ministers 
to take into account the political costs of their actions. Resignation is at the extreme end 
of the cost spectrum and is often regarded as inherently important to the concept of 
ministerial responsibility. It is but one, albeit important, cost which underlies ministers' 
incentives. 
50 
51 
Supra, p. 8 (The Great Experiment). 
According to a Cabinet Office statemenL The portfolios included in this sector are existing SOEs and: Broadcasting; Government Computing Service; Government Life Insurance Corporation; Government Printing Office; Public Trust Office; Rural Banking and Finance Corporation; and State Insurance Office. 
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The content of the incentives is beyond the scope of this paper to describe as it is 
the subject of an entire discipline in itself: political science. The present political climate 
surrounding SOEs is fractious . The government is politically committed to their 
success as businesses and the programme to achieve that success involves principles 
such as competitive neutrality, transparency and removal of ministers of day to day 
management The exercise by ministers of their responsibility in relation to S0Es will, 
in the current political climate, be influenced by these. 
The responsibilities that are the subject of the above influences on the 
shareholding ministers are, as also discussed above, twofold. Certain management 
functions are reserved for shareholders but most are allocated by the articles to the 
directors. The SOEs Act enables any sort of shareholder monitoring regime to be 
instituted in addition to the minimum statutory requirements. Again the political climate 
influences the choice of shareholder monitoring regime. The current climate and 
situation militates against close scrutiny of board decisions though the political 
advantage to be gained from such scrutiny could change rapidly . Shareholding 
ministers' involvement in both management and monitoring can be changed at little cost 
and will be changed if the political incentives are strong enough. Perceptions of success 
of the current regime would raise the costs of change. However, a set of conscious 
policy decisions at any time, by any Governmen4 would achieve change. This ability 
exists because the degree of closeness of the shareholder - director relationship derives 
from the articles and administrative regime rather than being explicitly written into the 
legislation. 
The ministers responsible for areas subject to section 7 transparency agreement 
are also subject to the influences of ministerial responsibility . The politically high 
profile the SOE experiment has had ensures that the Cabinet as a whole will continue to 
be interested in the development and extension of the programme. A serious issue of 
SOE failure would also involve Cabinet. In these ways collective responsibility 
influences are also relevant 
From the above it is obvious that the political climate determines the effectiveness 
of ministerial responsibility. It is perceptions of political cos4 as sanctions, that provide 
the motive force behind the efficacy of the convention in requiring ministerial 
answerability to Parliament Political incentives also influence the scope of ministerial 
responsibility in relation to SOEs through the articles on management and the shape of 
the monitoring regime. 
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1. Parliament and Economics 
A wide reading of the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty would ascribe to 
Parliament an almost unlimited potential to exercise control over all SOE related 
activities. Parliamentary procedures adopted from time to time translate that potential 
into a particular shape. In so doing, the potential is channelled, bridled; in the short 
term. Constitutional conventions influence practice and other, less definable, traditions 
contribute to the ambience. All is set in the context of political interest and incentives. 
Parliament may have direct influence over ministers, officials and SOEs 
themselves. As seen in Part ill.A, Parliament is integrally connected with the exercise 
of ministerial responsibility. It is the body to which ministers are responsible and its 1: 
procedures determine how a minister is to answer. This relationship provides a clue as 
to the wider role of Parliament which can be seen in economic terms. For the purposes 
of the paper Parliament consists of the democratically elected representatives of the 
electorate. When an election is held two simultaneous decisions are being made. The 
electorate is choosing a party to govern as its agents. This obviously economises on the 
transaction costs inherent in a perfect democracy. Simultaneously it is choosing an 
opposition party53 to monitor and scrutinise those agents - reducing agency costs. 
Parliament is the formal forum where that monitoring and scrutiny takes place. The 
mechanisms of Parliamentary scrutiny are the mechanisms by which the behaviour of 
the electorate's agents is influenced and misbehaviour deterred. 
There are four mechanisms of Parliamentary scrutiny that are particularly 
significant to SOEs: questions; debates; select committees; and information disclosure. 
The above analysis is relevant to all. The rest of this part analyses, for each mechanism 
in turn, the mechanics that relate to SOEs and the influence it has on the incentives and 
behaviour of the actors involved. 
52 
53 
See very generally Peter Wilenski Public Power and Public Administration (Hale & Iremonger and the RAIPA, Sydney, 1986). More particularly: Keith Jackson, The Dilemma of Parliament (Allen & Unwin with Port Nicholson Press, Wellington 1987), though a conventional approach is taken. 
The division is not as clear cut as this. Monitoring and scrutiny of decisions occurs within the governing party as well. 
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2. Qutstions 
Questions asked by members of Parliament and answered by ministers of the 
Crown constitute an obvious form of Parliamentary scrutiny and an important clement 
of effecting ministerial responsibility. Questions can be, and have been used as, a direct 
way to hold the shareholders of SOEs to account over a specific matter and/or elicit 
information about SOEs. They can be used as potent weapons in the political process 
though their use is curtailed by certain limitations. 
(a) Mechanics 
There are now four forms of questions: Questions of the Day; questions for oral 
answer; questions for written answer; and urgent questions. Questions of the Day, 
introduced in 1985, are asked and answered (before other questions) on the same 
day. 54 They provide a means of pursuing highly topical lines of inquiry. Other 
questions for oral answer are answered orally in the House on two days notice.55 In 
addition, supplementary questions may be asked by any member to "elucidate or clarify 
a matter raised in a question or in an answer" .56 Political campaigns on specific issues 
may be usefully pursued by either side using the mechanism of oral questions. 
Questions for written answer (answered within three sitting days of notice)57 are used 
primarily as information (or commitment) gathering mechanisms. Urgent Questions 
may be asked without notice on the ground of urgency in the public interest (which is 
assessed by the Speak:er).58 All questions are printed in Hansard.59 
The effectiveness of questions as a tool of scrutiny is limited in three main ways: 
the time available for answering; the subject matter; and the necessity to answer. 
(i) ~ 
Each sitting day the first six Questions of the Day are asked and answered (with 
supplementaries) first, for up to 15 minutes.60 Questions for oral answer by ministers 
are next, followed by urgent questions and then questions for oral answer by other 
members. 61 Questions to ministers may not be asked after 45 minutes have been spent 
on oral questions and any remaining questions are answered in writing by 5.30 p.m. 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
Standing Order 80(1). All Standing Orders quoted are from Standing Orders of the House of 
Representatives, New 2.ealand, as at 20 November 1986. 
Standing Order 78. 
Standing Order 85. 
Standing Orders 79 and 88. 
Standing Order 87. 
Oral questions inherently, and written questions by virtue of S.O. 88(1). 
Standing Order 80(3),(4). 
Standing Order 75(3). 
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that day.62 Dealing with remaining questions in this way is a common practice, but 
depends on the number of questions, particularly supplementary questions, and Points 
of Order, that arc asked or made. 
(ii) Subject Matter 
Standing Order 74 requires that questions to ministers must "[relate] to public 
affairs with which the Minister is officially connected. or to proceedings in the House or 
any matter of administration for which the Minister is responsible." Implications of 
this for SOEs depend on the scope of responsibility as discussed in Part ill.A. Day to 
day SOE management matters are not the responsibility of the shareholding ministers. 
They may legitimately refuse to answer questions on those matters. The degree to 
which a minister is prepared to acknowledge responsibility over certain matters will help 
determine the effective scope of responsibility. The practice in relation to questions 
about the management of SOEs is not yet clear but it is developing rapidly .63 
Sometimes ministers invoke a justification for not answering.64 Various formulae 
have been used: the information will be available in the annual report which is not yet 
ready for publication;65 "I am told by the corporation that the information is 
commercially sensitive and cannot be released" ;66 "the information sought is of a 
commercial nature and confidential to the corporation. I suggest the member approach 
the corporation direct.";67 "I have been told by the corporation that as .. . the question 
is irrelevant."68 Sometimes ministers pass on advice from the SOE that answers the 
question e.g. "I am advised by the corporation"69 or "the corporation has told me" .7° 
Sometimes ministers answer the question directly, but usually in answer to a 
supplementary oral question or where the minister is directly responsible for a matter 
that impinges on SOEs. 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
Standing Orders 81(2) and 86 
"SOEs' Accountability to Parliament" (1987) 10 T.C.L. 16 (431). 
Examples of questions are taken from all the kinds of question from the last three weeks of the 
Parliamentary term before the 1987 General Election. 
N. Z. Parliamentary Debates, Vol.482, 1987; 10,217. 
N. Z. Parliamentary Debates, Vol.482, 1987; 10,385. 
N. Z. Parliamentary Debates, Vol.482, 1987; 10,380. 
N. Z. Parliamentary Debates, Vol.482, 1987; 10,368. 
E.g. N. Z. Parliamentary Debates, Vol.482, 1987; 10,210. 
N. Z. Parliamentary Debates, Vol.482, 1987; l 0, 131. 
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The Deputy Prime Minister, in himself answering a written question, has stated:71 
"Responsibilty for the day to day operations of each corporation, 
however, will lie with management. Ministers will therefore consult the 
corporation concerned before providing answers to questions 
concerning its commercial activities. The decision whether to disclose 
information relating to its commercial approach is one for each 
corporation to make according to its own circumstances." 
The practice so far shows an large number of questions asked about SOEs, many 
of them written question eliciting information, often as part of a series on the same 
issue.72 The range of issues canvassed is very wide. Most encouraging of all, most 
questions are answered unless the excuse sounds reasonable. It seems here that the 
political cost of not answering questions even with a reasonable justification is too high. 
The number of (subjectively) unreasonable excuses is relatively low, though they 
certainly exist. A reading of Parliamentary questions can shed significant light on the 
operation of SOEs and, indeed, was helpful in the writing of this paper. 
(iii) Necessity to Answer 
Interrelated with the issue of which questions may be asked is the sanction for not 
answering. There is no formal requirement that any question be answered, though there 
are few blatant refusals to answer. This suggests that there is a perceived political cost 
to not answering questions. A reasonable excuse must lessen this cost. The scope of 
ministerial responsibility for S0Es discussed above (as defined by the minister) may be 
used as such a justification though that doesn't appear to be the case. Also, the 
increased emphasis on profitability of SOEs in a competitive arena increases the 
justification of refusing to answer on the ground of commercial sensitivity. 
(b) Incentives 
Examining the incentives provided by the mechanism of questions in their 
practical context emphasises potential results. Such an ex ante view leads to a greater 
appreciation of the value of questions than might otherwise exist 
The opposition and the government face political incentives to project 
advantageous images of themselves and disadvantageous images of each other. 
Parliamentary question time provides a public forum in which the opposition can mount 
71 
72 
N. Z. Parliamentary Debates, Vol.482, 1987; 10,634. 
See particularly the written questions of the Hon. G.F. Gair. 
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concerted campaigns aimed at undermining ministers' credibility on issues of the 
moment Such campaigns can be effective - the February 1987 off er of resignation by 
the Hon. Koro Wetere is an example. Ministers arc effectively forced to answer (given 
a perception of high political costs of refusing) on a subject picked by political 
opponents. Also, of course, the government has an incentive to ask questions aimed at 
bolstering their minister's image. 
Toe incentives that all this provides are significant A shareholding minister will 
be aware that an action taken with respect to an SOE could become the subject of public 
scrutiny by questions which the media could pick up. A political cost could occur if the 
minister is revealed to have acted improperly or unwisely. Such actions will therefore 
be avoided to the extent that: (a) the minister thinks about the consequences; (b) 
revelation is judged to be likely; and (c) the cost is perceived to be too great. A political 
benefit could accrue to the minister if good news is revealed, though there are other 
media available for such a message. 
Is revelation likely? There are incentives on ministers to avoid revelation. The 
time limits to question time are not significant except to the extent that Parliament does 
not sit. The perceived political cost to ministers of refusing to answer without a 
reasonable (sounding) excuse is relevant. So are the options of a minister in choosing 
the form of answer given. Again, the extent of these limitations will be determined by 
the interplay of political incentives. Perceptions of short term political problems of 
answering awkward questions will be balanced against potential opposition charges of 
non-accountability in specific and general contexts. It appears that in practice the 
outcome is a balanced one and that the incentives to conceal are not dominant. It is also 
evident that many questions are aimed at eliciting information that may be relevant in 
future political battles. Finally, it should be realised that unpredictability is a hallmark 
of issues that arise in Parliament A minister cannot rely on any subject not being aired. 
Parliamentary questions, then, do not constitute a calm, coherent, constructive 
method of exploring SOE issues with a view to improvement. They do provide an 
incentive for shareholding ministers to act wisely and properly in relation to matters for 
which they are responsible. This is their main value. The incentives provided are, of 
course, always dependent on perceptions of political cost and benefit The political 
climate underpins the efficacy of all mechanisms of Parliamentary scutiny. 
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3. Dtbatts 
(a) Mechanics 
(i) llilli 
Debates on bills occur on: introduction; report back from a select committee; the 
second reading; Committee stages; and the third reading. Introductory debate usually 
involves identification of issues by each side of the House and is limited to two hours. 
It is the second reading that provides the most comprehensive debate. Speeches are 20 
minutes each.73 Debate tends to be wide ranging and especially concerns policy. After 
the second reading a bill is committed to a Committee of the Whole House for more 
detailed consideration clause by clause and most amendments in the Chamber occur 
here. Unlike other proceedings of the House, committtee debates are not reported in 
Hansard. The purpose of the third reading debate is usually to record amendments 
made in Committee and restate each side's arguments for or against the bill. 
Occasionally, a Government Bill will refer to SOEs directly or indirectly. An 
example was the recent State Enterprises Restructuring Bill. 74 The passage of such a 
Bill renews, to varying degrees, the opportunity for Parliament to consider the role, 
status and functioning of SOEs. Of course, for there to be scope to examine the 
functioning of SOEs a bill must directly impinge on SOEs. 
The Budgetary Process offers some help in holding SOEs to account; but not 
much. The Imprest Supply Bill may be passed in one day. The annual Appropriation 
Bill, along with the Estimates of expenditure, may impinge on SOE as debate is very 
wide ranging. Pressure of time and wide potential subject matter constrain and diffuse 
the effect. The Estimates debate lasts for thirteen days and scrutiny could be devoted to 
any vote as the opposition has the initiative in use of time. The competition between 
political issues for attention crowds out many potentially useful topics. Also, as limited 
liability companies, only certain estimates will be relevant to SOEs: Vote, Capital 
Participation for loan and equity capital injections; the estimates of any monitoring 
department; and the estimates of any body that has negotiated a section 7 transparent 
social service with an SOE. In addition, the timing of the whole process raises major 
questions. The financial year begins on 1 April. The Budget is not usually introduced 
for that year until June or July . The money that Parliament is supposedly deciding 
whether or not to spend has of ten already been spent. 
73 
74 
Standing Orders 212 - 214. 
Supra p 8. 
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Private Members' Bills arc another vehicle for Parliamentary scrutiny of SOEs. 
Indeed, an Opposition member introduced a State-Owned Enterprises Amendment Bill 
' in 1987 in order to debate issues of concern regarding SOEs.75 The fate of Private 
Members' Bills which arc opposed by the Government is usually a quick death - they 
do not get introduced. However the introductory debate lasts for up to two hours, with 
mainly 10 minute spceches76 and docs provide some opportunity for points to be made 
about a particular subject Sometimes it will be politically difficult for the Government 
to oppose a bill and its fate may be a more lingering death in a select committee. Of 
course the opportunity to introduce a Private Members' Bill is also the subject of 
competition between all potential issues. As always, there must be a perceived political 
return from debate on SOEs (to at least one member) for this method of scrutiny to be 
relevant 
(ii) Miscellaneous Debates 
There are four miscellaneous debates that take place in Parliament in which 
SOEs could be mentioned. The Address in Reply debate is wide ranging in scope, 
replying to the Speech from the 'Throne which opens Parliament 77 
Once each sitting day, it is possible for a "debate on a definite matter of urgent 
public importance" to occur for two hours. The Speaker must be of the opinion that the 
matter concerns "a particular case of recent occurence which requires the immediate 
attention of the House and the Government and which involves the administrative or 
ministerial responsibility of the Government".78 Arguments could here be canvassed 
over a particular issue that flares up in relation to SOEs. 
Finally, on each Wednesday, a general debate is held for two hours. During the 
debate members may refer to "any private members' notices of motion, any select 
committee reports .. presented during the session and any Government responses to 
such reports, and any ministerial replies to questions given or ministerial statements 
made within the previous week."79 In a more general way than the urgent debate, this 
provides a useful opportunity to air matters of importance, but again is limited by the 
competition between subjects to be considered. 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
N.Z. Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 479, 1987; p.8233. 
Standing Order 203. 
This was traditionally an expression of loyalty to the Crown: David McGee, Parliamentary 
Practice in New Zealand, {Government Printer, Wellington, 1985). 
Standing Order 89 
Standing Order 92. 
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{b) Incentives 
There arc major limitations on the impact of debates which have frequently been 
lamented by commentators.80 With a perpetually tight Parliamentary timetable, many 
topics are available for debate. Coherent analysis and policy recommendations are 
lacking. Occasionally an eloquent, reasoned speech can have an effcct.81 Generally, 
however, the House is a forum for two sides to put pre-determined arguments past each 
other to the general public. Policy stances arc decided in caucuses within each party and 
few positive initiatives seem to come from the Chamber. The often highly charged 
atmosphere of the Chamber does not lend itself to constructive debate. Political 
incentives concern each side with strategies of attack and defence, embarrassment and 
victory. 
With such observations critics rest their charge of undue and deleterious 
politicisation of a scrutiny process. Yet from an ex ante perspective, useful incentives 
can be identified in the above account. The utility lies again not in the constructive 
effect of debate but in the deterrent effect. Parliamentary debate is a mechanism by 
which political cost, to the Government generally or a minister specifically, can be 
amplified. The government faces an incentive to formulate systems and structures 
which minimise the potential for errors and therefore embarrassment. With an issue at 
hand, a shareholding minister's performance may be criticised in the House, specifically 
or generally. A sustained attack in Parliamentary debates can generate significant 
political heat - cost - if mounted with good grounds. Ministers face incentives to avoid 
actions or omissions that could attract such damaging criticism. And MPs of the 
governing party face incentives to aid that avoidance. Again, these incentives are 
mitigated by the actors' perceptions of the likelihood of discovery and of sustained 
attack. It could be expected that larger policy issues are more likely to attract attention 
than lesser administrative decisions. This provides a justification for a key element of 
the SOE accountability structure: viz. , the accentuation of ministerial responsibility for, 
and thus Parliamentary scrutiny of, policy decisions rather than operational decisions. 
80 
81 
E.g. Sandra J. Davies, "Parliamentary Accountability of Government-Owned Corporations and 
Companies· (1986) 9 Public Sector 3. 
Palmer, supra n.2, 137. 
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4. Select Committees 
MPs often feel that working on select committees is one of their most important 
functions. Parliament's select committee system was reformed in 1985 with changes to 
Standing Orders. They now possess significant powers to initiate and follow through 
inquiries in addition to their conventional role of hearing submissions on bills bcf orc the 
House. While the powers are an improvement, it is not apparent that select committees 
are yet an optimal accountabilty mechanism. 
(a) Mechanics 
The new select committees are comprised generally of five members with a 
Government majority of 3-2. Ministers do not now sit on committees concerned with 
their portfolios. With one exception committees have a Government chairperson though 
there is scope for more. 82 Each side will usually still be guided by the party line, 
though much less so than in the House. Often a committee can develop a genuinely bi-
partisan atmosphere, though this always depends on the issues under discussion .. 
Personalities will, of course, also be relevant. Most committees are based around 
ministerial portfolios though others may be set up as need arises. 83 Proceedings are 
public unless otherwise decided Table 3 on page 32 sets out the select committees. 
A major role of select committees is to consider legislation introduced to the 
House. Procedure in this regard is well developed in the hearing of submissions. 
Major changes in the policy of a government bill are still usually with notice to and 
consent from the relevant minister are still rare. But changes can be and are made to 
bills in select committees, by the committee members alone. Select committees off er an 
opportunity for more considered reflection on SOEs. 
The new investigatory powers of select committees are potentially more relevant 
to SOEs. Their introduction follows the perceived success of use made of similar 
powers by the Public Expenditure Committee. Select committees have the power to:84 
82 
83 
84 
(a) send for persons, papers and records; 
(b) request any person to attend and give evidence; 
(c) summon any person as a witness to attend and give evidence, 
and produce papers and records in that person's possession, 
custody or control; and 
(d) on the direction of the House, examine witnesses on oath. 
Standing Order 318. The one exception was D.L. Kidd who chaired the Regulations Review 
Committee during the last Parliamentary session. 
Standing Order 317. 
Standing Orders 326, 358 and 360. 
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Sanctions exist for failure to comply. The ultimate sanction is being held in 
contempt of Parliament before the Privileges Committee. 
The terms of reference for each portfolio committee generally includes:85 "to 
examine the policy, administration and expenditure of departments and associated non-
departmental government bodies related to .. ". This phrase covers SOEs. 86 It seems, 
though, that no standing allocation of SOEs to particular committees has been arranged. 
If an investigation were to be initiated it is likely that a new SOE would be allocated to 
the committee which has responsibility for the department from which the SOE was 
created Table 3 presents a likely allocation. 
TABLE 3: SELECT COMMITTEES AND SOEs 87 
Select Committee 
Based on portfolio: 
Commerce and Marketing 
Communications and Road Safety 
Education and Science 
Finance and Expenditure 
Foreign Affairs and Defence 
Government Administration 
Internal Affairs and Local Government 
Justice and Law Reform 
Labour 
Maori Affairs 
Planning and Development 
Primary Production 
Social Services. 
Tourist Hotel Corporation of N .Z. 
Air New Zealand Ltd. 
Airways Corporation of N .Z. 
N.Z. Post Ltd. 
N .Z. Railways Corporation 
The Shipping Corporation of N .Z. 
Telecom Corporation of N.Z. 
Post Office Bank Ltd. 
Government Property Services Ltd. 
Electricity Corporation of N .Z. Ltd. 
Coal Corporation of N .Z. Ltd. 
N .Z. Forestry Corporation Ltd. 
Land Corporation Ltd. 
85 
86 
87 
Standing Order 322. The reference to policy is a significant development. 
It is intended to cover, and is interpreted by select committee officers to cover, SOEs. 
Standing Orders 322, 317. 
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TABLE J CTD: SELECT COMMITTEES AND SOEI 
Others 
33 
Business Allocation of SOE to committee? 
Electoral Law 
Privileges 
Regulations Review 
Standing Orders 
Also, the Finance and Expenditure Committee has "responsibility for the overall 
review of financial management in all government departments and other public 
bodies". The Government Administration Committee has "responsibility for the overall 
review of administration and management in government departments and other 
government bodies". Nomenclature is anything but consistent but there is little doubt 
on the part of those involved that these responsibilities include the relevant aspects of all 
SOEs. 88 In any case a challenge is difficult to mount to select committee jurisdiction89 
and even if it were successful jurisdiction could easily be granted by the House anyway 
if political incentives so dictated. 
The scope for investigation is wide. A committee may attend to detail or be 
concerned with broad principle. Almost every aspect of SOEs could be investigated: in 
relation to the minister; the SOE directors; or management directly. In a report to the 
House, anything could be recommended in detail or in principle. A one hour debate 
may occur on a motion to table a report on a bill. A new standing order now provides 
that within 90 days of a report other than this being tabled "the Government shall 
present a paper to the House responding to any recommendations contained in the report 
which are addressed to it "90 
A number of reports have been delivered under the new terms of reference. 
Committees seem still to be in the process of flexing their muscles but have already 
indicated a willingness to scrutinise SOEs to some extent. The Regulations Review 
Committee is keeping a watching brief over SOEs and was responsible for section 32( 4) 
of the SOEs Act 
88 
89 
90 
The most recent detailed consideration of select committees' terms of reference is found in: 
Public Expenditure Committee: Report on Inquiry into Devaluation, New Zealand Parliament. 
House of Representative. Appendix to the Journals, Vo) 12, l.12C. 
Ibid. The Speaker says, in relation to more constrained terms of reference: "I would not wish to 
see such sweeping challenges to a select committee's jurisdiction being made again." 
Standing Order 352. 
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Deficiencies still seem to exist in the functioning of the new committees. Pressure 
of other work weighs heavily on MPs' time and often prevents regular attendance. 
Membership of committees turns over frequently, in response to other pressures. 
Pressure of work in each committee, with bills passing endlessly through the House, 
crowds out detailed investigation of other longer term issues. Resources in the form of 
servicing research officers have been increased but there is still a major resource gap 
between an organisation being investigated and the investigating committee. It should 
be noted though that a select committee could expect substantial assistance from the 
Auditor-General and staff of the Audit Office. But an SOE has many permanent staff 
working on its concerns fulltime. A select committee has few staff working part time 
on one of a great variety of issues. Knowledge, time, skills, and experience are on the 
side of an SOE. 
(b) Incentives 
The Standing Orders Committee's first objective in restructuring the select 
committees was "to provide Parliament with the means of scrutinising the activities of 
the Government and its departments on a continuing and systematic basis, for the 
purpose of increased accountability ."91 Indeed the select committee could potentially 
exercise more coherent and comprehensive scrutiny over SOEs than could be achieved 
by any other method. In practice, particular matters of SOE administration may be 
investigated and/or commented on. An issue may be identified, pursued, analysed and 
recommendations made. The physical constraints on use of select committees are 
significant and reduce effectiveness. 
Lack of time and resources and the membership problems prevent fulfillment of 
select committee potential. The apparently high opportunity cost of MPs' time indicates 
that a solution may be found in increasing numbers of MPs as well as resources. And 
while the usual political incentives still operate, the implications of a government 
majority on a committee may stymie their effect in inducing investigations. Members of 
the governing party may have an interest in checking maladministration. In a select 
committee, unlike in the Chamber, that work may be successfully undertaken. 
However there is also a strong incentive not to allow attacks that will reflect on the 
Government's credibility . Also unlike in the Chamber those incentives may prevent 
even the exposure of the issues in the committee. This reflects the difference in thes 
role of the debating chamber and select committee. 
91 S1anding Orders Commiuee: First Report July 1985 Parliament. House of Representatives. 
Appendix to the Journals, vol. 12, 1.14: 31. 
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S. Disclosure of lnf onn/Jlion 
(a) Mechanics 
According to the Controller and Auditor-General, the essence of accountability is 
inforrnation.92 The perspective of accountability taken by this paper is most concerned 
with incentives, influences on behaviour. Yet the provision of adequate information is a 
necessary condition of this accountability too. The possession or lack of information 
has determinative effects on the behaviour of actors in the SOE process. Information 
costs lie at the very heart of the agency problem which is encountered so frequently in 
the SOE context. There arc several sources of authority requiring disclosure of SOE 
related inforrnation.93 Parliamentary disclosure may be significant. 
(i) Methods of Disclosure 
Information may become publicly available through being unearthed by the 
methods described earlier: through Questions; Parliamentary debates; and select 
committees; also by notices of motion and like devices. In addition there is a "purer" 
form of provision of infomation: for example, the presenting or tabling of papers in the 
House. Given the leave of the House any member may table a document.94 A Minister 
may present a "paper" to the House. In debate, if a Minister quotes from "a document 
relating to public affairs" any member may require it to be laid upon the Table of the 
House, unless it is stated to be of a confidential nature. A Minister may also provide 
information directly to the House by way of Ministerial statement in relation to "some 
matter of significant public importance which requires to be brought to the House's 
attention immediately" .95 Certain restrictions exist on Ministerial Statements in relation 
to time, subject matter and right of reply by the Opposition. Another means of 
information being disclosed to Parliament is by order of the House itself.96 This 
procedure is little used. 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
Auditor-General's Report 1984 Parliament. House of Representatives. Appendices to the 
Journal, B.1 [Part Ill] p.28. 
E.g. from Company Law infra III.C (Company Law), shareholder monitoring supra p.19-20. 
(Ministerial Responsibilty), and from the Official Information Act, infra m.E (Other Elements). 
"With regard to the tabling of documents by private members .. the rule or practice has been 
that the tabling is by leave of the House. If there is objection the document cannot be tabled." 
Speakers' Rulings: 1867 to 1980 inclusive New Zealand. House of Representatives. 104n. 
(NZ. Parliamentary Debates Vol. 417, 1978; 811 (Harrison). 
Standing Orders 94, 160 and 170 respectively. 
A specific procedure for ordering papers (by a "motion for a return") was removed from Standing 
Orders in 1985 on grounds of little practical significance, but the same effect may now be 
achieved by ordinary motion. See Standing Ordus Committee: First Report July 1985 supra 
n.91, para 3.6.4.1. 
\ 
PARUAMENT 36 
Finally, an Act may provide that certain documents must be tabled in Parliament 
The provisions of the SOE Act 1986 that do this have been identified by the 
Government, and observers such as the Auditor-General, as a major component of the 
accountability structure of SOEs - especially the Statement of Corporate Intent (SCI).97 
Under the SOEs Act the documents presented in Table 4 must be laid before Parliament 
In each instance in Table 4, it is the responsible Minister who has the duty of laying the 
documents before Parliament. If this does not take place the primary sanction would be 
political, as with many of Parliament's rules, though an application for judicial review 
could also be made.98 
TABLE 4: DOCUMENTS THAT MUST BE LAID BEFORE 
PARLIAMENT 
Sef;;tiQD Document 
13(3) 
[13(1)) 
17(1) 
17(2) 
[14,15] 
17(3) 
[14(4)] 
17(4) 
(16) 
23(2) 
[23(1)) 
97 
98 
All notices of direction to boards of 
new SOEs by the shareholding Ministers 
regarding: (a) including or omitting 
matters from a statement of corporate 
intent; or (b) determining the amount of 
dividend payable. 
The rules and changes to the rules of 
each SOE. 
(a) The statement of corporate intent of 
each SOE for that year and the succeeding 
2 years; 
(b) the annual repon and audited 
financial statements for each SOE for the 
preceeding year; 
(c) the auditor's report on those 
financial statements. 
All notices to shareholding Ministers 
from boards of SOEs, modifying an SCI. 
receives the notice. 
The half-yearly reports of SOEs. 
being given to the Minister. 
Contracts or other documents between 
the shareholding ministers and SOEs 
regarding: (a) the transfer of Crown 
assets and liabilities to the SOE; 
(b) the authorisation of SOEs to act on 
behalf of the Crown in providing goods 
or services or managing assets or liabilities; 
(c) the granting of leases etc to SOEs in 
relation to Crown assets or liabilities. 
Palmer, supra n.2, 87. 
Infra Part ill.D (Judicial Review). 
When required 
12 sitting days after 
notice given to the 
board 
12 sitting days after 
the date of the rules. 
12 sitting days after 
the Minister 
receives all the 
documents. 
12 sitting days after 
the Minister 
12 sitting days after 
12 sitting days after 
the date of the 
document 
') 
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TABLE 4 CTD: DOCUMENTS THAT MUST BE LAID BEFORE PARLIAMENT 
NJt 
S.13 A notice may be given anytime. 
S.14 The SCI must be deleivered to the shareholding Ministers within 3 months of the 
commencement of the financial year. 
S. l .S Annual repon, financial statement. and audita's report must be delivered to the shareholding 
ministers within 3 months after the end of each financial year. 
S.16 half-yearly reports must be delivered to the shareholding ministers within 2 months after the 
end of the first half of each financial year. 
(ii) Content of Information 
The documents detailed in Table 4 are to be disclosed. The substantive 
documents are: the SCI; the annual report; accounts; auditor's report; half-yearly 
reports. Almost any information could be disclosed in these documents. What 
infonnation will be disclosed? There are some statutory requirements as to content and 
there are powers to require certain infonnation to be in the documents. As already seen, 
the shareholder monitoring regime may be set up on the basis of these sections. They 
are presented in Table 5. There is also a broad discretionary restriction on disclosure. 
According to section 20 nothing in the SOEs Act requires inclusion in any of these 
documents of information that could be withheld under the Official Information Act 
1982.99 
TABLE 5: REQUIRED AND DISCRETIONARY DISCLOSURE 
UNDER THE SOEs ACT 
Section Infonnation Reguired to be Disclosed 
StatemenJ of Corporate /ntenJ - sutwn 14 
(2) Specify for the Group (SOE & subsidiaries) for the current and next 2 
financial years: 
(a) Objectives 
(b) Nature and scope of activities. 
(c) Ratio of consolidated shareholders' funds to total assets, and definitions. 
TABLE 5: REQUIRED & DISCRETIONARY DISCLOSURE UNDER 
THE SOEs ACT 
(d) Accounting Policies 
(e) Pefoonance Targets 
(f} Estimate of intended distribution of profits and reserves to the Crown. 
(g) What information is to be provided to the Shareholding ministers. 
(h) Procedures for an SOE acquiring any company or other organisation 
(i) Activities for which the board seeks compensation. 
99 Supra Part ill.E (Other Elements). 
(j) 
(k) 
(4) 
13(l)(a) 
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Board's estimate of commercial valute of Crown's investment and manner of 
ieassessmenL 
Such other matters as are agreed by the Shareholding Ministers and the board. 
The SO may be modified by the board using the wne procedure as for the SCI 
proper. 
The shareholding ministers may direct inclusion in or omission from the SCI 
of any provision of a kind referred to in s.14(2)(a) to (h). 
AMual Rtport - uction 15 
(l)(a) A report of the operations of the SOE and subsidiaries. 
(2)(a) Such infonnation as is necessary to enable an informed assessment of the 
operations of the SOE and subsidiaries, including a comparison of the 
performance of theSOEs and subsidiaries with the SO. 
(2)(b) The dividend payable to the Crown for that year. 
Accounts - section 15 
(l)(b) Audited consolidated financial statements for the financial year consisting of: 
- statements of - financial position 
- profit and loss 
- changes in financial position 
- such other statements as may be necessary to show 
- the financial position of the SOE and subsidiaries 
- the financial results of their operations. 
Half-Ytarly Report - section 16 
(2) Such information as required by the SCI. 
Other Information - section 18 
(1) Such information relating to the affairs of the SOE (or subsidiary) as the 
shareholding ministers requests after consultation with the board. 
(except, under subs.(2) information about, and enabling the identification of, 
individual employees and customers. 
Due to the short period of commercial operation of the SOEs and problems with 
asset transfers, it is difficult to assess the form and level of detail that information 
actually disclosed under these sections will take. Importantly too, the sections allow 
much information to be disclosed, but the level of detail necessary to satisfy the broad 
statutory requirements is subject to interpretation. Shareholding ministers have a broad 
power to require disclosure, to themselves under section 18 and to Parliament under 
section 13(l)(a). The sections make some attempt to specify the content of the 
documents but even these may be interpreted to require many degrees of specificity. A 
broad standard of the effect of the information that must be attained is present only in 
relation to the annual report. The degree to which it is invoked remains to be seen. The 
content of information disclosed generally appears to depend on the incentives of the 
actors as analysed below. 
Statements of Corporate Intent: 
The Statements of Corporate Intent are available, though access is dependent on 
Parliamentary photocopying or the goodwill of an SOE. To help gauge the likely 
\ 
' 
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information outcome of the process of disclosure, a brief analysis of the SCis that have 
been presented to Parliament is undertaken here. The SCls for the nine new S0Es vary 
in length from 3 to 7 pages plus annexes. They arc structured according to the 
paragraphs of section 14. All arc specific to that SOE. For many, elements of the 
required information are absent due to the incomplete status of assets valuations and 
other establishment actions. 
The statements of SOE objectives expand on the section 4 objective of running a 
successful business and place that in the context of the enterprise-specific activities. 
Two SOEs provide extremely brief and general statements100 but the others give a 
reasonable indication of the priorities and directions of management. At least three 
detail both general purposes and objectives and supplementary and specific objectives, 
or strategies, in relation to more detailed areas of operation. lOl The specifications of 
nature and scope of activities are also broad but most102 detail significant specific areas 
of current activity and the proposed future moves in them. 
No SCI details the capital structure of the company or the value of the Crown's 
investment due to incomplete asset valuation negotiations, though some indicate the 
types of capital or projected ratio.103 These will be the subject of modified SCis. The 
accounting policies are presented in varying amounts of detail - all but one SOE 
presented in an annex.1 04 Most refer to "generally accepted methods of accounting" 
and the New Zealand Society of Accountants' standards - in so far as they are 
applicable. Historical cost accounting and an accruals basis is adopted, with provision 
for asset revaluation periodically. Depreciation rates of certain items are set out in some 
statements. The balance dates, where provided, differ: either 31 March or 30 June. 105 
Performance targets are mainly unspecified as yet, though some types of 
indicators are specified, such as: after tax and other types of "profit" on shareholders' 
funds; ratios of profit to other corJX>rate indicators; output; accident rates. Telecom also 
pays attention to some non-financial indicators such as time taken to provide services; 
time taken to rectify faults; and service answering times. Dividend policy is specified, 
on an interim basis, in terms of procedure for determination, timing and broad goals. 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
Post Office Bank Ltd. and New 2.ealand Post Ltd. 
Airways Corporation of New Zealand Ltd., about pricing; safety; modernisation; industry study; 
and information to shareholders. Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd., about profit; 
pricing; financial management; investment; operations. Also, Coal Corporation. 
Electricorp's statement is two sentences. 
Post Office Bank Ltd. deliberately refers to gearing rather than the proprietorship ratio. 
Post Office Bank Ltd. has not formulated policies. 
31 March: Forest Corp; Electricorp; 30 June: Landcorp 
PARUAMENT 40 
Generally, "an appropriate level of earnings for profitable investment" is to be retained. 
Post Office Bank Ltd. anticipates no dividends in the next three years. Coal 
Corporation and New Zealand Post Ltd. flag the rate of 40% on after-tax earnings. 
The procedures for SOEs taking over other companies have obviously been co-
ordinated between the SOEs. With the exception of Electricorp106 prior written notice 
will be given to the shareholders of an intention to acquire more than 20% of a 
company's issued capital. 107 Compensation for the cost of various activities is sought 
from the Crown according to Table 6 below. 
The information flows to be provided by SO Es vary significantly. Most use the 
other SOE Act disclosure requirements as a basis. Some move little further beyond 
this. 108 Others anticipate section 18 requests. Some refer to private sector practice with 
a major shareholder as the relevant standard. Otherwise there is variation in the types 
and detail of information specified. 
Similarly the overall impression of the content of the SCis is that there is much 
discretion as to what to disclose. Degree of disclosure varies from SOE to SOE. Most 
have more than required in some areas and the bare minimum in others. The 
information required gives some idea of the general character and directions of an SOE 
and of aspects of its operations. Detail need not be and often are not disclosed. The 
SCI gives the flavour of an SOE, not the recipe. 
TABLE 6: REQUESTS FOR COMPENSATION FOR NON-
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES DISCLOSED BY SCis 
SQ& Activity 
New Zealand Post Ltd. 
Post Office Bank Ltd. 
Telecom 
Keeping open surplus Post Offices 
Universal letter delivery, if current legal 
protection is lifted. 
Rural mail deliveries 
Registered Publications 
Literature for the Blind 
Keeping open 600 Post Offices surplus to 
business requirements 
Telegraph services 
The 111 Emergency service 
106 Which specifies a similar requirement in relation to disposal of such shares. 
107 10% fer New Zealand Forestry Corporation. 
1 OS New Zealand Post Ltd., New 2.ealand Forestry Corporation Ltd. 
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TABLE 6: REQUESTS FOR COMPENSATION FOR NON-COMMERCIAL 
ACTIVITIES DISCLOSED BY SCh 
Landcorp South Island pastoral leases management 
Molesworth Station management planning 
Airways Corporation. Search and rescue 
Civil Defence 
(iii) Disclosure to Whom? 
An effect of information being before Parliament is that it is publicly available. 
For effective public availability however, it must also be printed and available for 
purchase. Printing of papers presented to the house by a Minister or the Speaker may 
be ordered, either by the Clerk at the time for presentation of papers, or on the motion 
of a Minister.109 Information imparted to the House during debate will be broadcast, 
recorded in Hansard and publicly available, though the Committee stage of a bill are not 
recorded in Hansard. 
Members of Parliament have limited supplies of all papers that are printed. 
Others are available from Government Bookshops throughout New Zealand. Of other 
papers, there is only one official copy, though copies may or may not be made available 
to each member by the Minister presenting it. For example the memorandum and 
articles of association tabled in the House may be photocopied if a a member of the 
public is interested. Copies may also be available from the SOE itself. Otherwise, if 
an SOE wants a document printed it is likely to be done commercially. 
(b) Incentives 
The disclosure of information by the SOEs Act has an enabling and facilitating 
role in engendering public debate. For instance its availability may enable the 
opposition to criticise decisions they may not otherwise have known of, on the basis of 
facts they may not othewise have known. Other pressure groups also benefit. This 
contributes to ministers' and boards' incentives to avoid actions that will represent a 
cost to them. 
The limitations on disclosure are important. First, the degree to which disclosed 
inf orrnation is useful depends on its circulation to relevant actors who can use it. The 
109 Under S.O. 93(2), in the Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives, or 
otherwise under S.O. 94. The printing process is supervised by the Speaker of the House under 
s.o. 95 
PARUAMENT 42 
shareholding ministers can be expected to have reasonable access to, and analysis of, 
disclosed information - through the shareholder monitoring regime, as discussed 
elsewhere. Parliamentarians generally receive the information but a high opportunity 
cost of time substantially discount the chances that full and careful analysis is 
undertaken. The public and media are dependent on these actors, but otherwise on the 
printing and distribution of the disclosed information - a matter by no means 
guaranteed. 
A second limitation is that the real contribution of Parliamentary disclosure 
requirements is their marginal effect This must be assessed against the inf onnation that 
would be disclosed any way, in response to other pressures. This will be assessed later 
in the paper. 
Third and finally, The scope and content of disclosure depends to a large part on 
the discretion of the boards and ministers. The overall incentives of the accountability 
structure affect this. Certainly there are incentives on boards and ministers to conceal 
information which could represent a cost, and reveal information from which they may 
benefit. There are also incentives not to conceal information where the concealment 
may be costly if discovered. The interplay of incentives from other parts of the paper 
will determine the outcome of this process. 
The experience of disclosure requirements for ordinary companies, as discussed 
in Part m.C, is not promising - due to incentives. The disclosure requirements of the 
S0Es Act are potentially greater than those of company law only in the requirement of 
the Statement of Corporate Intent and half yearly reports. Otherwise, the same accounts 
and reports are required, with the greater detail being required by the Companies Act. 
Even there the potential for creative accounting diminishes the value of the auditor's role 
and throws suspicion over the utility of audited information. 110 SOEs face an 
additional element that, because of incentives, promises more honesty. Section 19 of 
the SOEs Act appoints the Audit Office as auditor. As an Officer of Parliament the 
Controller and Auditor-General may be expected not to employ such dubious practices. 
There would be a high cost of being accused of such practices, and due to a statutorily 
entrenched position, little advantage in presenting accounts in the light desired by 
clients. This may improve the expected quality of information given under section 
15(1) paragraphs (b) and (c). 
110 Infra m.C (Company Law). 
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C. COMPANY LAW 
1. Introduction 
Ministerial responsibility and Parliamentary scrutiny influence the behaviour of 
SOEs. Yet it is the choice of the appropriate form of organisation as a model that 
shapes and defines the essence of the SOE accountability structure. Of all the many 
options available, 111 the model of the limited liability company has been preferred as the 
legal structure for S0Es. The structure determines the scope of ministerial 
responsibility. It provides an pre-existing system of monitoring and institutional 
relationships as a basis to which Parliament can add or subtract elements to meet the 
aims of SOEs. 
Company law played no part in the operation of departments. The incentives it 
now provides for SOEs were absent from the departmental model; at least in that form. 
In a broad sense, the comparison between the two structures is a simple one: company 
law provides a new set of incentives for SOEs. More specifically there are many 
aspects and principles of company law which must all be understood in the context of 
"market" pressures. Market activity is the reason that the company, as a structure, 
exists and is the reason that SOEs are formed as companies. Company Law governs the 
establishment and operation of limited liability companies. It regulates the functions, 
duties and powers of the various actors in the company structure. It sets a framework 
of incentives within which the relationships between these actors may develop, as 
influenced by incentives emanating from other sources. Every company has its own 
characteristics that may be developed within the framework of the company structure. 
In addition, company law does not apply to SOEs exactly as it does to ordinary 
companies. 112 
2. Law and Economics of New Zealand Companies 
Important general legal characteristics of a limited liability company include the 
following: it is a distinct legal entity; it may sue and be sued; liability is limited to the 
111 
112 
E.g. Douglas Fisher, "Legal Structures for State Enterprise", Purpose. Performance and Profit: 
Redefining the Public Sector, (Proceedings of the 1986 Convention of the New Zealand 
Institute of Public Administration) eds. Margaret Clark & Elizabeth Sinclair, (Government 
Printing Office, Wellington, 1986) 124. 
This paper uses the terminology "ordinary companies" to distinguish from SOEs. The paradigm 
ordinary company considered in this paper is a public, listed company comparable to the SOEs. 
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company alone; 113 it has perpetual succession; and it may own property. Consider the 
actors involved in the operation of a typical ordinary company. The company is owned 
by shareholders. As owners they may receive residual profit. The shareholders 
collectively appoint a board of directors to manage the operations of the company. A 
general manager or managing director may oversee the employment of people to carry 
out the company's activities. The product will be sold by contract to buyers and the 
company will contract with sellers to buy inputs. To finance activities funds from the 
equity securities of the owners may be used, as may debt securities, such as debentures, 
issued for a promise to repay principal and interest and perhaps some security. 
Unsecured credit may be advanced by trade creditors or finance houses. 
(a) Economics 
There is a significant amount of literature that applies economics to companies. 
This now permeates explanations of company lawl 14 and the insights presented here are 
conventional. As outlined in Part II.A economic analysis provides explains the very 
reasons that companies exist. Transaction costs provide incentives for the formation of 
organisational alternatives to markets. Agency costs, however, may result from the 
organisational form. The interests of the owners are (generally) to maximise their 
receipt of dividends from the company, and thus company profits, over a particular time 
period. The interests of directors may diverge from this. A shareholder, especially a 
minority shareholder, could face significant costs in monitoring and deterring such 
behaviour. Of course, shareholders have an incentive to minimise agency costs to the 
extent that they perceive a gain from doing so. More recent economic analysis has 
recognised that methods of economising on agency costs are available through market 
activities. They include: 115 
(i) the debt and equity markets, encouraging financial analysis of management 
performance; 
(ii) the transferability of control through shares, encouraging analysis of potential 
gains of a takeover and encouraging director avoidance of job loss; 
(iii) the availability of agency cost monitoring provisions in a debt contract, 
encouraging creditor monitoring of management perfonnance; 
113 
114 
115 
For economic analysis of limited liability see: F.H. Easterbrook & Fischel, "Limited Liability 
and the Ccrporation" (1985) University of Chicago Law Review 89. 
E.g. Farrar and Russell, infra n.116 
For a good. relevant review of the operation of mmket methods: Stephen Jennings, "State Owned 
Enterprise Agency Issues" Paper presented to the Institute of Policy Studies Conference on 
"Corporatisation and Privatisation: Completing the Revolution?" Wellington, 3 September, 
1987, 5-15; and Stephen Jennings & Rob Cameron "State Owned Enterprise Reform in New 
2.ealand" in Economic Liberalisation ill New Zealand, eds., Alan Bollard & Bob Buckle, (Allen 
& Unwin, Wellington, 1987 - forthcoming). 
'>: 
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(iv) the market for managerial labour, encouraging investment in managerial 
reputation; 
(v) the operations by directors in boards, encouraging inter director monitoring; 
and 
(vi) the availability of performance based remuneration of directors. 
(b) Company Law - general principles 
Company law derives primarily from cases, the Companies Act 1955 and the 
Securities Act 1978 together with regulations.116 Much company law can also be 
viewed as regulating the relationships between shareholders and directors in a company. 
It economises on agency costs by providing incentives for directors to follow 
shareholders wishes which are generally assumed to be profit maximisation. The 
opportunity cost of these principles being applied by law to all companies is the 
transaction costs that would result from companies, directors and shareholders having 
to agree on them on an individual company basis. The principles of company law that 
relate to SOEs are presented in this context in six broad areas. 
(i) Constitution and control 
Theoretically, a company is ultimately controlled by shareholder voting. 
According to the Companies Act, certain majorities are necessary for certain matters and 
the Act and the articles govern the mechanics of meetings and voting. For most 
practical purposes however, the memorandum and articles of association are crucial to 
control. They form the constitution of the company. They set out the fundamental rules 
under which the company is governed. More specifically, they allocate the power of 
decisionmaking between directors and shareholders. The Companies Act has a model 
set of 137 articles for the management of a company limited by shares in Table A of the 
Third Schedule. They form companies' articles unless expressly excluded or 
modified.1 17 They generally concern: Shares; Capital; Meetings; Directors; Dividends; 
Accounts; Winding Up; and Indemnity. 
116 
117 
As general references to this part see: John H. Farrar & Mark W. Russell, Company Law and 
Securities Regulation in New 'Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington, 1985); and Colin Howard, 
Law of Commercial Companies (The Law Book Co. Ltd., Sydney, 1987). 
Section 22 of the Companies Act 1955. All sections referred to in Part III.C will, unless 
otherwise stated, be of the Companies Act 1955. 
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Until 1984 all companies specified objects and powers in their memorandum. 
Actions that were outside the objects or the powers were ultra vires the company and 
void. Since the Companies Amendment Act (No. 2) 1983 objects do not have to be 
specified, powers arc implied by statute and the effect of a lack of capacity has been 
lessened. 118 In addition, the memorandum and articles arc a binding contract between 
the company and the shareholders.I 19 The "contract" can be modified by the company 
by special resolution. 120 It is only binding on shareholders qua shareholders. 
(ii) Financial structure 
The financial structure of an ordinary company is made up of debt, equity and 
hybrid securities. Each type of security has advantages and disadvantages in terms of 
the holder's return, ability to transfer, ability to control, tax implications etc. Generally, 
equity securities confer rights of control and the possibility of residual profit. Debt 
securities generally guarantee a set, periodic rate of return and involve no control other 
than in respect to matters directly affecting the security. Disclosure of certain aspects of 
debt and equity security issues is required by the Securities Act 1978 . 
(iii) Director liability 
The liability of directors is an obvious and direct method of controlling agency 
costs. There are two main sources of director liability. First there are statutory 
penalties on directors personally for a variety of undesirable activities. 121 Particularly, 
sections 190 to 199 govern the disclosure of director's interests. Second, equity and 
tort are relevant to company directors in the variety of duties that apply to them. 
Commentators have identified several variations of fiduciary and tort duties. 122 
Directors must: (a) must act bona fide in the interests of the company; (b) must not 
exercise powers for an improper collateral purpose; (c) must exercise reasonable skill 
and care as may be expected of a person of the knowledge and experience; and (d) must 
not place themselves in a position where their duty to the company may conflict with 
their own interests. 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
Sections 14A. 15A and 18A of the Companies Act 1955. Section 15A states that "a company 
has the rights, powers, and privileges of a natural persoo". 
Section 34. The wording of this section is particularly arcane. See Howard supra n. 5, 360-361 
on the 1986 Australian wording. 
Section 24. 
E.g. SS. 88(2), 102(10), 116(3), (5), 117(6), 118(4), 119(4), 121(4), 185(5), 130(6), 131(3), 
132(2), 231(5), 151(7), 152(3). And see generally s.463. 
Farrar & Russell, supra n.116, 224. 
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Care must be taken not to ascribe rigid boundaries or certainty to these fluid 
"categories". Generally the law is concerned that fiduciaries not abuse their position of 
trust 123 However courts arc traditionally cautious about passing ethical judgments on 
the activities of business people. A wide view is taken of what may properly constitute 
business judgement. This is reflected in the standard of care which is conventionally 
criticised for lack of rigour.124 
"it must be questioned whether [the law] has not gone to the other extreme of 
positively encouraging incompetent people to accept directorships(sic.), safe 
in the knowledge that the law expects little or nothing of them." 
However, it may be that New Zealand courts are developing a harder line on the 
standard of care and the traditional case law can be interpreted to support this. In 
addition it is not certain the New Zealand directors have much appreciation one way or 
the other of the strength or laxity of directors' legal duties. 
An obstacle to successful actions against directors derives from the rule discussed 
in the leading case of Percival v. Wright 125 that directors owe duties exclusively to the 
company rather than to the individual shareholders. The rule in Foss v. Harbottle 126 
prohibits individual shareholders from suing in respect of the breach of directors' 
duties. There are certain exceptions to thisl27: acts that are illegal or ultra vires the 
company; acts that must be ratified by special resolution; a personal action by the 
shareholder; or a fraud on the minority and control rests with the directors. If these 
exceptions are not applicable and a shareholder cannot convince the company to pursue 
an action, statutory relief must be sought under section 209 of the Companies Act. 
Section 209 allows an application by a member of a company on the grounds that an act 
or the affairs of the company are "oppressive, unfairly discriminatory or unfairly 
prejudicial" to that member. A court may grant such relief as it thinks fit if it is just and 
equitable to do so. 
Overall, the area of directors' duties is nebulous and unpredictable. There are 
problems in predicting the duty and standard of care. There are procedural problems in 
enforcing even that for some shareholders. There is also difficulty in discerning the 
impact that the duties have on directors. The existence of director duties, though, may 
be expected to play some (increasing?) part in controlling "outrageous" director 
behaviour. 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
Generally, see Coleman v. Myers (1977) 2 NZLR 225 (CA). 
Farrar and Russell, supra n.116, 235. 
(1902) 2 Ch. 421. 
(1843) 2 Hare 461. 
Farrar and Russell, supra n.116, 258-265. 
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(iv) Use and distribution of company assets and funds 
Specific types of behaviour on which directors' and shareholders' and others' 
interests may diverge include the use and distribution of assets and funds. These arc the 
subject of specific provision in the Companies Act and case law.128 Distributions of 
company capital may unfairly diminish the equity cushion thereby disadvantaging 
creditors. Reduction of share capital, dividends, redemption of preference shares and 
other distributions are governed by the Companies Act 129 Similarly the rule in Trevor 
v. Whitworth 130 prohibits the repurchase of own shares by a company, though 
redeemable preference shares are an exception to this.131 Provisions against the 
financial assistance by companies of the purchase of their shares also exist. They 
inhibit bootstrap takeover operations.132 
(v) Re,wrtin2 reguirements 
Another set of restrictions on company related behaviour are the requirements of 
reporting, disclosure and audit. Sections 151-162 of the Companies Act govern: the 
keeping of and access to company records; the annual disclosure of a profit and loss 
account, a balance sheet, an auditors' report and a directors' report. 133 There are 
detailed provisions governing the contents of these documents, most notably the 
requirement that a "true and fair view of the state of affairs of the company" be reflected 
by the accounts.134 Other provisions govern the (required) appointment of the auditor, 
disqualification of an auditor and the auditor's powers. Other reporting requirements 
are found in the Income Tax Act, the Stock Exchange Listing Rules and the New 
Zealand Society of Accountants' Statements of Standard Accounting Practice. 
There is a serious question, an in depth study of which is beyond the scope of the 
paper, as to the content of information that is required by these documents. There is a 
perception by many135 that New Zealand accounting standards and requirements are 
ineffectual in providing useful information from which a true assessment of a 
128 See generally about these areas, R. Dugan "Repurchase of Own Shares" (1987) 17 V.U.W.L.R. 
179. 
129 E.g. sections 75-80. 
130 (1887) 12 App. Cas. 409. 
131 Under s. 66. 
132 Section 62. 
133 
134 
135 
Sections 154-158 concern group accounts. 
Section 153 and the Eighth Schedule. 
E.g. John McManamy "Accounting the creative way" New Zealand Sunday Times, October 12 
1986, 19. 
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company's financial performance, situation and prospects may be gained. The 
Companies Act requirements arc detailed, but it is always difficult to provide enough 
detail to prevent circumvention by creative accounting while retaining sufficient 
flexibility to deal informatively with a variety of situations. The "true and fair view" 
requirement offers more promise, but is mainly unenforced. If accounts are within the 
letter of the detailed rules they are presented. A certain amount of accountant "risk 
taking" in complying with the law also seems prevalent, with little remedy being sought 
by those affected, "the market" or the New Zealand Society of Accountants. 
(vi) Takeover reeuJation 
Takeovers and mergers are other notable forms of activity that constrain director 
behaviour. As referred to above, takeovers constitute market activity in the market for 
corporate control. 136 Takeover is said to become attractive if there is a perception that 
the management of a company could be improved and the share price is potentially 
undervalued. The threat of potential takeover and replacement of management acts as an 
incentive on directors to manage efficiently. (It also encourages the development of 
anti-takeover mechanisms). In New Zealand takeovers are regulated by the Commerce 
Act 1986, the Companies Amendment Act 1963137 the Stock Exchange Listing 
Requirements and common law duties such as those already discussed. Broadly, for 
companies of a certain size, a takeover or merger requires clearance or authorisation by 
the Commerce Commission. This is assessed on the criteria of whether a "dominant 
position in the market" is created. The Stock Exchange requirements are more 
restrictive, for example in applying a best price rule over a 3 month period,138 but the 
sanction of delisting is threatened rarely. 
136 
137 
138 
The Treasury, Regulation of Company Takeovers: Treasury Submission lo the Securities 
Commission (The Treasury, Wellington, 1984). 
This is practically ineffective as it relies on a written offer and there are several exceptions. It 
provides a notice/response information requirement 
R613, NZ.SE Listing Rules. 
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3. Company Law and SOEs 
The principle of competitive neutrality underlies the operation and establishment 
of SOEs: 139 "the advantages and disadvantages which state owned enterprises have, .. 
will be removed so that commercial criteria will provide a fair assessment of managerial 
performance". True competitive neutrality would require that company law apply 
directly to SOEs as it does to ordinary companies. This is largely the case. The 
differences in the application of company law priniciples to SOEs are explored here. 
The influence of company law on SOEs can be viewed as the influence of company law 
on ordinary companies as modified by the differences between them and SOEs. 
(a) Machinery and Estab/islunent 
The machinery aspects of the new SOEs are straightforward. The SOEs are 
limited companies. The share capital authorised by clause 3 of the memoranda is 
$100,000 in each case; divided into 100,000 shares of $1 each.140 Each memorandum 
is signed by the Minister of Finance and the Minister responsible for the SOE.141 The 
memoranda and articles of all the SOEs are identical. 
There is no legislative statement setting up new SOEs as companies. They were 
simply formed and registered as companies under the Companies Act 1955. This is 
recognised by sections 2 and 10(1) of the SOEs Act.1 42 Section 30(1) allows 
registration to happen without complication. As set out in Table 1, section 30 adjusts 
certain provisions regarding the establishment of a company. In an admittedly technical 
way these provisions are the most explicit difference to ordinary company law. The 
articles form a distinctive constitution for SOEs but the articles of most ordinary 
companies are different 
139 
140 
141 
142 
Principle (d), Hon. R.O. Douglas, Economic Statement, Statement to the House of Represent-
atives, 12 December 1985, (Government Printer, Wellington, 1985) 12. 
The Post Office Bank Ltd. claims in its SCI to have an authorised share capital of $300,000. 
Presumably the increase complied with the provisions of the Companies Act 1955, especially s. 
71. 
Section 22 of the SOEs Act provides that the person holding these offices hold the shares and that transfer is not necessary on a change in the person holding the office. Since mid 1987 the responsible minister has been the same for all SOEs: the Hon. R.W. Prebble. 
Section 2 defines "company" to mean a company focmed and registered under the Companies Act 
1955. Section 10(1) empowers the Minister of Finance and the responsible minister to acquire shares in new SOEs. 
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TABLE 7: ADJUSTMENTS TO THE LAW RELATING TO 
ESTABLISHING A COMPANY 
SOEs Act Provision Provision Affected 
Section 30( 1) Anything in any enactment or rule of law that would otherwise prevent 
ministers faming a company (in which they hold all the shares) 
andrcgistering it under the Companies Act 1955 with the name of a new 
SOE. 
Section 30(1) Section 31 of the Companies Act: governing the registration of a company 
name. 
Section 30( 1) Section 32(2) of the Companies Act empowering the Registrar of 
Companies to direct a company to change its name. 
Section 30(2) Section 13( 1) of the Companies Act, changing the minimum number of 
persons required to incorporate a company from 7 to 2. 
Section 30(3) The following sections of the Companies Act, reading references to 7 
members as references to 2 members: 
Section 41, imposing personal liability on members for 
debts contracted by a company while trading with fewer [2) 
members; 
Section 217(d), empowering a court to wind up a company if 
the number of members is reduced below [2]; 
Section 219(1)(aXi),143 preventing a contributory from 
petitioning for a winding up unless the number of members 
is reduced below [2]. 
Section 30(4) Section 134 of the Companies Act, dispensing with the requirement to hold 
a "statutory meeting" of the members of the company between I to3 
months from being entitled to commence business.144 
(b) Corporate Constitution 145 
The memoranda of the SOEs do not prescribe objects. 146 The powers are broad 
as implied by section 15A of the Companies Act Otherwise, the constitutional position 
of a new SOE and an ordinary company are similar - in terms of company law. 147 The 
constitution forms a contract between the SOE and the ministers and other shareholders 
143 
144 
145 
146 
147 
An error in the SOEs Act omits the reference to subsection (1). 
Presumably because the shareholders are undertaking the "establishing" here. 
See pan ill.B (Parliament) 
Under s.14. 
Pan IV of this paper examines, inter alia. what extra force is conferred by the requirement of 
section S of the SOEs Act that the board must make decisions relating to the operation of an 
SOE in accordance with its SO. This requirement can be seen as a superadded element of the 
corporate constitution. 
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and equity bond holders. 148 If outsider rights may not be enforced, as seems likely, a 
minister must only enjoin an SOE to adhere to its constitution as a shareholder. 
Certain articles from Table A arc adopted, in relation to: share capital and 
certificates; liens over shares; transfers of sharcs;I49 transmission of shares; forfeiture 
of shares; and notices. The rest are divided into 30 headings in 4 parts, relating to the 
same general concerns as in Table A. The general headings of the articles concern: 
Capital and Calls on Shares; Notice of and Procedure at General Meetings; Directors' 
Interests and Proceedings and Committees of Directors; Certain Powers and Duties of 
Directors; Validity of Directors' Acts; Dividends; Capitalisation of Profits; Share 
Warrants; Accounts; Audit; Discovery of Secrets Winding Up; Distribution of Assets; 
and Indemnity. Generally, the articles allocate the power of management of SOEs to the 
directors. The more significant of their powers a.re outlined by Table 2. A more general 
power that is important is article 14.3.1 which provides that:150 
"the business of the Company shall be managed by the Directors who may 
exercise all such powers of the Company as are not, by the Act, or by these 
Articles, required to be exercised by the Company in general meeting, subject, 
nevertheless, to any of these Articles and to the provisions of the Act" 
Shareholding ministers and only shareholding ministers may vote in shareholders' 
meetings. The more significant shareholder powers exercised by voting are outlined in 
Table 2 below. They concern the shares, directors, dividend and sale of the main 
undertaking. Apart from these the articles prevent the shareholding ministers from 
exercising significant power in the operation and management of the company. Note 
though, that the shareholders may, by special resolution, change any article. 151 As 
noted in Part IILA the cost of changing this relationship is not prohibitive though costs 
in inititating an alternative relationship mean that it is unlikely to be changed without a 
conscious political change of will. 
148 
149 
150 
151 
Other (Redeemable Preference) Shareholders and Equity Bond holders are members. Infra p .. 
Though the transfer and transmission provisions of Table A do not apply to a redeemable 
preference share or Equity bond issued by share warrant per article 22.4. 
Article 14.3.1 is broader than article 80 of Table A as it is not subject to "such regulations, as 
may be prescribed by the company in general meeting". 
Section 24 of the Companies Act 1955 and the disclosure requirements of s. 17(1) of the SOEs 
Act. 
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TABLE 8: SIGNIFICANT FUNCTIONS RESERVED TO 
SHAREHOLDING MINISTERS BY THE ARTICLES: 
Article Subject Matter 
2.1 
3.1 
3.3 
3.4 
9.1 
9.3 
9.5 
10.5 
14.3.1 
17.1.1 
20.1 
20.2.9 
21.1 
22.1 
23.1 
Issuance, and terms and conditioos, of shares. 
Increase of share capital and type of new share capital. 
Consolidation, Subdivision and Cancellation of Share Capital. 
Reduction of Share Capital (and capital redemption reserve or share 
premium account). 
Determination of number of directors. 
Appointment of Directors. 
Determination of remuneration of directors. 
Relaxation of Interested Director Articles. 
Approval of sale or disposal of the main undertaking of the Company. 
Appointment of Executive Directors and Managing Director if 
recommended by the Board. 
Agree with the Board on the dividend (subject to section 13 of the SOEs Act). 
Approval of distribution in kind of assets among members. 
Issue Bonus Shares. 
Issue, and determine the conditions of, Share Warrants with respect to 
Redeemable Preference Shares and Equity Bonds. 
Inspect, or authorise inspection of, books of accounL 
(c) Non-transferable Control 
A policy decision in the establishment of SOEs was not to allow control of a 
new SOE to pass out of the Government's hands without legislative provision. The 
consequences of this are manifested in: the financial structure; voting; and takeovers. 
(i) Financial Structure 
The financial structure of the new SOEs is similar to that of ordinary companies. 
Debt and equity securities may be issued and function in the usual way with the addition 
of a new type of security: Equity bonds. There are also restrictions on voting rights 
and on the transferability of shares. 
The SOEs Act envisages that shares in SOEs are to be held by the shareholding 
ministers. Section 11(1) prevents a minister either transferring shares held in the 
minister's name, or permitting shares to be allotted to any other person. 152 Due to the 
152 The legal sanction for breaching this is judicial review - see Part ID.D. Article 3.2.1 provides 
that "all shares and Convertible Securities [except for Redeemable Preference Shares, and 
presumably from the context, Equity Bonds] shall be issued only to the {shareholding 
ministers]". Any proposal to issue new shares to a third party would involve amending this 
article and would have to be approved by the shareholding ministers which is probably prevented 
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SOEs Amendment Act 1987, though, it is possible that an initial allocation of shares in a 
newly established SOE could be made to a third party without legislative 
amendment 153 A specific legislative exception to section 11 ( 1) is the issuance of non-
convertible, non-voting, redeemable preference sharcs. 154 Preference shares arc issue 
specific but they generally have some similarity to debt securities in conferring 
preferential rights to dividends or on winding up but carrying no voting rights. 155 
Redeemable preference shares may be redeemed by the company on certain 
conditions. 156 Note that redeemable preference shares do not carry voting rights at 
&eneral meetings. Shareholders may vote at a "special meeting", per the articles,157 on 
the modification of their rights.158 Otherwise the articles enable a new SOE to issue 
various classes of share with various characteristics - to ministers. An SOE may 
consolidate, divide or cancel its share capital. There are also provisions governing calls 
on shares. 159 
The Government has indicated that Equity Bonds will be issued by some SOEs 
in the near future. 160 There are plans to list them on the New Zealand Stock Exchange. 
There are several peculiar characteristics of Equity Bonds - apart from their solely 
political heritage. Section 12(1) of the S0Es Act empowers an SOE to issue Equity 
Bonds to anyone (including shareholding ministers) "if authorised to do so at any time 
or times by resolution of the House of Representatives".161 Section 12(2) confers on 
them the following characteristics: 
IS3 
1S4 
155 
156 
157 
158 
159 
160 
161 
(a) they confer no voting rights at general meetings of shareholders; 
(b) they are transferable as provided in the rules; 
(c), (d) they are deemed to be ordinary shares for the purposes of the Companies 
Act 1955, the Securities Act 1978 and the Income Tax Act 1976 (with 
corresponding meanings fer "shareholder" and "dividend"); and 
(e) they have other characteristics as specified in the authorising resolution 
or as determined by the shareholding ministers. 
by section ll(l)(b). (Note that article 2.1 provides that securities may be issued with such 
restrictions as to voting as the SOE may, by ordinary resolution, determine). 
The SOEs Amendment Act 1987, inter alia, removed the words "all the" from section 10 which 
previously read: "[A shareholding minister] may from time to time, .. subscribe for or otherwise 
acquire all the shares in the [new SOEs]". When an initial allocation of shares is being made, 
a minister is not a shareholder and therefore section 11(1) may not apply. 
Issuable per section 66 of the Companies Act 1955 and articles 2.2.1 and 32.2. 
Farrar and Russell, supra n.116, 128-133. 
The conditions control the source of redemption and of any premium. 
E.g. per article 2.3.1. 
This would lower the value of SOE shares compared to ordinary company shares. Also, it would 
conflict with r. 421 of the NZSE Listing Requirements. 
Articles 2.3, 3 and 4. 
Budget 1987, Pt I Speech, New Zealand Parliament House of Representatives. 1987, B.6: 12. 
The "resolution" will be a Government notice of motion. It will not be referred to a select 
committee. See Hon. R.O. Douglas' answer to question 12 on 29 July 1987, N.Z. 
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 482, 1987; 10,635. 
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It is mainly from sections 12(2)(c) and (d) that Equity Bonds derive their 
character. In most ways, they seem to be equivalent to non-voting ordinary sharcs.162 
The articles of the SOEs include Equity Bonds in their definitions of "sharc" 163 though 
the SOEs Act itself, as amended in 1987, specifically excludes Equity Bonds from the 
definition of "share" .164 Holders of Equity bonds arc shareholders (except for the 
purposes of the SOEs Act) and mem~ of the SOE.165 
(ii) Votio1: 
The articles provide for the voting rights and procedures of SOEs. Annual 
General Meetings must be called every calendar year. Other meetings are "extraordinary 
general meetings" and are convened by the Directors or shareholding ministers. 166 All 
business at general meetings is special. 167 The quorum is the two shareholding 
ministers in person or by representative. The Chairman of Directors or other director 
chairs general meetings. All classes of shareholders (including Equity Bond holders, 
also Auditors168) are entitled to receive company notices, reports and accounts, and to 
attend general meetings.169 The only persons allowed to vote are the shareholding 
ministers or their representatives and voting is by voice and show of hands. I70 Note 
that this effectively requires unanimous decisions whether for special, extraordinary or 
ordinary resolutions.171 
(iii) Takeovers 
Takeovers are relevant to SOEs in so far as they cannot occur, thereby providing 
another distinction with ordinary companies. The agency cost economising influence 
of takeovers is therefore absent - a factor much emphasised by some economists. 172 
162 
163 
164 
165 
166 
167 
168 
169 
170 
171 
172 
A description approved by the Hon. R.O. Douglas in written answer to Question 5 on 2 July 
1987, N2. Parliamentary Debates, Vol.482, 1987; 10,220. 
Article 1.2, though this often seems to have been forgotten; e.g. in article 3.2.1 which is 
explicitly made subject to different provisions for redeemable preference shares in 3.2.2 but not 
Equity Bonds per 3.2.3 though such seems required by the contexL 
Section 2, "share", except in sections 14,and 22 which relate to the SCI and Provisions relating 
to Ministers' shareholding, respectively. 
Concerning status as members: section 39 of the Companies Act 1955 and the definition of 
"member" in article 1.2.1. 
Or under s.136 of the Companies Act 1955. 
With certain exceptions at the AGM. 
Section 166(4) of the Companies Act 1955. 
Article 7 .5. The right to attend meetings is subject to any direction to the conttary by the 
company in general meeting. 
Article 8.2. 
Because voting is not according to number of shares (c.f. s.138(e), 142), there are only 2 
ministers and they must have half the shares each (per ss. 10(1 ),(2) and 11 ( 1) of the SOEs Act). 
Jennings supra n.115. 
\ 
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This argument is based on an insufficiently defined view of the notion of "agency". 
Ordinary companies may not be managed "efficiently" thus stimulating a takeover. An 
efficient management incentive is therefore provided by the market for corporate 
control. But it economises on agency costs only if the original owner desired efficiency 
- which is presumed in ordinary companies. Application of the market for corporate 
control to SOEs may provide extra efficiency incentives but it docs not necessarily 
economise on agency costs. Indeed the strong controlling position of shareholding 
ministers (bearing in mind the ability to change the articles) indicates that shareholder 
control of the agent may be well effected. The problem in the SOE context, as noted in 
Part II, is that efficiency li a desired objective, but there may also be other objectives. 
Note that the listing of Equity bonds will go some way toward fulfilling some of 
the other functions of shares, but since they do not carry voting rights, their acquisition 
cannot lead to a change in control.173 
( d) Director liability 
The directors have the function of making "all decisions relating to the operation 
of [an S0E]" 174 - to manage the business. 175 There are 5 - 9 directors of each SOE 
(including up to 3 Executive Directors)176 who may be appointed (or reappointed) for 
up to 3 years. 177 There are several circumstances in which a director's office is 
vacated. 178 Director remuneration is determined by the shareholding ministers. Note 
that as in Table A, directors may appoint committees of any persons to which they may 
delegate any of their powers. 179 In relation to certain "operational" decisions such 
delegation may not be legally valicf.180 
SOE director liability is little different from that of ordinary company directors. 
Toe statutory duties apply to SOE directors as to ordinary directors. Article 10 governs 
interested directors in a similar way to article 84 of Table A though in addition the 
Chairman of a meeting is given conclusive authority to rule on the materiality of interest, 
173 
174 
175 
176 
177 
178 
179 
180 
Ibid. 27. 
Section 5(2) of the SOEs Act 
Article 14.3.1. 
Article 17 .1.1. One of whom may be appointed as a Managing Director. 
For the details of this paragraph, see Article 9. 
Bankruptcy or insolvency; a section 189 court order; mental disorder; resignation; expiry of appointment; removal by the company per section 187; failure to attend 2 consecutive board meetings without permission. C.f. article 88 of Table A. 
Article 13.1. 
See Part ill.D 
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and the Company may. by ordinary resolution. relax the requirements of Article 10. 
Fiduciary duties in relation to corporate opportunities, for example. arc the same as for 
ordinary directors. Since two ministers own the voting shares there is no problem of 
enforcement for them. Equity Bond holders and redeemable pref ere nee share holders 
do have a problem since they can not even instigate a vote to force a company to sue 
directors and the rule of Foss v. Harbottle limits the derivative actions available to 
them. They (and shareholding ministers) may use section 209 of the Companies Act to 
gain a "remedy in case of oppression" if a court thinks it would be "just and equitable" 
to grant one. 
(e) Disclosure and Audit 
There is no difference between SOEs and ordinary companies in the content of 
material required by company law to be disclosed. There are extra disclosure 
requirements emanating from other sources - as discussed in Part lli.B. 
Section 19 of the SOEs Act constitutes a distinction between S0Es and an 
ordinary company. It provides that the Audit Office shall be the auditor of all SOEs and 
may exercise the functions, duties and powers of an auditor appointed under the 
Companies Act as well as the powers it has under the Public Finance Act 1977 in 
respect of public money and public stores. Its fees are to be prescribed by the Minister 
of Finance. In addition, after consultation with the Audit Office and with the approval 
of the responsible minister, an SOE board may appoint a suitably qualified firm as an 
additional auditor, but not as a substitute. 
As noted in Part ill.B, for incentive reasons, this might constitute a significant 
potential difference with ordinary companies. As an Officer of Parliament the Controller 
and Auditor-General may be expected not to indulge in creative accounting. From the 
perspective of company law however, competitive neutrality is violated by the extra 
accountability. The broader issue, addressed later, is whether competitive neutrality or 
accountability should outweigh the other. 
(f) Group Windings Up 
One remaining distinction between SOEs and ordinary companies concerns 
sections in the Companies Act relating to winding up of related companies: sections 
31 lB, 31 lC, 315A and 315B of the Companies Act These provisions concern: setting 
aside securities, charges and transactions involving inadequate or excessive 
\ 
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consideration, and contribution between and pooling of, assets of related companies all 
in a winding up context Because shares in the SOEs arc now held by the Minister of 
Finance and one Minister responsible for all SOEs, all SOEs are "related" per section 
5(2)(c). In practice sections 31 lB, 315A and 315B probably have little effect They 
relate only to winding up contexts. Also a court must be satisfied that it is "just and 
equitable" to treat the companies as related and for the latter two sections mere 
relationship alone cannot be enough to satisfy this test.181 Strictly interpreted section 
31 lC could apply to a contract of supply between two SOEs for consideration that did 
not reflect the value of the goods supplied, but a liquidator and court may take the view 
that the definition of "related" applies only artificially to SOEs. 
181 Section 315C(3}. 
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4. Shareholder Monitoring Regime 
In economising on agency costs, the shareholder monitoring regime is vital to the 
shareholder - director relationship. It provides for scrutiny of management decision-
making and for the basis of corrective action in case of a perceived inadquacy in that 
decisionmaking. As noted in Part III.A, for the purposes of determining the scope of 
ministerial responsibility, the SOEs Act provides ample scope for any sort of 
shareholder monitoring regime to be instituted. The answer to the question of the 
appropriate shareholder monitoring regime for SOEs has not been finally determined at 
the date of writing. A Treasury proposal, "approved in prinicple" by Cabinet was 
released for public discussion on 10 June 1987 and encountered vehement criticism by 
the SOEs.182 The importance of the question is briefly examined here and views 
expressed as to the directions of the appropriate policy. 
What is the appropriate relationship between shareholder and director? The 
preceding analysis was vitally concerned with aspects of the relationship due to the 
importance of agency costs emphasised by an economic view of organisational 
accountability. Yet the role of company law lies in enabling the organisation of activity 
and monitoring of management rather than determining how exactly the it is to be done. 
Company law does not determine the operating relationship between shareholders and 
directors that develops in practice. As noted already, a wide variety of relationships 
between shareholder and director may occur within the same formal company 
structure.183 They depend mainly on the number, voting strength and wishes of the 
shareholders. Company shares may be closely or widely held. Control may be 
exercised by a large majority shareholder or by a coalition of several minority 
shareholders. These factors determine whether the shareholders will require a large 
amount of control, reporting and disclosure from and by the board, or not. For 
instance, the board of a wholly owned subsidiary will face different demands from its 
shareholders than that of a large, widely held, publicly listed company. The possible 
shareholder-director relationships form a continuum of dominance from the one to the 
other. 
When using the company as a model for a new form of organisation the variety 
creates a dilemma. Which is to be followed? The Treasury proposal is based on the 
model of a wholly owned subsidiary.184 It provides for a relatively high degree of ex 
l 82 The Treasury, Commercial Performance of State-Owned Enterprises: Principles for Shareholder 
Monitoring, (Wellington, 1987). 
183 Farrar and Russell, supra n.116, Chapter 17. 
184 The Treasury, supra n.171, 3. 
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post monitoring of SOE performance by officials, plus trigger rcponing mechanisms on 
the occasion of a cause for major concern, and periodic in-depth reviews of 
performance. The ground rules of the continuing monitoring include provision by the 
SOE of: full financial information following NZSA prinicples; annual business plans; 
annual operating budgets; board papers, monthly; six monthly progress reports; and the 
annual report, audited accounts and all end-of-year reports to the board. 185 Some of 
these requirements seem already to exist as per the SOEs Act disclosure requirements 
and the Statements of Corporate Intent. It combines to form a formidable array of 
information available to the shareholders. 
The SOE directors argue that it is more appropriate to view SOEs as widely held 
companies - held by the New Zealand taxpayers, for whom ministers are merely 
representatives. Consequently the reporting requirements should reflect those of a 
company where the board is dominant over the shareholders. 
These respective positions may be predicted by an analysis of the incentives 
facing officials and boards. The question remains of the appropriate relationship 
remains. This paper adopts an argument that has as its goal consistency with the current 
policy environment. The problem that instigated the SOE experiment was inefficient 
performance by the state trading organisations caused by mismanagement. To remove 
the influence of political considerations and introduce efficiency incentives, S0Es were 
set up on the model of the company. Politicians are still to have overall regard for the 
performance of the SOEs but directors are to make the operational decisions. A 
subsidiary model for the relationship between the two is therefore inappropriate - close 
shareholder (political) control is not desired and therefore reporting that encourages 
political intervention is inappropriate. Shareholders should have ex post monitoring and 
sufficient control to enable them to take action remedy deficiencies as would a 
significant shareholder in a widely held company . If that is inadequate, it is an 
inadequacy that occurs generally with such companies. The other accountability 
mechanisms surveyed in this paper, such as those in company law and in the SOEs Act, 
will also operate to reduce agency costs. 
The implications of this for the exact reporting requirements may well be a less 
stringent version of the Treasury proposals. The detailed reporting requirements might 
be replaced by a bi-monthly shareholders report indicating the general state of SOE 
activities. Additionally, a team of analysts with no special legal powers could be 
employed to report on SOEs annually. Certainly contingency plans for the occurance of 
185 Ibid., see especially the summary of Highlights Summary and Summary Report. 
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a major problem should be in place. There may also be a role for a medium term 
periodic review of SOEs generally to assess the adequacy of the accountability 
mechanisms in terms of pcrf onnance. 
It should be noted that the detailed shape of a shareholding monitoring regime 
could be changed for the price of developing a new one. As explained in Part ill.A, it 
is not legislated for. 
S. Incentives 
Company law provides the essential institutional framework within which SOEs' 
actors' incentives interrelate and produce "company" behaviour. It provides both 
explicit legal mechanisms to control agency costs and the framework within which 
market behaviour can do the same. It is always apparent that the company structure 
developed to perform in markets. This fundamentally shapes the incentives derived 
from company law, and indeed was the reason for choosing the company structure as 
the basis of SOEs. The incentives provided by general company law to align director 
behaviour with shareholder wishes - profit maximising efficiency - generally apply to 
SOEs. The specific distinctions between SOEs and ordinary companies are firmly 
based in the policy decisions taken in establishing SOEs. Some of them have 
interesting effects on incentives. 
The constitution formed by the memorandum and articles allocates management 
power to directors as any company constitution might. In doing so it effects the policy 
of separating power over operational and general policy decisions. Yet the articles may 
be altered by special resolution of the shareholders and there are few statutory 
provisions that a lay a firmer basis for that view of SOE power. The incentives that 
would lead to a change in the separation policy are, as discussed in Part ill.A, political. 
A conscious decision made on political grounds faces little cost in effecting a change. 
The principle of non-transferable control has significant consequences. One is to 
create a new security, Equity bonds, though the name seems the most distinctive feature 
when compared to non-voting shares. Though Equity bond holders may attend 
meetings, neither they, nor any person other than the shareholding ministers, may vote. 
There is thus no diffusion of effect of shareholder incentives - the ministers incentives 
may be given free expression in exercising that corporate power allocated them. The 
lack of transferable control inherently prevents takeovers, thus denying the role of the 
market for corporate control in controlling agency costs. A closer analysis of this 
\ 
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argument though, indicates that the market provides an incentive for efficient behaviour 
rather than controlling real agency costs. 
The requirement on an SOE to appoint the Audit Office as auditor may distinguish 
its accounts from those of ordinary companies. As analysed in Part 111.B, the 
Controller and Auditor-General faces different incentives than do private auditors. The 
status and security of the position are relevant There is little incentive to please a client 
who is statutorily bound to be audited by the Audit Office. Indeed, reputations of 
Auditors-General are made by well grounded public criticism of accounting methods. 
Against this should be weighed the time available to the Audit Office to carefully 
scrutinise accounts. 
Finally, the incentives emanating from and influenced by the shareholder 
monitoring regime are part of the influence of company law and practice. The ultimate 
point to be made here is that the shape of the monitoring regime at any given time will 
be dependent on political incentives. The statutorily enabling, and informal basis of the 
regime means that, as with the distribution of management power, a conscious decision 
made on political grounds faces little cost in effecting a change. The monitoring regime 
currently under discussion should, if the current policy environment is to be consistent, 
allow only ex post monitoring of most management decisions and an ability to remedy 
apparent deficiencies. 
\ 
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D. JUDICIAL REVIEW 
1. Introduction 
Like other statutes the S0Es Act can be interpreted by the courts. Actions done or 
decisions made under its authority may be reviewed. The general principles of such 
court scrutiny are labelled "judicial review" normally of "administrative action" . 
Judicial review of administrative action in New Zealand has grown increasingly rapidly 
in inventive directions since 1960.185 Designed to curb abuse of administrative power, 
judicial review rests on two foundations : ( 1) a series of implications that courts are 
prepared to draw about the intention of Parliament when allocating power by statute; 
combined with (2) a wide view of the proper role of the judiciary in public law. 
SOEs are surrounded by statutorily conferred power. The State-Owned 
Enterprises Act 1986 is the umbrella legislation governing the new SOEs and in itself 
constitutes an important distinction from ordinary companies. lts various provisions 
may, in general, be enforced by court action. Courts may review actions under it 
according to principles of judicial review. 186 The ramifications of this are explored here 
by way of an economic analysis of the elements of judicial review as applied to SOEs. 
2. Judicial Review and Economics 
The economic function of the principles of judicial review is straightforward. It is 
to impose costs on behaviour that, it has been decided, is undesirable. The cost 
associated with the behaviour will deter it The extent of deterrence is dependent on 
individuals' perceptions of the probability of imposition of the cost and of the amount of 
the cost. This depends on such factors as: the certainty of the principles; the degree of 
general awareness of judicial review; costs, such as procedural difficulty, of initiating 
action; remedies; efficiency of the legal process; and degree of error in decisionmaking. 
The principles of judicial review are briefly considered here before applying them 
to SOEs. 
185 
186 
KJ. Keith, "Administrative law reform 1953-1978" (1978) 9 V.U .W.L.R. 427. 
On administrative law generally, see: Ian Thynne & John Goldring Accoun1ability and Control: Governmenl Officials and the Eurcise of Power, (Law Book Co. Ltd., Sydney, 1987); S.A. De Smith & J.M. Evans eds., De Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action (4th ed., Stevens & Sons, London, 1980); Judicial Review of Administrative Action in the 1980s: Problems and Prospects ed. Michael Taggart, (Oxford University Press and the Legal Research Foundation Inc., Auckland, 1986). 
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(a) Application Procedure and Remedies 
The main problem with the traditional remedies of judicial review - prerogative 
writs - was the restrictive and complex nature of the procedure necessary to ensure their 
availability. In 1972 it was decided that the transaction costs of the limitations of the 
writ procedures ~ere too high. The Judicature Amendment Act 1972 simplified 
proceedings so that the remedies under the writs, as well as injunctions and 
declarations, were available without so much procedural complexity. This is achieved 
by a procedure known as an application for review which is now used in most actions 
seeking judicial review. Under the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 an application for 
review must relate to an "exercise, refusal to exercise, or proposed or purported 
exercise by any person of a statutory power". 187 There are several important 
definitions in section 3 that relate to this: "person"; "statutory power"; and "statutory 
power of decision" (the last occurs in the definition of statutory power).1 88 
The old prerogative writs are still available as remedies within the limits of the 
High Court Rules 1985 and the Judicature Amendment Act 1972. 189 Mandamus 
compels performance of a public duty. Prohibition prohibits the exceeding of 
jurisdiction. Certiorari quashes a decision where there is a lack of jurisdiction. An 
injunction to restrain a breach of duty is available under the same part of the Rules in 
addition to deriving from equitable jurisdiction.190 A declaration is available under the 
High Court Rules or under the Declaratory Judgments Act. Some of the extraordinary 
remedies are available only in relation to certain grounds of review, but injunctions and 
declarations are broad enough to cover most conceivable situations. 
187 Section 4(1). 
188 "Persoo" includes corporate bodies and other "bodies of persons" . 
"Statutory Power" includes: a "power or right conferred by or under any Act or by or under the constitution or other instrument of incorporation, rules of any body corporate: 
(b) to exercise a statutory power of decision; or 
(c) to require any person to do or refrain from doing any act er thing that, but for such requirement, he would not be required by law to do or refrain from doing" . 
"Statutory power of decision" means "a power or right conferred by or under any Act, or by or under the constitution or other instrument of incorporation, rules, or bylaws of any body corporate, to make a decision deciding or prescribing or affecting 
189 
190 
(a) the rights, powers, privileges, immunities, duties or liabilities of any person; or (b) the eligibility of any person to receive, or to continue to receive, a benefit or licence, whether he is legally entitled to it or not". 
Part vn of the High Court Rules 1985, Rs 623, 625, 626. 
Rule 624 of the High Court Rules. 
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the significance of the sanctions available. More recently the legitimate expectations of 
the affected person have assumed increasing irnportance.196 
The same considerations are also relevant in determining the extent of the duty 
imposed. Particular aspects can include: notice of time and place of hearing and the 
charges; opportunity to prepare, put a case, call witnesses and cross examine; disclosure 
of all information; and legal representation. Also, there are rules against bias on the part 
of the decisionmaker in relation to: pecuniary interests; personal connections; and 
prejudgement of a case. More recently natural justice has been expressed in substantive 
as well as procedural terms, viz. that a decision must be based on evidence of probative 
value, and that evidence and argument must be fairly heard. 197 
Procedural fairness is a broader concept than natural justice. It now appears to 
have developed into a separate notion in the United Kingdom and may be viewed as 
such in New Zealand.198 It is especially applicable in an administrative rather than 
judicial context 199 Its criteria are unclear but in practice its requirements are likely to be 
similar to those of natural justice. 
(iii) Abuse of Discretion 
Where a body is acting pursuant to a statutory discretion there may be no question 
of natural justice considerations being relevant or the act being ultra vires. Yet there 
may still be legal objection to it if the discretion is "abused". This concept can be 
simplistically divided into three concepts: taking into account irrelevant considerations 
or not taking into account relevant considerations; taking into account improper 
purposes or not taking into account proper purposes; and unreasonableness.200 
Whether a consideration is relevant or irrelevant is to be determined from the 
express or implied language of the statute together with its context and purpose. The 
purpose for which a discretion or power is exercised must be that envisaged by the 
provision. Otherwise it may be improper taking into account: the scheme of the Act; the 
nature and purpose of the particular provision compared to others; and the relationship 
196 
197 
198 
199 
200 
Schmuit v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs first case (Denning); Council of Civil Service 
Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985) AC 374 (HL). 
Re £rebus Royal Commission [1983] NZLR 662 (PC). 
CCSU supra n.186 and Anderton v. Auckland City Council (1978); though Stininato v. AucJcland boxing Association [1978] (CA) is still most authoritative - the other way. 
CCSU supra n. 186, esp Lord Diplock. 
For other (mainly tripartite) divisions: Associated Provincial Picture Housu Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948) 1 K.B. 223, 228-229; CCSU supra n. 186, Lord Diplock:; and 
Rt Hon Sir Robin Cooke, "The Struggle for Simplicity in Administrative Law" in Judicial Review of Adminstrative Action in tlu! 1980s supra n. 176, 5. Bad faith seems to the writer to 
be a psychological condition which is, in practice, accompanied by one of these three typeS of 
abuses. 
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between the dccisionmaker and others.201 It may be that being "substantially 
influenced" by other purposes is enough to invalidate the exercise of a discrction.202 
Finally, a person acts unreasonably if no reasonable person could have so actcd.203 
(iv) Exercise of Discretion 
In addition to the abuses of discretion described above, other rules are concerned 
with the influences on a discretion that is otherwise validly exercised. Three important 
elements are: delegation; acting under an overriding policy and acting under dictation. 
There are strict rules governing the delegation of a discretion entrusted to a specific 
body. Whether delegation is effective depends on factors such as: the nature of the 
subject matter; the degree of control retained; and the character of the delegate.204 If a 
body has a statutory discretion, it may not exercise it pursuant to an overriding policy. 
While it may be reasonable to have a policy, there must be an ability to consider cases 
aside from the policy.2o5 Similarly, a body charged with a discretion may not act under 
the dictation of a third party. A prerequisite set by a third party need not be followed, a 
third party's views may not be determinative, nor must the approach to the decision be 
the same as the third party's. 
( C) Limitations 
To pursue a claim an applicant must possess sufficient "standing". One aim of 
standing rules is to economise on court administration costs by imposing a procedural 
cost on those with no obvious incentive to bring an action. Courts' time should not be 
wasted by "busybodies" far removed from the issues. Traditionally the tests for 
standing have varied for each remedy though the "sufficient interest" test has been 
influentia1.206 It now seems that standing may increasingly be approached on a case by 
case basis having regard to the facts and law concemed.207 There is a trend towards 
courts taking a flexible, and often liberal, stance towards the question of standing. The 
factors weighed include: scope and purpose of the statutory provision; gravity of the 
201 Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (1968) AC 997 (ID..). 
202 Poan.anga v. State Services Commission (1985) 2 NZLR 385. 
203 Secretary of State for Education anbd Science v. Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council (1977) AC 1014. 
204 Ministerial delegation to a Government Department is a special case. 
205 British Oxygen Co. Ltd. v. Minister of Technology [1971) AC 610; Re Findlay [1985) 1 AC 318. 
206 Now enacted into English Law bys. 31(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981. 207 IRC v. Nationm Federation of Self-Employed and Small Busin.esses Ltd, (1982) AC 617; Wall v. Livingston (1982) 1 NZLR 734, 739; Finnigan v. New "Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc. [1985) 2 NZLR 159. 
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allegations; strength of the case; public interest; nature of the remedy; nature of the 
injury; and previous connection with the issue.208 
In addition a court's power to review is dependent on its jurisdiction. The 
concept of Jurisdiction can be seen as similar to ultra vires in a judicial context. 
However, a privative clause that purports to restrict or exclude the jurisdiction of a court 
may not be as effective as it appears. For example, a clause may provide that a 
"determination" shall not be questioned by a court. Yet it must be within the jurisdiction 
of a court to determine whether an order is a determination or not209 
20S Grahame Aldous & John Alder, Applications for Judicial Review: Law and Practice (Butterworths, London, 1985) 95-6. 
209 Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission (1969) 2 AC 147; Bulle Gas Users Group v. Attorney-General [1983) NZLR 129 (CA). 
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3. Judicial Review and SOEs 
Principles of judicial review of actions and decisions in the SOE context may be 
informed by the principles applied to other public corporations. However, the sui 
generis nature of the legal framework of the new SOEs - limited liability companies 
governed by broad statutory principles and a monitoring regime - limits the relevance of 
those applications. The following account examines judicial review of SOEs.210 
(a) Functions, Powers and Duties 
There are two main potential sources of authority in relation to which judicial 
review can be invoked with respect to SOEs: the SOEs Act 1986 and, subordinately, the 
rules and perhaps the SCI of an SOE. There are essentially two actors to whom judicial 
review is directly relevant: ministers and (board of) directors. The SOEs Act 1986 also 
confers powers and duties on the Crown and the SOE. For most purposes in this part 
these are treated as the ministers and directors respectively. As mentioned in Part III.A 
power in relation to SOEs can be characterised as concerning: management functions; 
monitoring functions; or more indirect regulatory functions. The SOEs Act provides the 
basis for most monitoring functions. The SCI rests on this basis though section 5 of 
the Act enhances its status. The rules may, inter alia, also enable some types of 
monitoring to be undertaken. The prime function of the rules is to allocate management 
power, with which the SOEs Act is (expressly) concerned only in broad, enabling 
terms. 
As is clear from the paper so far, the structure of the SOEs legislative framework 
is complex. In relation to management, directors are given broad operational power by 
the Act but exercise it in accordance with the so.211 The Act says little expressly 
about what overseeing role ministers have in relation to management though it sets out 
the broad principles and objectives to govern the SOEs. The articles allocate most 
management power to directors, leaving the shareholding ministers with certain 
important residuary functions. The Act has a set of explicit monitoring provisions in the 
form of disclosure duties on the directors and ministerial powers to require disclosure. 
Ministers are conventionally and legislatively responsible to Parliament for the 
performance of their functions. Ministers are also responsible for matters that touch 
more indirectly on SOEs. Examples are responsibility for transparency negotiations and 
responsibility for regulatory control of an area. Overall, the competitive neutrality 
210 
211 
Though see H.S.E. Gravelle, "Judicial Review and Public Firms" (1983) 3 International Review 
of Law and Economics 187. 
Section 5. 
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purpose is particularly evident from the Act, especially given sections 4 and 7. This 
structure is relevant to judicial review. 
The functions, powers and duties conferred by the S0Es Act arc detailed in 
Tables 9 and 10 for ministers and directors respectively. The articles were examined in 
Part III.C. 
TABLE 9: STATUTORY DUTIES, POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF 
THE CROWN AND SHAREHOLDING MINISTERS212 
Section 
Express 
Part/: Principles 
s.5(1) Ministers 
s.6 
s.7 
s.9 
Ministers 
Crown 
Crown 
Duty, Power. Function 
The directors shall be persons, who in the opinion of those 
appointing them, will assist the SOE to achieve its principal 
objective. 
must be responsible to the House of Representatives for the 
performance of the functions given to them by the SOEs Act or 
SOE rules. 
must agree with an SOE to pay it to provide goods and service if 
that is wished. 
must not, by vinue of the SOEs Act, act in a manner 
inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
Pan II: Formation and Ownership of New State Enterprises 
s. l O Ministers may, on behalf of the Crown, acquire shares er equity bonds in 
the new SOEs (in equal shares) using money appropriated by 
Parliament fer the purpose. 
s.11 Ministers must not dispose of shares or permit shares to be allotted to any 
other person. 
s.13(1),(2) Ministers may: 
(a) direct a new SOE to include/omit certain provisions 
in/from its SCI; and 
(b) determine the dividend; 
but, in doing so, must: 
(a) have regard to Part I; and 
(b) consult the board. 
s.13(3) Minister must lay before Parliament: notices of direction about SCI, 
dividend 
(s. 13(1 )). 
s.17(1) Minister must lay before Parliament the rules and changes to rules of 
SOEs. 
s.17(2) Minister must lay before Parliament the SCI, annual report, audited 
financial statements, and auditor's repcn of an SOE. 
s.17(3) Minister must lay before Parliament a modification (under s.14(4)) of an 
SCI. 
s.17(4) 
s.22(3) 
212 
Minister 
Minister 
must lay before Parliament the half yearly report of an SOE. 
may exercise all the rights and powers attaching to SOE shares 
held by that Minister. 
The table excludes those duties, powers and functions in Part IV of the SOEs Act 1986 that are 
not relevant to accountability. 
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TABLE 9 CTD: STATUTORY DUTIES, POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF 
THE CROWN AND SHAREHOLDING MINISTERS 
Implied: 
Part Ill : A.ccountabiliry 
s.14(1) Ministers 
s.14(3) 
s.14(4) 
s.15 
s.16 
s.18 
s.19 
Ministers 
Ministers 
Ministers 
Ministers 
Ministers 
Ministers 
receive a draft SCI within one month of commencement of 
financial year (comprising certain provisions under 14(2). 
comment on draft SCis within 2 months of commencement of 
financial year, and 
receive completed SCI to ministers within 3 months of 
commencement of financial year. 
receive a written proposal to modify an SCI by written notice and 
comment in 1 month. 
receive: annual report; audited financial statements; auditors' 
report; 
which must contain such information as is necessary to enable 
informed assessment of the operations; and state the dividend 
payable. 
receive half yearly repons within 2 months after the end of the 
first half of the financial year. 
may request information relating to affam of the SOE after 
consultation with the board (except for information on any 
identifiable individual). 
prescribe the rates of fees for the Audit Office as auditor, and 
approval the appoinanent of an additional auditor. 
TABLE 10: STATUTORY DUTIES, POWERS AND FUNCTIONS 
OF DIRECTORS AND SOES213 
Section 
Pan I: Principles 
s.4 SOE 
s.5(2) Directors 
s.5(3) Directors 
s.7 SOE 
Duty. Power. Function 
The principal objective shall be to operate as a successful 
business, and. to this end. to ... (be profitable, a good employer 
and to exhibit a sense of social resp:>nsibility). 
must make, or authorise the making of all decisions relating to 
the operation of an SOE, in accordance with its SCI. 
must be accountable to the shareholding Ministers in the manner 
set out in Part ill of the Act (ss. 14 - 20). 
must agree with Crown to be paid it to provide goods and service 
if that is wished by the Crown. 
Part II: Formation and Ownership of New Staie Eruerprises 
s.12 
213 Supra n. 4. 
SOEs may issue Equity bonds if authorised by resolution of the House 
of Representatives (on certain terms). 
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TABLE 10 CTD: STATUTORY DUTIES, POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF 
DIRECTORS AND SOES 
s.13(1),(2) Direcun must comply with a ministerial directions to: 
Part Ill: AccoUlllabiliry 
s.14(1) Directors 
s.14(3) Directors 
s.14(4) Directors 
s.15 Directors 
s.16 Directors 
s.18 Directors 
s.19 SOE 
s.20 SOE 
(a) direct a new SOE to include/omit certain provisions 
in/from its SCI; and 
(b) decamine the dividend; 
but, in doing so, may: 
(b) be consulted by the ministers. 
must deliver to Ministers a draft SCI within one month of 
commencement of financial year (comprising certain provisions 
under 14(2). 
must consider Ministers comments made within 2 months of 
commencement of financial year; and 
must deliver completed SCI to Ministers within 3 months of 
commencement of financial year. 
may modify an SCI by written notice to Ministers if made a 
written proposal and considered comments made in 1 month. 
must deliver to Ministers: annual report; audited financial 
statements; auditors' report; 
which must contain such information as is necessary to 
enable informed assessment of the operations; and state 
the dividend payable. 
must deliver half yearly reports to Ministers within 2 months 
after the end of the first half of the financial year. 
must supply to ministers such information relating to affairs of 
the SOE as is requested after consultation with the board (except 
foc information on any identifiable individual). 
must have the Audit Office as auditor, pay fees at rates prescribed 
by Minister; and 
may, after consultation with the Audit Office and with approval 
of Minister, appoint an additional audita. 
may withhold, from the SCI, annual report, financial statements 
and half yearly report, information that could properly be 
withheld under the Official Information Act 1982. 
(b) Application Procedure and Grounds 
(i) Ai,plication Procedure 
This has a potentially wide application in the SOE context All SOE actors are 
"persons": ministers, directors, the SOE. Even the Crown's prerogative may now be 
subject to judicial review. Actions under the authority of the SOEs Act, an SOE 
specific Act, the memorandum and articles may be reviewed if, broadly, they affect 
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others' interests. The memorandum and articles fall within one of "constitution .. rules 
or bylaws of any body corporate". The SCI derives power from the SOEs Act and may 
be the basis of review under it It is possible, though unlikely, that it may also fall 
within the definition itself, as part of the constitution. In addition of counc, one of 
paragraphs (a) to (c) of the definition of "statutory power" must also be satisfied, 
which includes, in paragraph (b), a "statutory power of decision" - broadly, if 
someone's interests arc affected. It should be noted that the Judicature Act could 
equally apply to ordinary companies' actions under their constitution or rules. 
(i) Ultra vires 
This is the most relevant ground of judicial review in relation to SOEs, as it is for 
ordinary companies. SOE actors must act within their powers and duties that derive 
from, most notably the SOEs Act and the articles of association, but also from the other 
SOE-specific Acts. 
As seen in Part III.C, the grounds of ultra vires in relation to articles have been 
reduced with the lack of objectives and the statutorily implied powers. Those powers, 
however, and the allocation of management powers specific to the articles, must not be 
exceeded, and the duties must be fulfilled. Ultra vires thus provides for the 
enforcement of the articles and affects the incentives analysed in Part m.c accordingly. 
Similarly, the SOEs Act powers and duties are enforceable. The procedural 
requirements of the monitoring provisions in Part III of the Act - on both the directors 
and ministers - thus require such reasonable compliance as may be expected in the 
circumstances. Breach of the timing requirements by a few days would probably incur 
no sanction, but if by six months review might succeed. Compliance with the 
substantive monitoring and management provisions in Parts II and ill may be reviewed. 
Review of Part I principles is subject to a limitation discussed later. In any case 
the broad nature of most of the principles makes review on the basis of ultra vires 
difficult. A court would be extremely hesitant to impose its view of the meaning of the 
section 4 objective in a particular situation. What Part I does do well is present the 
principles to govern the SOEs which may be used to inform review of actions done or 
decisions made under other parts of the Act or the articles. Sections 4 and 7 are 
particularly relevant in this regard. They may limit political interference by ministers in 
extreme circumstances. There are some aspects of Part I that are specific enough to be 
reviewed on the basis of ultra vires. Section 5(2) is significant, requiring directors' 
\ 
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operational decisions to be made in accordance with the SCI. The substance of SCis 
means that this bestows an almost constitutional status on the SCls, comparable to and 
wider than the objects clause in pre-1984 memoranda of association. The nature of the 
SCis, as analysed in Part ID.B, is also broad enough as to cause courts to hesitate in 
ruling a decision ultra vires, but it is possible. It is difficult to know how sections 6 or 
7 could be legally enforced as they rest respectively on agreement and on constitutional 
convention. Section 5(1) is capable of enforcement though the subjective wording 
makes ultra vires more difficult to establish. 
(ii) Other Grounds 
Certain observations apply to the other grounds for review collectively. In 
considering those grounds in relation to an action or decision in the SOE context, a 
court will have regard to the principles in Part I, and especially the commercial nature of 
SOEs. Competitive neutrality is quite clear from the statute. It is sufficiently legislated 
that a court may well grant judicial review on this and the following grounds only where 
it would do so in relation to an ordinary company. This depends on all the factors 
analysed earlier but in this context, especially on the degree of public interest (in a 
policy sense) in the decision. For example, a pricing decision by Electricorp may, 
ceteris paribus, attract a greater likelihood of judicial review than that of Government 
Property Services. 
It is probable, however, that those areas which are of significant public interest 
are also governed by the SOE specific legislation - almost by definition. A court would 
have regard to that The consequence is that competitive neutrality in judicial review 
attaches to those aspects of SOE operation that are not governed by SOE specific 
legislation. For those aspects, that legislation is very relevant to a court's review in 
providing the statutory context of the decision and thus the requirements of the 
principles of judicial review. 
Some aspects of the specific grounds of review are of note. Procedural fairness 
would probably be more use in an SOE context than the more judicial like principles of 
natural justice. It is most likely in relation to SOE management decisions but the 
requirements will depend on the individual decision under review. 
The application to SOEs of the principles of abuse of discretion produce the 
following (extreme) examples. In determining the amount of an SOE dividend payable 
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under section 13(1)(b) the shareholding ministers must actually have regard to Part I of 
the Act under subsection (2). They may not have regard to the fact that the managing 
director has a new BMW. Under section 18, ministers may not request information 
from an SOE on the basis that information politically embarrassing to the opposition 
may be revealed. This would be an improper purpose. It would be unreasonable for a 
minister to authorise, under section 22(4), a business competitor of the SOE to act as 
the minister's representative at shareholder meetings. Most of these examples are 
extreme. The less extreme, the more room for doubt as to the outcome. It should be 
obvious, however, that a significant range of situations could be caught as abuse of 
discretion. If the procedures or motives feel wrong - especially if they feel political - it 
may be caught. It should be noted that lack of evidence is often a problem in relation to 
abuse of discretion. 
Principles regarding the exercise of discretion are important in the SOE context in 
view of the central relationship between minister and director. Section 5(2) is relevant. 
There may be some decisions, of an executive management nature, that the directors 
could not legally delegate. Similarly, they must not be governed by either a strict self 
imposed policy or by ministerial dictation in the exercise of discretion. Note, though, 
that the last point is subject to ministers' legal powers as shareholders.214 
( c) Limitations on Availability 
(i) Standin~ 
Not just anyone can challenge the exercise of any of the powers or duties 
conferred in Tables 9 and 10. A person or group of persons who is directly affected by 
a decision might challenge it For example, an SOE customer or contractor affected by 
a decision would probably have sufficient standing. A candidate for directorship who 
missed out on appointment might (ceteris paribus) challenge the compliance with the 
duty in section 5(2). A "grave enough" breach might be subject to challenge. For 
example a challenge could probably be mounted against a minister who purports to sell 
shares. Allied to this, a matter of great public importance could satisfy standing 
requirements.215 For example, considerations such as this may lie beneath the 
unchallenged standing of the applicant in relation to the SOE context in The New 
Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney-General. 216 
214 
215 
216 
Authority for this is found in section 6 combined with section 22(3) if it is necessary to point to 
a link with the legal powers of shareholders under the Companies Act 1955. 
Finnigan supra n. 207. 
(1987) 6 NZAR 353, especially Casey J. at 405. 
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(ii) Section 21 of the SOEs Act 
Section 21 provides: 
"A failure by a State enterprise to comply with any provision contained in Part I 
of this Act or in any statement of corporate intent shall not affect the validity a 
enforceability of any deed, agreement, right or obligation entered into, obtained, 
or incurred by a State enterprise or any subsidiary of a State enterprise." 
76 
This limits the application of judicial review. It prevents a remedy from being 
effective where it involves challenging the validity or enforceability of one of the items 
mentioned. The scope of this limitation, however, is itself limited. It applies to Part I 
or an SCI. It applies to non-compliance by an SOE, which involves sections 4, 7 and 
8, but not by a minister, director, board or the Crown. Hence judicial review of actions 
or decisions under sections 5, 6, one side of 7, and 9 is not limited. Notably, the 
directors' duty of accordance with the SCI is not protected from judicial review, though 
rights and obligations etc entered into as a result of an unlawful exercise of the duty are 
not affected. Also, if practical, a remedy such as injunction could be sought in advance 
of, and preventing, the objectionable action giving rise to the right or obligation etc. 
4. Incentives 
What is the impact of Judicial Review on the incentives of actors in the SOE 
accountability process? It is simply to increase the costs of particular behaviour to 
particular actors in particular circumstances. Analysis of incentives mainly involves 
determining the content of these three factors. A brief such determination is presented 
here. 
Generally, actions and decisions done or made on the basis of the SOEs Act, 
articles or other SOE-specific legislation are potentially reviewable. Most people 
connected with SOEs have sufficient standing to apply for judicial review. 
Most management functions are allocated by the articles. The functions, powers 
and duties constituting that allocation, and those provisions of Part II of the SOEs Act 
that deal with management functions, are enforceable on the basis of the ultra vires 
ground of judicial review - procedural and substantive. The principles of Part I of the 
Act that lay the basis of management, such as sections 5 and 6, are not as susceptible to 
review for two reasons. Their broad nature inhibits consideration of their substantive 
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requirements. The section 5 requirement in relation to the SCI is more specific than 
other provisions but the content of the objectives part of SCis arc still broad enough to 
inhibit review. Also, section 21 affects the availability of a remedy implying invalidity, 
in the limited range of circumstances discussed above. Management decisions on the 
basis of the Act or the articles may also be subject to the requirements of other grounds 
of judicial review - those of procedural fairness, abuse of discretion and exercise of 
discretion. They are available to the same extent as they are in relation to ordinary 
companies, unless a significant public interest is present The presence of SOE specific 
legislation is an important indicator of that and affects the requirements of these 
grounds. 
Review is available in respect of monitoring functions in the same ways as it is for 
management functions. One difference is that most articles are not directly relevant. 
The monitoring provisions in the Act (in Part III) are more precisely specified in 
procedure substance and object than are the management functions. This allows more 
scope for review on the basis of both ultra vires and the other grounds. Section 21 is 
not relevant except to the extent that monitoring is implied in the broad functions of Part 
I. 
What of the broader effect of incentives relating to judicial review? It is only 
relevant in some contexts. Where the immediately aggrieved party is Parliament, or a 
shareholding minister, a less costly means of enforcement is available than court action 
in most cases: political sanctions or shareholder action. Review merely remains a less 
attractive option. There is possibly some incentive for directors to use judicial review to 
enforce ministerial compliance with duty, or prevent ministerial abuse of discretion. 
There is more likelihood of interested third parties using judicial review to enforce Part 
III of the Act. Apart from political pressure, for which there may be procedural 
information costs or transaction costs, judicial review may, for third parties, be the most 
cost effective avenue. The problem would be standing, but those with the incentive to 
pursue judicial review should be able to satisfy this. A creditor, Equity bond holder or 
market analyst has a direct interest in the matter disclosed under part ill. So does a 
business rival, but for reasons with which a court is likely to disapprove. Most 
tenuously, an interested member of the public could argue the objects of disclosure. 
The effect of judicial review is also dependent on actors' perceptions of the 
likelihood of an action and of the level of cost or harm that would result. Some 
ministers, possibly, and most directors, probably, do not have much appreciation for 
the detailed scope of judicial review. There will be, however, some recognition of legal 
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need to adhere to the Act which actually provides a reasonable guide to potential actions. 
Sufficient notable applications for judicial review have been made in New Zealand that 
some expectation of an action for a serious breach should exist A remedy would, 
generally, affect the continuance of the abuse or non compliance. The political costs of 
such an action could be significant for a minister. Reputation costs to directors may be 
lesser but still positive. 
Judicial review can thus be expected to impose some cost on serious non 
compliance with, or abuse of, duties and powers in SOEs' articles, and in the SOEs Act 
(Parts II and III especially). The New Zealand Maori Council 217 case illustrates the 
potentially enormous implications of judicial review. 
217 The New 'Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney-General (1987) 6 NZAR 353. 
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E. OTHER ELEMENTS 
A potential strength or weakness in examining an accountability structure as the 
product of influences is a tendency to try to take account of all influences. This paper 
focusses on four significant elements of SOEs' accountability structure that derive from 
the core elements of government and private law: ministerial responsibility; 
Parliamentary scrutiny; company law; and judicial review. It is their confluence that 
seems to result in the essentials of the accountability structure of SOEs. There are, of 
course, other significant elements. The paper will not examine them all in detail, but 
here briefly presents an outline of some of the more interesting. This enables the 
structural framework of SOEs' accountability to be placed in a context of other 
influences. 
1. The Ombudsman 
The Office of Ombudsman, adapted from Scandinavia, provides an avenue of 
complaint against "unfair" decision making in government.218 It has been effective in 
doing so.219 A matter usually arises for an Ombudsman's consideration by complaint 
of an individual about an act, omission, decision or recommendation "relating to a 
matter of administration and affecting any person .. in his personal capacity" in or by 
certain Departments.220 The Ombudsman may, subject to certain restrictions, and with 
certain powers, investigate, report and make recommendations to the organisation, its 
minister, the Prime Minister or Parliament. Recommendations may be made if an 
Ombudsman is of the opinion that the decision etc was:221 illegal; unreasonable;222 
unjust; oppressive; improperly discriminatory; based on mistake of fact; wrong;223 in 
the case of a discretion, based on relevant or irrelevant considerations or lacked 
adequate reasons. It seems that in practice Ombudsmen are most concerned about the 
procedure involved in making decisions rather than the substance of a decision.224 
218 
219 
220 
221 
222 
223 
224 
See generally: the Ombudsmen Act 1975; Annual Reports of the Ombudsman; (1982) 12 
V.U.W .L.R and also J.L. Robson, Sacred Cows and Rogue Elephants: Policy Development in 
the New aaland Justice Department, (Government Printing Office, Wellington, 1987) pp. 217-
236. 
Ibid 236. 
Section 13 Ombudsmen Act 1975. 
Section 22(1), (2) Ombudsmen Act 1975. 
This is interpreted broadly by the Ombudsman: G.D.S. Taylor "May Judicial Review Become a 
Backwater?" in Judicial Review of Administrative Action in the 1980s: Problems and Prospects 
ed. Michael Taggart, (Oxford University Press and the Legal Research Foundation Inc., 
Auckland, 1986) 152, 173. 
Idem. 
Annual Report of the Ombudsmen, 1978. 
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The Ombudsmen's jurisdiction includes new S0Es225 though section 31 of the 
SOEs Act provides that the jurisdiction should be reviewed by a select committee 
reporting to the House of Representatives by 1 April 1990. There is few special 
consequences deriving from the form of organisation of S0Es. For instance, there 
seems no doubt now that a court would hold that the phrase "matter of administration" 
is perfectly applicable to SOEs.226 It must be important, however, that the explicit 
function of SOEs is to "operate as a successful business". Again, sections 4 and 7 are 
important It would seem reasonable that the Ombudsmen should develop a "standard" 
against which to assess SOE behaviour that takes this into account Potential 
competition will be relevant to the behaviour of SOEs - which suggests that there may 
be different considerations relevant to different SOEs. The discretion of the 
Ombudsmen will be significant in determining the treatment of S0Es. The review 
provided for may affect their incentives in such a determination. It is too early to assess 
the application of the Ombudsmen's jurisdiction to SOEs in practice. 
The incentives affected by the application of the Ombudsmen Act will be mainly 
those of the directors.. The perceived cost of possible consequences in terms of 
reputation and possible disclosure of information is likely to be significant. This will 
particularly involve decision making procedures. The incentive will be to institute 
systems of management that avoid such costs to the extent that there is net benefit in 
doing so. The degree of public knowledge, and SOE appreciation, of this form of 
remedy compared to that of judicial review suggests that, possibly in relation to the 
same broad types of behaviour, the Ombudsmen will have a reinforcing if not greater 
effect 
2. The Official Information Act 1982 
The Official Information Act replaced an emphasis on secrecy of official 
information with an emphasis on freedom of access. As noted already in relation to 
Parliamentary disclosure and disclosure under the Companies Act information is vital to 
monitoring, scrutiny, criticism - accountability. Indeed section 4(a)(ii) explicitly states 
that a purpose of the Act is "to promote the accountability of Ministers of the Crown and 
officials". It applied to the pre-SOE government departments and now applies to 
SOEs,227 subject to a review on the same terms as that of the Ombudsmen's jurisdiction 
under section 31 of the S0Es Act 
225 Under the Third Schedule of the SOEs Act 
226 Re British Columbia Development Corporation (1984) 14 DL.R (4th) 129 (S.C.C). 
227 Under the Third Schedule of the S0Es Act. and now section 23(1) of the Official Information 
Amendment Act 1987. 
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The regime instituted by this Act is complex and has been overhauled by the 
Official Information Amendment Act 1987 .228 The prime principle is that information 
is to be made available. The Act provides procedures for: 
(i) applying for the release of official information; 
(ii) the duties of those holding the information; 
(iii) the criteria for release; 
(iv) the reasons for refusal of release; 
(v) the mode of release; 
(vi) time limits for release; 
(vii) complaints about non release to the Ombudsmen; and 
(viii) ultimate decisions for release by Cabinet subject to judicial review. 
The criteria most relevant to S0Es are now in section 9(2) paragraphs (b) and 
especially (i) and (j): if and only if the withholding of the information is necessary to: 
(b) Protect information where the making available of the information -
(i) would disclose a trade secret; 
(ii) would be likely unreasonably to prejudice the commercial 
position of the person who supplied or who is the subject of the 
inf onnation; 
(i) enable . . any organisation holding the information to carry out, without 
prejudice or disadvantage, commercial activities; 
(j) enable .. any organisation holding the information to carry on, without 
prejudice or disadvantage, negotiations (including commercial or 
industrial negotiations). 
Unless there are outweighing public interest considerations these are good reasons 
for withholding official information. The incentives emanate from the disclosure of 
information under the Official Information Act are thus unlikely to operate in respect of 
commercial information. They will operate in respect to other information about the 
operation of SOEs. 
3. "The Crown" 
The Crown's legal status is sui generis.229 It is immune from some general legal 
principles. It is sometimes excepted from the operation of specific provisions of 
legislation. There is even a general rule that legislation shall not bind the Crown 
228 
229 
For a recent account see Palmer, supra n.2, Ch.16. 
See generally Peter W. Hogg, Liability of the Crown: in Australia, New 'Zealand and the United 
Kingdom (The Law Book Co. Ltd., Sydney, 1971), especially chapter8. 
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"unless it is expressly stated therein that Her Majesty shall be bound thereby" _23o 
Examples of areas where crown status may malce a difference include: liability for rates 
or taxes; priority in windings up; limitation periods; enforcability of contracts; 
discovery; and injunctions and other remedies. In addition certain sections of the SOEs 
Act is relevant here. Section 9 restricts acts by the Crown that are inconsistent with the 
Treaty of W aitangi. It may often be important to determine whether a corporation or 
company owned by the Crown is similarly excepted. "The legal issue is whether the 
nature of the relationship between the corporation and the crown entitles the corporation 
to the particular Crown attribute which is claimed." 
It is unlikely that any attributes of Crown status adhere to SOEs in many contexts. 
Section 4 of the SOEs Act makes it clear that the Crown owns the SOEs.231 The clear 
intention, indeed the whole purpose, of the SOEs Act is to separate SOEs from the 
Crown. This is explicitly recognised in several provisions of the SOEs Act. In section 
2 "Crown" is defined as her Majesty the Queen in right of New Zealand". Section 7 
provides that transparent non-commercial activites are to be negotiated between the SOE 
and the Crown. Section 23 regulates the transfer of Crown assets and liabilities to 
SOEs. Few situations can be imagined where such clear legislative intent will be 
overriden. Certainly the nature of the functions of the SOE are not determinative. 232 
Generally a control test is applied to the particular function in issue.233 
The most likely situation where the possibility of Crown status arises is where an 
SOE is performing a peculiarly Crown function according to a section 7 agreement. In 
this circumstance the SOE will be the agent of the Crown. Administration of the 
electoral system by New Zealand Post is probably an example. This does not seem to 
violate the principle of competitive neutrality since a private company could be in the 
same position and therefore have the same status. It is not dependent on status as an 
SOE. The point is that the incentives facing an SOE (directors specifically) will be 
different in relation to section 7 behaviour than commercial behaviour. 
230 
231 
232 
233 
Section S{k) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1924. 
Through the shareholding ministers per s. 10. 
Hogg supra n. 229, 210. 
Ibid., 211. The "In Consirnili Casu" cases of the nineteenth century appear to be confined to their facts and era. Ibid 213. 
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IV. THE ACCOUNTABILITY PROCESS 
Part IV brings together the elements of the accountability structure analysed in 
Part ill and the analysis in Part II of motive incentives in the political and commercial 
spheres of activity. This illuminates the overall picture of the operation of the SOE 
accountability process and clarifies certain policy implications for the SOE reforms. 
The starting point of incentive analysis is the motive incentives. In Part II these 
were analysed as political power and financial profit. They represent basic aims of 
human endeavour relevant to SOEs. They are the subjects of activity in the political 
and commercial marketplaces respectively. The electorate desires the implementation 
of and adherence to social decisions and shareholders desire profit. In each sphere 
transaction costs induce the formation of organisations by the electorate and by 
shareholders: governments and companies. As principals they delegate the 
management of the organisational activity - the exercise of political and commercial 
decisionmaking - to agents: boards of directors, and governing parties. There are 
agency costs inherent in each delegation. These are controlled by mechanisms that 
channel the incentives of the actors involved so as to align prinicipals' and agents' 
interests. A framework of such mechanisms is an accountability structure. 
The SOE exists at the confluence of the political and commercial spheres. By 
definition it has trading functions and operates in the world of commerce. It is also 
owned by the government and may be used to achieve government purposes. Prior to 
the latest reforms the new SOEs were organised along departmental lines that were 
designed to serve political functions. The reforms represent a recognition that the 
commercial aspect of SOEs was not adequately catered for by an accountability 
structure aimed at political goals. The decision was to create a structure to meet the 
profit and efficiency demands of commercial goals. Public and private, or political 
and commercial, accountability structures have been melded to produce a unique mix 
of mechanisms affecting the incentives of SOE actors. This paper has examined the 
working of the more fundamental of those mechanisws. 
Ministerial responsibility is a monitoring mechanism that helps to align the 
incentives of ministers with those of Parliament and the electorate at large. It amplifies 
the effect of ministers' political incentives with respect to those functions for which 
ministers are responsible. The SOE reforms have deliberately aimed to confine the 
extent of ministerial responsibility to broad policy and directional decisions. This is 
achieved through the articles of association and the shareholder monitoring regime. 
Yet these means are subject to low cost change by political decision, as influenced by 
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the political "success" of the present arrangements. The solidity of this clement of the 
reforms is questionable. Thus the political climate directly determines not only the 
behaviour of ministers in relation to the broad direction of S0Es. But it also 
determines the degree of that broadness; which may not be very broad at all. 
Parliamentary scrutiny is specifically linked to ministerial responsibility in that it 
provides the procedure for requiring answerability. This is achieved through debates 
and select committees, but most particularly through questions. In addition, the new 
select committee powers are available for direct Parliamentary scrutiny of directors. 
The scope for debates and the effective answering of questions by SOEs themselves 
are also avenues for direct scrutiny. More generally, the mechanisms of 
Parliamentary scrutiny determine the effectiveness of Parliament as a monitor of 
government, particularly of ministers. They thus directly affect ministers' perceptions 
of the seriousness of the political costs of various actions and the extent to which the 
costs are discounted by the likelihood of non disclosure. They also affect directors' 
incentives to the extent that political controversy or disclosure is costly to them. 
Contrary to the conventional constitutional wisdom economic analysis indicates 
that Parliamentary scrutiny can be an effective institution for accountability; in 
affecting incentives. Certainly this accords with political actors' own beliefs. The 
efficacy derives from the unpredictability of the Parliamentary arena and potential for 
disclosure and criticism of any action. It is further reinforced by the mixed nature of 
the mechanisms for scrutiny. Questions provide a sharp focus of attack. Debates 
allow sustained criticism. Select committees encourage more detailed analysis of bi-
partisan issues. Parliamentary scrutiny is more suited to debate of broad or 
fundamental principles and issues because higher political stakes are involved. This 
provides a justification for confining ministerial responsibility to the broad directional 
issues of SOE. Again, of course, the political climate influences the substantive 
incentives of what to monitor from what angle. The study of those incentives is the 
subject of political science. 
Ministerial responsibility and Parliamentary scrutiny are both part of the 
conventional system of political decisionmaking. They are still part of SOE 
decisionrnaking though ministerial responsibility is currently narrowed to exclude 
management decisions. The new part of the accountability structure is company law 
and behaviour. 
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Ordinary companies arc established by shareholders to make a profit They are 
therefore the obvious model to address efficiency problems in SOEs. Economic 
analysis reveals when the company structure is applie.d to SOEs inherent limitations on 
efficiency incentives are created. First some efficiency incentives are absent from 
SOEs due to the non-transferability of control. Takeovers may not occur. Second, 
and more subtly, agency cost analysis emphasises that efficiency incentives ultimately 
derive from the shareholder's aims: profit. SOE shareholders' aims depend on 
political incentives. They are not necessarily profit and only profit Consequently, 
those mechanisms of the market and of company law which economise on pure 
agency costs, rather than promote the ordinarily assumed goal of profit. may not be 
effective in inducing efficiency. 
There are still efficiency influences to be gained from using the company 
structure. Psychologically, the change to a corporate structure may induce a change of 
behaviour patterns amongst employees, directors and other actors. The political 
selling of the reform as efficient has reinforced any such effect And most of the legal 
principles and characteristics of companies are geared to profit, assuming that to be the 
aim of the agency relationship. The rules regulating directors' interests and specific 
types of behaviour in relation to the use and distribution of company assets and funds 
are examples, though it is true that some of these may be waived by shareholder 
resolution. The ability to issue debt and non-voting equity securities maintains some 
market pressure on profitable performance by inducing financial analysis of 
management performance. Importantly too, directors appointed from the commercial 
sector have an incentive to maintain their reputation as managers. The articles of 
association have been drafted to allocate management power to directors. Though the 
articles could be changed this has at least constructed a barrier to casual shareholder 
interference. The shape of the shareholder monitoring regime is also relevant To 
encourage efficiency it should not encourage ex ante ministerial involvement 
The general influence of company law, then, is to encourage efficiency. 
Certainly it is much more geared to efficiency than the departmental structure. But 
efficiency is not encouraged to the extent that it is in ordinary companies. In the 
company structure shareholding ministers are inherently able to affect the commercial 
operation of an SOE. The extent and direction of their effect is dependent on the 
operation of political incentives on the mechanisms of ministerial responsibility and 
parliamentary scrutiny. At present the political climate encourages efficient 
management and non-interference by ministers. A change in New Zealand politics 
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comparable to that in 1984 could dramatically change the relationship between 
ministers and SOEs. 
Judicial review is a more passive element of the SOE accountability structure. It 
reinforces the policy of the SOE reform by emphasising the SOEs Act. Certain 
behaviour is discouraged by costs being attached to it Specifically, judicial review 
discourages the exercise of management powers other than in the way they are set out 
by the articles and the SOEs Act It enforces the allocation of management power 
under the articles. It also reinforces the efficiency incentives of company law by 
having regard to the clear commercial objective in the SOEs Act apparent from 
sections 4 and 7. The exercise of shareholder powers inconsistently with this may, in 
extreme circumstances, be reviewed. A significant limitation on the effect of judicial 
review is the degree to which it's likelihood is discounted by the availability of 
alternative courses of action and by ignorance of its potential. The Ornbudsmen's 
effect is probably similar to that of judical review without the authority of binding 
legal sanction but with greater likelihood of action. 
The availability of information is important in influencing the actions of 
directors, ministers, Parliament, the market and the courts - in fact all actors in the 
SOE accountability process. Information lies at the heart of accountability. Yet 
information itself is costly and is guarded jealously in the commercial arena. 
Disclosure under the SOEs Act, Companies Act and market pressure seems to result in 
some useful broad characterisations of activities and financial statements. Due to the 
Auditor-General's incentives reasonably thorough and frank auditing can be expected. 
Yet the dominant characteristic of disclosure regimes is the leaving of discretion in the 
person of whom disclosure is required. This is controlled to a large extent by the 
Official Information regime under which significant but mainly non-commercial 
information is available. Apart from this the interplay of incentives is relevant to 
determine the degree of disclosure. It is ironic that disclosure of information is both 
basic to the operation of SOE actors' incentives and dependent on them. This may be 
an inherent problem. 
The overall operation of the accountability process of SOEs is a function of two 
conflicting sets of mechanisms: those of the political and the commercial worlds. The 
balance is weighted in favour of the political sphere. All the mechanisms of political 
control apply to SOEs: ministerial responsibility; Parliamentary scrutiny; judicial 
review by the courts; the Ombudsmen; the Official Information Act These influences 
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surround the company structure and principles of company law and behaviour that 
govern it Neither set of mechanisms is unadulterated. The political accountability 
mechanisms must take into account the fundamental commercial nature of the new 
S0Es. Some of the incentives of company law for efficient behaviour arc altered or 
removed. 
In the present political environment it seems that much management discretion 
will be left to SOE directors. The articles of association and likely shareholder 
monitoring regime are evidence of that. Yet it remains true that political incentives 
may dominate the operation of SOEs. The extent of ministerial responsibility and 
hence Parliamentary scrutiny depend on an act of political will to refrain from 
instituting a close shareholder connection with management matters. A change in the 
political climate could reverse that 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has analysed the accountability process of SOEs by focussing on the 
incentives of the actors involved as modified by the mechanisms of the accountability 
structure. On the basis of the analysis policy conclusions arc drawn regarding the SOE 
experiment and methodological conclusions arc drawn regarding the value of the 
economic approach. 
The adequacy of an accountability structure of any organisation must be judged 
against the goals which the organisation is to meet. The company structure encourages 
"efficient" behaviour. Its legal and market accountability mechanisms influence 
directors to meet the profit motivated concerns of shareholders. The company is a 
viable way of organising commercial behaviour, at least relative to the other 
mechanisms examined. This suggests that if efficiency is the sole aim of an 
organisation it should structured along company lines. 
The departmental structure, in the context of the political system, facilitates the 
achievement of political goals. Goals that can be achieved by the exercise of power, 
and the supposedly subsidiary goal of staying in power, provide the motive incentives. 
Full ministerial control over a department is monitored by responsibility to Parliament, 
mechanisms of Parliamentary scrutiny and the political process as a whole. If the aims 
of an organisation are solely political (socially desired) this structure has advantages 
over the mechanisms considered. 
An organisation that is owned by government but which operates in the 
commercial marketplace is a hybrid animal. Efficiency must constitute one of its goals. 
If there are no others it should be privatised along full commercial lines. If there are 
other goals then a composite structure must be developed that utilises elements of both 
political and commercial decision-ma.king structures. These conclusions of the paper 
justify the current political consideration of both corporatisation and privatisation of 
elements of the state sector. An explanation of why that political consideration is 
occuring rests with the goals of current political actors and on the current political 
climate. The economic approach also has implications for the method of deciding 
whether an organisation has social goals. It is a political decision and should be made 
in the political marketplace. The actors in the political marketplace face incentives that 
lead them to behave "efficiently" in political terms. 
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Once it is decided that both social goals and efficiency arc desired a more specific 
policy issue is raised. Is the SOE mix of political and commercial accountability 
mechanisms, as described in the paper, appropriate? As analysed in Part IV the mix is 
weighted, in the medium term, towards consideration of political incentives. 
Commercial incentives are present in the law and market behaviour of the company 
structure. Political incentives exist in the form of ministerial responsibility, 
Parliamentary scrutiny, the Ombudsmen and the official information regime. Yet 
political incentives also affect the operation of the commercial structure. Because the 
SOEs Act is consistent with a range of shareholder - director relationships, and there is 
a relatively low cost to changing the articles and shareholding monitoring regime, the 
closeness of relationship depends on political incentives. Political incentives themselves 
determine whether political incentives become important! This suggests that there is 
some need to further entrench efficiency incentives in the SOE accountability structure. 
There is no point in removing all political influence because it is the political 
marketplace in which the achievement of the political goals is monitored and assessed. 
Ministers face the appropriate incentives to attain those goals, at least within the 
confines of the present political system. Certain methods of attaining a more balanced 
mix suggest themselves. Further checks should be imposed on the procedure for 
shareholding ministers in changing the articles of association. Alternatively the current 
policy of a management/monitoring split between directors and ministers might be given 
greater legislative recognition in the SOEs Act. A non-interventionist ex post 
shareholder monitoring regime should be instituted. Equity bonds should be issued. 
The application of the Official Information Act and the jurisdiction of the Ombudsmen 
Act should be restricted to the information that relate to the public interest element of 
SOEs. Lessened political influences would continue to exist in the face of these 
changes. Residual shareholder control of important management issues would 
continue. Shareholder monitoring of performance would continue. Policy goals can 
then be achieved by use of the section 7 transparency procedure. 
In the longer term the strongest incentive for retention of a structure that produces 
efficient and socially desired results is that very commercial and political success of the 
structure. Success raises the political costs of change. 
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The broader conclusion of the paper concerns the methodology used: the 
economic approach. As explained in Part II, the economic approach is a method of 
thinking about human behaviour. It perceives behaviour to be driven by particular 
motive incentives and to take into account perceived costs and benefits - in the broad 
sense of difficulties and advantages. It is therefore applicable to a wide range of 
situations that may have little to do with finance or the economy. It offers to the 
lawyer a fresh perspective on familiar concepts. For example the analysis of Parliament 
on the basis of incentives reveals an efficacy in the scrutiny mechanisms beyond that 
criticised by conventional analysis. It may be that the same insights could be gained in 
other ways but they are emphasised naturally by the economic approach. 
In the paper the economic approach has been applied to concepts such ministerial 
responsibility, parliamentary sovereignty and principles of company law and judicial 
review. It has been used to characterise the overall nature of the political and 
commercial spheres of activity and to analyse the role of actors within those systems. 
Analysis of the interaction of actors on the basis of incentives modified by 
accountability mechanisms clarifies the specific operation of those mechanisms. It also 
allows the formulation of a picture of the broad operation of SOEs. The paper returns 
frequently to the simple but key concept of agency. Economics recognises an agency 
relationship as a response to transaction costs. The recognition of agency costs in the 
organisational response leads to an analysis of mechanisms for economising on agency 
costs. A framework of thinking about accountability structures results. It is simple but 
yields valuable insights. 
In the end the policy conclusions of this paper derive from a judgement of the 
influences explained by the economic approach. The value of the approach is the clarity 
it can give to an explanation of the influences involved. To be able to change something 
it is first necessary to understand how it operates. Thus in this wider methodological 
aspect the paper is presented as an example of how the economic approach can be 
valuable in analysing complex and fundamental policy issues. 
********************************** 
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An Act to promote improved performance in respect of 
Government trading activities and, to this end, to-
(a) Specify principles governing the operation of State 
enterprises; and . 
Public-124 Prilt Codt: '7 - D 
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(b) Authoris.e the formation of companies to can-y on 
certain Government activities and control the 
ownership thereof; and 
(c) Establish require~ents about the accountability of 
State enterpnses, and the responsibility of 
Ministers [/ 8 Dtumbtr J 986 
BE I_T ENACTED by the General Assembly of New Zealand in 
Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as 
follows: 
I. Short Tide and commencemcnt-{l) This Act may be 
cited as the Stace-Owned Enterprises Act 1986. 
(2) Sections 32 ( I) and 33 of, and the Third, Fifth, and Sixth 
Schedules to, this Act shall come into force on the 1st day of 
April 1987 . 
(3) Subject to subsection (2) of this section, this Act shall 
come into force on the day after the date on which it receives 
the Governor-General's assent. 
%. Interpretation-In this Act, Wlless the context otherwise 
requires,-
"Board" means-
(a) In relation to a State enterprise that is a 
company, the board of directors of the State 
enterprise: 
(b) In relation to a State enterprise that is not a 
~ompanr, the persons occupying the positions in or 
m relauon to the State enterprise that are 
comparable with those of the board of directors of a 
company: 
"Company" means a co!11pany formed and registered 
under the Companies Act 1955, or an existing 
company within the meaning of that Act: 
"Crown" means Her Majesty the Queen in right of New 
Zealand: 
"Minister" means a Minister of the Crown: 
"Organisation" includes a company, a body corporate, a 
partnership, and a joint venture: 
., 
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"Responsible Minister", in relation to a State enterprise, 
means the Minister for the time being responsible for 
that State enterprise: 
"Rules" means-
(a) In relation to a State enterprise that is a 
company, the memorandum of association and 
articles of association of the State enterprise: 
(b) In relation lO a Stale enterrrise that is not a 
company, the documents relatmg to the S ate 
enterprise that are comparable to the memorandum 
of association and articles of association of a 
company: 
"Share" means-
(a) In relation to a company that has a share 
capital, a share in that capital of any class: 
(b) In relation to an organisation (other than a 
company) that has a capital, an interest in or right to 
the whole or any part of that capital, other than an 
interest or right as a creditor. 
(c) In relation to a company or other organisation 
that does not have a capital,-
(i) An interest in or right to any part of the 
assets of the company or or~anisation, 
other than an interest or nght as a 
creditor; or 
(ii) Where there are no assets, a direct or 
contingent obligation to contribute 
money to or bear losses of the company 
or organisation;-
and "shareholder" has a corresponding meaning: 
"Shareholding Ministers" means the Minister of Finance 
and the responsible Minister: 
"State enterprise" means an organisation that is named in 
the First Schedule to this Act: 
"Statement of corporate intent", in relation to a State 
enterprise, means the current statement of corporate 
intent for the State enterprise prepared pursuant to 
section 14 of this Act: 
"Subsidiary" has the same meaning as in section 158 of 
the Companies Act 1955. 
5. Act to bind the Crown-This Act shall bind the Crown. 
In ._ .. , I 
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PART I 
PRINCIPLES 
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4. Principal objective to be successful business-(l) The 
principal objective of every State encerprise shall be to operate 
as a successful business and, to this end, to be-
(a) As profitable and efficienc as comparable businesses that 
are not owned by the Crown; and 
(b) A good employer; and 
(c) An organisation that exhibits a sense of social 
responsibility by having regard to the interests of the 
community in which it operates and by 
endeavouring to accommodate or encourage these 
when able to do so. 
(_2) For the purposes of this section, a "good employer" is an 
employer who operates a personnel policy concaining 
provisions generally accepted as necessary for the fair and 
proper treatment of employees in all aspects of their 
employment, including provisions requiring-
(a) Good and safe working conditions; and 
(b) An equal opportunities employmenc programme; and 
(c) The impartial selection of suitably qualified persons for 
appointment; and 
(d) Opportunities for the enhancemenc of the abilities of 
individual employees. 
5. Directors and their role-( I) The directors of a State 
enterpri_se shall be. rers~ms who, in the opinion 0~ those 
appomung them, wtl assist the State enterpnse to achieve its 
principal objective. 
(2) All decisions relating to the operation of a State 
enterprise shall be made by or pursuant to the authority of the 
board of the State enterprise in accordance with its statement 
of corporate intent. 
(3) The board of a State enterprise shall be accowitable to 
the shareholding Ministers in the manner set out in Part III of 
this Act and in the rules of the State enterprise. 
6. Responsibility of Ministers-The shareholding 
M inistcrs of a State enterprise shall be responsible to the 
House of Representatives for the performance of the functions 
given to them by this Act or the niles of the State enterprise. 
7. Non-commercial activities-Where the Crown wishes a 
State enterprise to provide goods or services to any persons, 
t.,. 
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the Crown and the State enterprise shall enter into an 
agreement under which the State enterprise will provide the 
goods or services in return for the payment by the Crown of 
the whole or part of the price thereof. 
8. Industrial relations and personnel-Every State 
emerprise named in the Second Schedule to this Act shall 
comply with those provisions of the State Services Conditions 
of Employment Act 1977 that apply to it. 
9. Treaty of Waitangi-Nothing in this Act shall pennit the 
Crown to act in a manner that is inconsistent with the 
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
PART II 
FORMATION AND OWNERSHIP Of NEW STATE ENTERPRISES 
I 0. Ministers may hold shares in new State 
enterprises-( l) The Minister of Finance and the responsible 
Minister may from time to time, on behalf of the Crown, 
subscribe for or otherwise acquire all the shares in the 
companies named, or to be formed with the names specified, 
in the Second Schedule to this Act. / 
(2) The number of shares in a .company held by each 
shareholding Minister pursuant to subsection (I) of this section 
shall be the same. 
(3) Any money required to be paid by a shareholding 
Minister on subscribing or applying for, or being allotted, 
shares pursuant to subsection (I) of this section shall be paid 
out of money appropriated by Parliament for the purpose. 
11 . Ministers to hold all shares in new State 
enterprises-(1) No Minister who is a shareholder in a 
compan( named in the Second Schedule to this Act shall-
(a) Sel or otherwise dispose of any shares in the company 
held in the Minister's name; or 
(b) Permit shares in the company to be allotted to any 
person other than a shareholding Minister. 
(2) Nothing in subsection (l) of this section shall apply to 
redeemable preference shares that-
(a) Are not convertible into shares of any other class; and 
(b) Do not confer any rights to vote at any general meeting 
of the company. 
12. State enterprise equity bonds-( l) NOlwithstanding 
section 11 of this Act or any other enactment, a company 
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named in the Second Schedule lO this Act may issue Stale 
en1erprise e9uity bon~s to any. pers<;m ':'r persons in 
accordance wnh subsecuon (2) of this section, 1f authorised to 
do so al any time or times by resolution of the House of 
Representatives. 
(2) The terms of issue of State enterprise equity bonds shall 
be as follows: 
(a) The bonds shall not confer any rights to vote at general 
meetings of shareholders: 
(b) The bonds shall be transferable in the manner provided 
by the rules: 
(c) For the purposes of the Companies Act 1955 and the 
Securities Act 197 8 the bonds shall be deemed to be 
ordinary shares, and the holder of any bonds shall 
be deemed to be a shareholder: 
(d) For the purposes of the Income Tax Act 1976-
(i) The bonds shall be deemed to be ordinary 
shares and the holder of any bonds shall be deemed 
to be a shareholder: 
(ii) Every sum distributed by a company named in 
the Second Schedule to this Act in any manner and 
under any name to a holder of bonds shall be 
deemed to be a "dividend" for the purposes of 
section 4 (l) of the Income Tax Act 1976: 
(iii) No deduction shall be allowed to such a 
company for any such distribution: 
(e) Such other tenns as are specified in the authorising 
resolution. 
15. Powers of shareholding Ministers in respect of new 
State enterpriscs-0) Notwithstanding any other provision of 
this Act or the rules of any company,-
(a) The shareholding Ministers may from time to time, by 
written notice to the board, direct the board of a 
company named in the Second Schedule to this Act 
~o include in, or omit from, a statement of corporate 
intent_ for that comp'.'flY any provision or provisions 
of a kind referred to in paragraphs (a) to (h) of section 
14 (2) of this Act; and 
(b) The shareholding Ministers may, by written notice to the 
board, determine the amount of dividend payable by 
anr. company named in the Second Schedule to this 
Act in respect of any · financial year 'or years, -
and any board to whom such a notice 1s given shall comply 
with the notice. 
l, 
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(2) Before giving any notice under th~s section, the 
shareholding Ministers shall-
(a) Have regard to Part I of this Act; and 
(b) Consult the board concerned as to the matters to be 
referred to in the notice. 
(3) Within 12 sitting days after a notice is given to a board 
pursuant to this section, the responsible Minister for the 
company concerned shall lay a copy of the notice before the 
House of Representatives. 
PART Ill 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
H. Statement of corporate intent-0) The board of every 
State enterprise shall deliver to the shareholding Ministers a 
draft statement of corporate intent not later than 1 month 
after the commencement of each financial year of the State 
enterprise. 
(2) Each statement of corporate intent shall specify for the 
group comprising the State ent~rprise ~d i~s s';1b_sidia~es (if 
any), and in respect of the fmanoal year in whach 1t 1s delivered 
and each of the immediately following 2 financial years, the 
following information: 
(a) The objectives of the group: 
(b) The nature and scope of the activities to be undertaken: 
(c) The ratio of consolidated shareholders' funds to total 
assets, and definitions of those terms: 
(d) The accounting policies: 
(e) The performance targets and other measures by which 
the performance of the group may be jmlged in 
relauon to its objectives: 
(f) An estimate of the amount or proportion of accumulated 
profits and capital reserves that is intended to be 
distributed to the Crown: 
(g) The kind of information to be provided to the 
shareholding Ministers by the State enterprise during 
the course of those financial years, including the 
information to be included in each half-yearly report: 
(h) The procedures to be followed before any member of the 
group subscribes for, purchases, or otherwise 
acquires shares in any company or other 
organisation: 
(i) Any activities for which the board seeks compensation 
from the Crown (whether or not the Crown has 
agreed to provide such compensation): 
Intel l 
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board's estimate of the commercial value of the 
Crown's investment in the group and the manner in 
which, and the Limes al which, this value is to be 
reassessed: 
(k) Such other mauers as are agreed by the shareholding 
Ministers and the board. 
(3) The board shall consider any comments on the draft 
statement of corporate intent that are made to it within 2 
months of the commencement of the financial year by the 
shareholding Ministers, and shall deliver the completed 
statement of corporate intent to the shareholding Ministers 
within 3 months of the commencement of the financial year. 
(4) A statement of corporate intent for a State enterprise 
may be modified at any ume by wriuen notice from the board 
to the shareholding Ministers, so long as the board has first 
given wriuen notice to the shareholding Ministers of the 
proposed modification and considered any comments made 
thereon by the shareholding Ministers within 1 month of the 
date on which that notice was given. 
15. Annual report, accounu, and dividend-( l) Within 3 
months after the end of each financial year of a State 
encerprise, the board of the State enterprise shall deliver to the 
shareholding Ministers-
(a) A report of the operations of the State enterprise and 
those of its subsidiaries during that financial year; 
and 
(b) Audited consolidated financial statements for that 
fmancial year consisting of statements of financial 
position, profit and loss, changes in financial 
position, and such other statements as may be 
necessary to show the financial position of the State 
enterprise and its subsidiaries and the financial 
results of their operations during that financial year; 
and 
(c) The auditor's report on those financial statements. 
(2) Every report under subsection ( l) (a) of this section shall-
(a) Contain such information as is necessary to enable an 
informed assessment of the operations of the State 
enterprise and its subsidiaries, including a 
comparison of the performance of the Stale 
enterprise and subsidiaries with the relevant 
statement of corporate intent; and 
1 
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(h) State the dividend payable to the Crown'. by the State 
enterprise for the financial year to which the report 
relates. 
16. Half-yearly reports-(l) Within 2 months after t_he end 
of the first half of each financial year of a State enterpnse, ~he 
board of the State enterprise shall drliv~r to the shareholding 
Ministers a report of its opcration_s dun~g that ha~f-year. 
(2) Each report required by this section shall mc~ude the 
information required by the statement of corporate intent to 
be included therein. 
17. lnfonnation to be laid before House of 
Representatives-(l) The responsible Minister for _a . State 
enterprise shall lay before the House of Representauves the 
rules of the Stale enterprise, and any change to those mles, 
within 12 siuing days after the date of those rules or that 
change or the date on which the State enterprise became such, 
whichever is the later. 
(2) Within 12 sitting days of receiving all the follow~ng 
documents in respect of a financial year of a ~tale enterpnse, 
the responsible Minister for the State enteq~nse shall lay the 
documents before the Hous~ of Representauves: 
(a) The statement of corporate intent _of the State enterprise 
for that year and the succeeding 2 years; and 
(b) The annual report and audited fin~cial state~ents of the 
State enterprise for the preceding finanoal year; and 
(c) The auditor's report on those financial statements. 
(3) Where a statement of corporate inte~t for a Stat_e 
enterprise has been modified pursuant to secuon 14 (4) of this 
Act, the responsible Minister sh~II lay b_efore the H_ouse_ of 
Representatives a copy of the nouce making ~he mod1fi~a_uon 
within 12 sittin6 days after the date on wluch the Mmaster 
receives the nouce. 
(4) Within 12 sining days after a half-yearly report _is given to 
a responsible Minister pursuant to section 16 of this Act, the 
responsible Minister shall lay a copy of the report before the 
House of Representatives. 
18. Other infonnation-(1) Subject to subsection (2) of this 
section, the board of a State enterprise shall supply to the 
shareholding Ministers such inform~t~on relatin~ to the affairs 
of the State enterprise as the Minister of Fmance or the 
responsible Minister from time to time rec1uests after 
.... .. , ,. 
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consultation with 1he board (whether or not the information is 
of a kind ref erred to in the statement of corporate intentl. 
(2) T~e board of ~ Stal~ enterprise shall not be obliged by 
subsecuon (I) of this secuon to supply to any Minister any 
infonnation on an individual employee or customer of the 
State . enierprise or any other person if the infonnation 
supplied would enable the identification of the person 
concerned. 
19. Audit Office to be auditor of State enterprises and 
subsidiaries-()) Notwithstanding sections 163 to 165 of the 
Companies Act 1955, the Audit Office shall be the auditor of 
every State enterprise, and of every subsidiary of every such 
State enterprise, and for the purposes of that Act shall have 
and may exercise the functions, duties, and powers of an 
auditor appointed under that Act and all such powers as it has 
under the Public Finance Act 197 7 in respect of public money 
and public stores. 
(2) Every State enterprise shall pay to the Audit Office for 
carrying out its duties and functions under this section fees at 
such ra1es as may be prescribed by the Minister of Finance. 
(3) Without limiting the foregoing provisions of this section, 
the board of a State enterprise may, after consultation with the 
Audi~ Office and if its res~nsible. Minister so approves, 
appom~ a person or firm that 1s qualified for appointment as 
an auduor of a company to be an additional auditor of the 
State enterprise or any subsidiary thereof. 
20. Protection from disclosure of sensitive 
information -Nothing in this Act shall be construed as 
requiring the inclusion in any statement of corporate intent, 
annual report, financial statements, or half·yearly report 
referred to in sections 14 to 16 of this Act of any information 
that could be properly withheld if a request for that 
information were made under the Official Information Act 
1982. 
PART IV 
MISCELI..ANEOUS PROVISIONS 
21. Saving of certain transactions-A failure by a State 
enterprise to comply with any provision contained in Part I of 
this Act or in any statement of corporate intent shall not affect 
the validity or enforceability of any deed, agreement, right, or 
. ,,. ., 
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obligation entered into, obtained, or incurred by , a State 
enterprise or any subsidiary of a State enterprise. 
22. Provisions relating to Ministers' shareholding-
( I) Shares in a State en1erprise held in the name of a per~on 
described as the Minister of Finance or the responsible 
Minister shall be held by the person for the time being holding 
the office of Minister of Finance or responsible Minister, as the 
case may be. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other enactment or rule of law, it 
shall not be necessary to complete or register a transfer of 
shares of the kind referred to in subsection (I) of this section 
consequent upon a change in the person holding the office of 
Minister of Fmance or responsible Minister, as the case may 
be. 
(3) Each shareholding Minister may exercise all the rights 
and powers attaching to the shares in a State enterprise field 
by that Minister. 
(4) A shareholding Minister may at any time or times, by 
written notice to the secretary of a State enterprise, authorise 
(on such terms and conditions as are specified in the notice) 
such person as the Minister thinks fit to act as the Minister's 
representative at any or all of the meetings of shareholders of 
the State enterprise or of any class of such shareholders, and 
any person so aurhorised shall be entitled to exercise the same 
powers on behalf of the Minisrer as the Minister could exercise 
1f present in person at the meeting or meetings. 
23. Transfer of Crown assets and liabilities to State 
enterprises-(1) Notwithstanding any Act, rule of law, or 
agreement, the shareholding Ministers for a State enterprise 
named in the Second Schedule to this Act may, on behalf of 
the Crown, do any one or more of the following: 
(a) Transfer to the State enterprise assets and liabilities of the 
Crown (being assets and liabilities relating to the 
activities to be carried on by the State enterrrise): 
(b) Authorise the State enterprise to act on behal of the 
Crown in providing goods or services, or in 
managing assets or liabilities of the Crown: 
(c) Grant to the State enterprise leases, licences, easements, 
pennits, or rights of any kind in respect of any assets 
or liabilities of the Crown-
for such consideration, and on such terms and conditions, as 
the shareholding Ministers may agree with the State 
enierprise. 
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(2) The re_sponsible Minister shall lay before the
 House of 
Representatives any contract or other document 
entered imo 
pursuant lO subsection ( I) of this section within 12
 sitting days 
after the date thereof. 
(3) Assets that are fixed to, or are under or over
, any land 
may be transferred to a State enterprise pursuan
t to this Act 
whether or not any interest in the land is also
 transferred. 
Where any such asset is so transferred, the asset 
and the land 
shall be _regarded as separate assets each capable
 of separate 
ownership. 
(4) Any asset or liability of the Crown may be tran
sferred to 
a State enterprise pursuant to this Act whether or
 not any Act 
or agreement relating to the asset or liability 
permits such 
transfer or requires any consent to such a transfe
r. 
(5) Where a transfer of the kind described in subse
ction (4) of 
this section takes place-
(a) The transfer shall not entitle any person to 
terminate, 
alter, or in any way affect the rights or liabilities
 of 
the Crown, or the State enterprise under any Act
 or 
agreement: 
(b) Where the tr~nsfer is re~strablc, the person r
esponsible 
for ke~pmg the re~ster sha.ll register the trans
fer 
forthwith after wntten nouce of the transfer
 is 
receiv~d by him or her from any person authori
sed 
for thts purpose by the responsible Minister: 
(c) The laying before the House of Representativ
es of any 
contract or other document relating to the trans
fer 
shall be deemed to be notice of the transfer, and 
any 
third party shall after the date of such contract
 or 
document deal with the State enterprise in place
 of 
the Crown: 
(d) The Crown shall remain liable to any third par
ty as if the 
asset or liability had not been transferred: 
(e) Any satisfaction or performance by the State en
terprise in 
respect of the asset or liability shall be deemed to
 be 
also satisfaction or performance by the Crown: 
(0 Any satisfaction or performance in respect of t
he asset or 
liability by any third party to the benefit of the S
tate 
enterprise shall be deemed to be also to the ben
efit 
of the Crown. 
(6) No provision in any agreement limiting the Cro
wn's right 
to s~ll any assets to third rarties, or for dete
rmining the 
consaderauon for the sale o any assets to thir
d parties, or 
obliging the Crown to account to any person for 
the whole or 
l -
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part of the proceeds of sale by the Crown of any a
ssets to third 
parties, or obliging the Crown to pay a greate
r price than 
otherwise by reason of or as a consequence of the sale of any 
assets to third parties, shall have any application
 or effect in 
respect of any agreement or tr-ansf er entered im
o or effected 
pursuant to or under this Act or pursuant 
to such an 
agreement or transfer. 
(7) Where-
(a) Rights or obligations to provide goods or servic
es to third 
parties arc transferred to a State enterprise pursuant
 
to this Act; and 
(b) Those goods or services have previously been
 provided 
by the Crown on terms and conditions wholly 
or 
partly prescribed by any Act; and 
(c) The Govemor·General has by Order in Counc
il declared 
that this subsection shall apply in respect of th
ose 
goods or services-
the goods or services shall, to the extent that tho
se terms and 
conditions are not already contained in contracts
 between the 
Crown and third parties, from the date of transfe
r be deemed 
to be provided pursuant to contracts betwee
n the State 
enterprise and the third parties (whether or no
t the Act is 
repealed). Each such contract shall be deemed to 
include such 
of 1he terms and conditions contained in that 
Act (with all 
necessary modifications), and such of the followin
g provisions 
as are specified in the Order in Council: 
(d) A condition permitting termination at any ti
me by the 
third party on giving 14 days' notice to the St
ate 
enterprise; and 
(e) A condition permitting variation or terminati
on at any 
time by the State enterprise on giving to the th
ird 
party I month's notice in such manner (includ
ing 
newspaper advertising) as the State enterprise thin
ks 
fit. 
(8) Where-
(a) Land, interests in land, licences, permits, or rig
hts created 
on terms and conditions wholly or partly sec out
 in 
any Act are transf e1Ted to a State enterpr
ise 
pursuant lO this Act; and 
(b) The Govemor·General has by Order in Counc
il declared 
that this subsection shall apply in respect of that la
nd 
or those incerests, licences, permits, or righcs-
then, whether or not the Act is repealed, such of t
he terms and 
conditions set 0111 in the Act as are specified in 
the Order in 
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Council (wi1h all necessary modifications) shall con
tinue to 
apply in respect of that land or those interests, 
licences, 
pennits, or rights after the transfer unless the State e
nterprise 
and the holders of that land or those interests, 
licences, 
permits, or rights otherwise agree. 
(9) Where any designation or requirement und
er an 
operative district scheme is vested in a State e
nterprise 
pursuant to this Act, that designation or requirem
ent shall 
continue to apply for as long as that district sc
heme is 
operative as if u had been granted to the State enterp
rise and, 
in respect of that designation or requirement, every r
eference 
to the Minister in section 117 of the Town and 
Country 
Planning Act 1977 shall be deemed to be a referenc
e to the 
State enterprise concerned. 
( 10) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, 
where 
prior to the date on which this Act comes into force an
y Maori 
land was leased to the Crown under a lease adminis
tered by 
the Minister of Forests, the shareholding Ministers s
hall not, 
except with the consent of the lessor or where the
 lease so 
permits, transfer that leasehold interest to a State en
terprise, 
but the shareholding Ministers may enter into an ag
reement 
with a State enterprise pursuant to subsection (I) (b
) of this 
section to manage, on behalf of the Crown, its righ
ts under 
that lease. 
24. Provisions relating to transfer of la
nd-
(1) Notwithsca.nding any other provision of this Ac
t, Crown 
land within the meaning of the Land Act 1948 and a
ny lands 
of the Crown other than lands registered under t
he Land 
Transfer Act 1952 that are to be transferred to
 a State 
enterprise pursuant to this Act shall-
(a) Be identified by an adequate legal description, 
or on 
plans lodged in the office of the Chief Surveyor for 
the land district in which the land is situated (being 
plans certified as correct for the purposes of this 
section by that Chief Surveyor); and 
(b) Be approved by the Governor-General in Counc
il and 
vest in the State enterprise pursuant to and on a date 
specified in an Order in Council made for the 
purposes of this section. 
(2) Not withstanding any other provision of this Act, n
o land 
which is subject to-
(a) A lease or licence pursuant to section 66 or section
 66AA 
of the Land Act 194 8; or 
~ , 
·~ 
1.1 
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(b) Rcser1acion from sale or disposition under sedion
 58 of 
the Land Act 1948-
shall be transferred co a State enterprise. 
(3) All land that is subject to chc Land Act 194 8 
or the 
Forests Act 1949 and that is transferred to a State e
ntedrise 
pursuant to this Act shall cease to be subject to the L
an Ace 
1948 or the Forests Act 1949, as the case may be, 
from the 
date of that transfer, unless otherwise expressly pro
vided by 
this Act or any other Act. 
(4) Nothing in sections 40 to 42 of the Public Works Ac
t 1981 
shall apply to the transfer of land to a State e
nterprise 
pursuant to this Act, but sections 40 and 41 of that 
Act shall 
after that transfer apply to that land as if the State e
nterprise 
were the Crown and the land had not been tra
nsferred 
pursuant to this Act. 
25. Title to land-( 1) A District Land Registrar shal
l, on 
written application by any person authorised by a 
Minister 
and on payment of the prescribed fee,-
(a) Register a State enterprise as the proprie~
or, in 
substitution for the Crown, of the estate or mterest 
of the Crown in any land that is incorporated in the 
register or otherwise registered in the land registry 
office of the land registration district concerned and 
that is transferred to the State enterprise pursuant to 
this Act; and 
(b) Make such entries in the register and on any outst
anding 
documents of title and generally do all such things as 
may be necessary to give effect to this section. 
(2) A District Land Registrar shall, on written applicat
ion by 
any person authorised by a Minister and on payme
nt of the 
prescribed fee, issue a certificate of title for land ve
sted in a 
State enterprise pursuant to section 24 (1) of this Ac
t in fonn 
No. 1 in the First Schedule to the Land Transfer A
ct 1952, 
amended as appropriate. 
(3) As soon as registration is accomplished in acco
rdance 
with subsection ( 1) of this section or a certificate o
f title is 
issued in accordance with subsection (2) of this sec
tion, the 
Stace enterprise shall be deemed to be seized of an est
ate in fee 
simple in possession in respect of that land. 
(4) Applications in accordance with subsections (I) and
 (2) of 
this secuon shall specify the name of the State enterp
rise and 
the date of the agreement, together with a descriptio
n uf the 
land sufficient to identify it and, in the case of app
lications 
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under suhsc(lion Cl) of this section, a cenilicate by the Chirf 
Surveyor for the <listrin concerned as to the co1Tectness of 
such description. 
26. Land ccrtification-(1) Before a District Land Registrar 
issues a certificate of tide in respect of any land vested in a 
State enterprise pursuant lo section 24 (I) of this Act, the 
District Land Registrar shall request from the Director·General 
of Survey and Land Information a certificate in the form set 
out in rhe Second Schedule lo the Land Act 1948 as to the legal 
description of the land, any trusts, reservations, or restrictions 
affecting the land, and any other matters that the Disti-ict Land 
Registrar considers appropriate. 
(2) Where any land that has been vested in a State enterprise 
pursuant to section 24 (I) of this Act and for which no 
certificate of tide has been issued in the name of that 
enterprise, is lo be transferred 10 any other person, the District 
Land Regis1_rar shall, before issuing a certificate of title, request 
from the Darector·General of Sur\'ey and Land Information a 
certificate in the form set out in the Second Schedule to the 
Land Act 1948 as to the legal description of the land, any 
trusts, reservations, or restrictions affecting the land and any 
other mailers that the District Land Registrar consi<lers 
appropriate. 
(3) A certificate in accordance with subsection (I) or 
subsection (2) of this section shall be filed by the District Land 
Regisuar in the Land Registry Office and shall be conclusive 
evidence co the District Land Registrar of the matters required 
to be slated therein. 
27. Maori land claims-(1) Where land is transferred to a 
Stale enterprise pursuant to this Act and, before the day on 
which this Act receives the Govemor·General's assent, a claim 
has been submitted in respect of that land under section 6 of 
the Treaty of Waitangi Act 197 5, the following provisions shall 
apply: 
(a) The land shall continue to be subject to that claim: 
(b) Subject 10 subsection (2) of this section, the Seate 
enterprise shall not transfer that land or any interest 
therein to any person other than the Crown: 
(c) Subject to subsection (2) of this section, no District Land 
Registrar shall register the State enterprise as 
proprietor of the land or issue a certificate of tide in 
respect of the land. 
{ 
1986, No. 124 Stalt ·Oumtd EntrrprutJ
 17 
('.l) Where findings have been made pursuant _to sectio,~ 6 <~f 
the Treaty of Waitangi Act 197 5 in respect of land which 1s 
held by a State enterprise purs~ant to a tr~nsfe~ made ~nder 
this Acl (whether or not subsecuon (I) of 1h1s secuon applies to 
that land), che Governor-General may. by Order in Council,-
(a) Declare that all or any part of the land shall be resumed 
by the Crown on a dace specified in the Order in 
Council; or 
(b) In the case of land co which subsection (I) of this section 
applies, waive the application of paragrarhs (b) and 
(c) of that subsection to all or any part o the land. 
, (3) Where any land is lo be resumed pursuant to subsection 
(2) (a) of this section-
(a) The State enterprise shall transfer the land to the Crown 
on the date specified in the Order in Council; and 
(b) The Crown shall pay to the State enterprise an amount 
equal to the value of the interest of the State 
enterp1ise in the land (including any improvements 
thereon). The amount of any such value shall be that 
agreed between the State enterprise and ics 
shareholding Ministers or, failing agreement, that 
detennined by a person approved for this purpose 
by the State enterprise and its shareholding 
Ministers. 
28. Orders in Council relating to transfer of .uscts and 
liabilities-(1) For the purpose of facilitating the transfer of 
assets and liabilities to a State enterprise pursuant to this Act, 
the Governor-General may from time to time, by Order in 
Council, do any one or more of the following: 
(a) Vest in or impose on a State enterprise any asset or 
liability (other than land to which section 24 (l) of 
this Act applies), or any class of any such asset or 
liability, chat the State enterprise has agreed to have 
transferred to it: 
(b) Vest land in a State enterprise for the purposes of section 
24 (I) of this Act: 
(c) Declare that a reference to the Crown or a Minister, 
officer, employee, department, or instrument of the 
Crown in any or all regulations, orders, notices, or 
documents shall be deemed co be or to include a 
reference to a State enterprise specified in the order: 
(d) Declare that a State enterprise shall assume or continue 
to have the rights and obligations of Lhe Crown or a 
Minister, officer, employee, department, or 
18 Stalt ·Owntd Entuproti 
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instrument of the Crown in respect of applications 
for rights, objections, or proceedings before any 
court, authority, or other person, being rights and 
obligations that the State enterprise has agreed to · 
assume: 
(c) Declare that sections 294 to 2941 of the Local 
Government Act 197-t (which relate to reserve 
contributions, development levies, and contributions 
to certain regional works) shall not apply to specified 
developments, being developments that the 
shareholding Ministers have a&"eed to transfer to a 
State enterprise pursuant to this Act: 
(0 Declare, in respect of any assets or liabilities transferred 
to a State enterprise pursuant to this Act, that the 
State enterprise shall be deemed to have specified 
rights or obligations in respect of those assets or 
liabilities, b~ing rights or obligations that are 
required in respect of those assets or liabilities as a 
result of the change of ownership or responsibility 
from the Crown to the State enterprise: 
(g) Declare that any Order in Council made under this 
section shall he deemed to be notice to all persons, 
and that specific notice need not be given to any 
authority or other person: 
(h) Direct any authority or other person to register or record 
any such vesting or declaration. 
(2) Every Order in Council made under this section may be 
made on such terms and conditions as the Governor-General 
thinks fit, and shall have effect according to its tenor. 
29. Interpretation relating to transfer of assets and 
liabilities-(1) In this section and in sections 23 to 28 of this 
Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
"Agreement" includes a deed, a contract, an agreemen1, 
an arrangement, and an understanding. whether oral 
or writ~n. express or implied, and whether or not 
enforceable at law: 
"Asse~s" means any real or personal_ property of any 
kind, whether or not subject to nghts, and without 
limiting the generality of the foregoing includes-
. (a) Anr estate or interest in any land, including all 
nghts o occupation of land or buildings: 
(b) All buildings, vehicles, plant, equipment, and 
machinery, and any rights therein: 
-------··- ------ ~--·- - -
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(c) All livestock, products from livestock, and 
crops: 
(d) All securities within the meaning of the 
Securities Act 19 7 8: 
(e) All rights of any kind, including rights under 
Acts, deeds, agreements, or licences, planning rights, 
water rights, and clean air licences, and all 
applications for and objections against applications 
for such rights: 
(0 All patents, trade marks, desigris, copyright, and 
other intellectual property rights whether 
enforceable by Act or rule of law: 
(g) Goodwill, and any business undertaking: 
(h) All natural gas, petroleum, and other 
hydrocarbons: 
"Liabilities" includes-
(a) Liabilities and obligations under any Act or 
agreement; and 
(b) Deposits and other debt securities within the 
meaning of the Securities Act 1978; and 
(c) Contingent liabilities: 
"Rights" includes powers, privileges, interests, licences, 
approvals, consents, benefits, and equities of any 
kind, whether actual, contingent, or prospective: 
"State enterprise" includes a subsidiary of a State 
enterprise: 
"Transfer" includes-
(a) Assigri and convey; and 
(b) Vest by Order in Council; and 
(c) Confer estates in fee simple of land held by the 
Crown, whether in allodium or otherwise; and 
(d) Grant leases, rights, and interests in any real or 
personal property; and 
(e) In the case of liabilities, the assumption thereof 
by a State enterprise. 
(2) In this section and in sections 23 to 28 of this Act, a 
reference to "transfer", "authorise", or "grant" includes 
entering into an agreement to transfer, authorise, or grant, as 
the case may be. 
(3) This section and sections 23 to 28 of this Act shall have 
effect, and assets and liabilities may be transferred pursuant to 
this Act, notwithstanding any restriction, prohibition, or other 
provision contained in any Act, nile of law, or agreement that 
would otherwise apply. 
20 Statt -Vwntd E11ltrprut1 
1986. No. 12~ 
(4) NoLhing in this An shall limit any powers or rights that 
the Crown or a Minister has other than pursuant to Lhis An. 
50. A{>plication of Companies Act 1955 to new State 
enterp~ses-(l) Notwithstanding anything in the Companies 
Act I 95.J, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1964, or any 
other enanment or rnle of law, a company in which all the 
shares are subscribed for by Ministers may be fonned and 
regisLered under the Companies Act 1955 with a name 
specified in the Second Schedule to this Act; and sections 31 
and 3 2 (2) of the Companies Act 1955 shall not apply 10 any 
such company. 
(2) Notwithstanding the Companies Act 1955, the Minister of 
fina~Ke and a respon~ible Minis~er may fonn a limited liability 
public company that 1s named m the Second Schedule to this 
Act as if Lhe reference to the figure "7" in section 13 ( l) of the 
Companies Act 1955 were a reference to the figure "2". 
(3) In the application of the Companies Act 1955 LO a 
company named in the Second Schedule to this Act, the 
following provisions of the Companies Act 1955 shall be 
constrned as if references therein to 7 members were 
refe1 ences to 'l. members: 
(a) SecLion 4 I, as to carrying on business when the number 
of members is reduced below the legal minimum: 
(b) Section 21 7 (d), as to winding up by the Court when the 
number of members is reduced below the legal 
minimum: 
(c) Section 219 (a) (i), as to the presentation of a winding-up 
petition by a contributory when the number of 
members is reduced below the legal minimum. 
(4) Nothing in section 134 of the Companies Act 1955 (which 
relates to statutory meeLings) shall apply to a company named 
in Lhe Second Schedule to this Act. 
!H. Review of Ombudsmen Act 1975 and Official 
Information Act 1982 in relation to State enterprises-The 
effect of the Ombudsmen Act 197 5 and the Official 
lnfom1ation Act 1982 on the operation of State enterprises 
shall be reviewed after the I st day of April 1989 by a select 
committee appointed by the House of Representatives for this 
purpose. ihe committee 5hall report to the House of 
Representatives before the lst day of April 1990, and shall 
state in its repon-
(a) Whether, in its view, either or both of those Acts should 
continue to apply to State enterprises: and 
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(h) If it considns that either or both Acts should so tontinue, 
the changes (if any) thaL should be made to eiLher or 
boLh of Lhose Acts so far as Lhey apply LO Stale 
enterprises. 
52. Amendments and transitional provisions relating to 
new State enterprises-(1) The enactments specified in tl~e 
Third and Fifth Schedules to this Act are hereby amended in 
the manner indicated in those Schedules. 
(2) During the period beginning on the 1st day of April 1987 
and ending with the close of the 31 st day of December 198 7. -
(a) The enactment!. specified in the fourth Schedule to this 
Act shall have effect as stated in that Schedule; and 
(b) The Town and Country Planning Act I 97 7 and the Public 
Works Act 1981 shall have effect as if every State 
enterprise named in the Second Schedule to this Act 
were the Crown and every work and every use of 
land which such a State enterprise constructs, 
undertakes, establishes, manages, operates, or 
maintains by virtue of any Act were a public work 
within the meaning of the Public Wor.ks Act 1981. 
{3) Where, by virtue of subsection (2) of this section, a State 
enterprise has a.ny power, right, or authority that it would not 
otherwise have, the responsible Minister may at any time or 
times, by noLice in the Gaz.ette,-
(a) Direct the State enterprise not to exercise that power, 
right, or authority; or 
(b) Impose conditions on the exercise of that power, right, or 
authority, -
either generally or in any particular case or cases. 
(4) Every Stale enterprise shall comply with a notice given 
under subsection (3) of this section; and every such notice shall 
be deemed to be a regulation for the purposes of the 
Regulations Act 1936. 
!Ill. Repeals-The enactments specified in the Sixth 
Schedule to this Act arc hereby repealed. 
'- . 
Examined and cmifad: No. 117 
-~ 
In the name and on bthal.f of Her Majesty Q.ueen Eliz.abeth 
the Second '[ hereby a.umt to thiJ Act this 
day 
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An Act to amend the State-Owned Enterprises Act 19
86 
BE IT ENACTED by the Parliament of New Zealand as follo
ws: 
I. Shon Title and commencement-{ 1) This Act may be 
cited as the State-Owned Enterprises Amendment Ace 19
8 7, 
and shall be read together with and deemed ~an of the State·
 
Owned Enterprises Act 1986 (hereinafter referred to as 
the 
principal Act). 
(2) Except as provided in sections 10 and 11 of this Act, thi
s 
Act shall be deemed to have come into force on the 1st day o
f 
~ April 1987. 
2. Interpretation-;-{t) ~f the principal Ace is 
hereby amended by ~. after the definition of the te
rm 
"Crown", the following defuiition: 
"'Equity bond' means a State enterprise equity bond 
issued pursuant to section 12 of this Act:" 
(2) Section 2 of the princieal Act is hereby further amended 
by adding to paragraph (a) of the definition of the term "sha
re" 
the words "(but, except in sections 14 and 22 of this Act, d
oes 
not include an equity bond)". 
State-Owned Ent"priseJ Amendment 3 
(2) Section 23 of the principal Act is hereby furthe
r amended 
by repealing subsection (9), and substituting 
the followmg 
~
·ons: 
,: 9 here a designation tmder an operative dist
rict scheme 
is v ted in a State enterprise pursuant to this A
ct-
"(a) The designation shall remain in force until
 the next 
review of the district scheme, and shall then lap
se; 
and 
"(b) Sections 82 and 83 and Part VI of the Town a
nd Country 
Planning Act 19 7 7 shall apply to the designation a
s if 
the State enterprise were a local authority and h
ad 
made the requirement consequent upon which t
he 
designation was ma.de: . 
... Provided that where the designation was m
ade under 
section 43 ( 1) ( d) or section 118 ( 1) ( d) of the Town
 and Country 
Planning Act 1 9 7 7 the designation shall be incl
uded in the 
dist;txt- .scheme when it is next reviewed. 
1 '~r9AYWbere any land is transferred under this section b
ut 
th~gnation in respect of that land is not veste
d pursuant to 
this Act, any use of that land which is established 
at the date of 
the transfer shall be deemed to be a use permitted as of
 right 
tmder the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 
tmtil the next 
review of the operative district scheme. To the ex
tent that any 
use which would be lawful under the designation
 has not been 
established by the date of the cransf er of t
he land. the 
designation shall be deemed to be a consent under 
Part IV of 
the Town and Country Planning Act 19 7 7 gran
ted as at the 
date of transfer and section 7 0 of that Act
 shall apply 
accordingly. 
·~ere any requirement has been made un
der section 
43 or section 118 of the Town and Country Plann
ing Act 197 7 
in respect of any work which has been transferr
ed co a State 
enterprise pursuant to this Aet. the procedW"es speci
fied in the 
Town and Country Planning Act 1977 may be co
mpleted as if 
the Minister of Works and Development cont
inued to be 
financially responsible for the work and as if the work. w
ere a 
public work." · 
7. Provisions relating to t1"2n.Sfer ofland-{l
)~on ~ 
(2) of the principal Act is hereby amended by ad
'~ e wor 
"pursuant to section 23 (1) (a) of this Act". 
(2) Section 24 of the principal Act is hereby funhe
r amended 
by adding the following subsection: 
St.a.t.e-Owntd. Enterprises Amendmrnt 5 
<,'/ (2) This section shall come into force on the day on which 
this Act receives the Governor-General's assent. 
11. Consequential amendments-{ I) The enactments 
specified in the First Schedule to this Act are hereby amended 
in the manner indicated in that Schedule. 
(2) Part A of the First Schedule to this Act shall be deemed to 
have come into force on the 1st day of April 1987. 
(3) Part B of the First Schedule to this Act shall come into 
force on the day on which this Act receives the Govemor-
~eral' s assent. 
( 4) Part C of the First Schedule to this Act shall come into 
force on the 1st day of January 1988. 
12. Repeals consequential upon provisions of 
principal Act-The enactments specified in the Second 
Schedu1e to this Act are hereby repealed. 
SCHEDULES 
FIRST SCHEDULE 
ENACTMENTS AMENDED 
Part A 
Section 11 ( I ) 
(Which .is deemed to have come into force on the 1st day of April 
1987) . 
19!7. No. 27-Thc 
Petroleum Act 193 7 
(R.S. VoL 7. p. ~7) 
194 7. No. 3.5-The 
Masterton Licensing 
Trust Act 194 i (R.S. 
VoL 3. p. H5 
1948, No. 63-The 
Valuers Act 1948 (R.S. 
VoL 11. p. i23) 
By omitting from section 4 (2) (b) (as amended 
by section 6.5 ( 1) of the Conservation Act 
198 7), the words .. the Mini.stc:r within the 
meaning of section 2 ( lA) of the Harbours 
Act 1950". and subsriruring the words "the 
Ministen of Tr.msport and Conservation". 
By omitting from section 42 (b) the words 
.. Post Office Savings Bank", and 
substituting the word! "Post Office Bank 
Limited". 
By omitting from section 3 7 (7) the words "in 
the Post Office Savings B.nk. or". 
The Companies Act 1955 
MEMORANDUM OF ASSOCIATION 
- of -
TELECOM CORPORATION OF NEW ZEALAND LIMITED 
A Public Companv Limited by Shares 
t. THE name of the company is TELECOM CORPORATION OF NEW ZEALAND 
LIMITED. 
2. THE liability of the members is limited. 
3. THE share capital of the Company is one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00) 
divided into or.e hundred thousand (100,000) Ordinary Shares of one dollar ($1.00) 
each. 
WE, the several persons whose names. addresses and descriptions are subscribed 
hereto are desirous of being formed into a Company in pursuance of this 
Memorandum of Association and we respectively agree to take the number of shares 
in the capital of the Company set opposite our respective names. 
DATED this 24th day of February 1987 
Name in full No . of Shares 
Description Signature Taken by Each Witness 
Address Subscriber 
~~ 
ROGER OWEN DOUGLAS "' (µ~ 
Minister of Finance I ' ' ~ t \\,-:·'"'--· ·-' ,R.,..) ,,;_(--; 'fc,,--Parliament Buildings / ' '-- '· ' ---
WELLINGTON 
I 
' ' I ' 
JONA THAN LUCAS HUNT 
.. ~.,,~ n 
Minister responsible Jfo 
for Telecom Cor;,oration ~ /; 'i"" L ;?~ ./ ~ ' 
of New Zealand Limited 
~ry •. s. / -#~)~ d 
P arUament Buildinc;s ( . · 
WELLlNC TON / 
V i 
ARTICLES OF ASSOCIA TtON 
of 
TELECOM CORPORA i!ON OF NEW Z~ALANO UM£TED 
CONTENTS 
PART l - PREL!M{NAR v 
l. ?REL!MINARY 
l. l Application of iable A 
l.2 1~ te:;::-eta t ic:, 
PART l! - C.AP!i" :.;_ 
2. CAPITAL 
2.1 Issue of Sri..tres 
2.2 Preference Shares 
2. 3 Modiflcat~on of Rights 
3. AL TERA TtON OF CAP!T Al 
3. l Power to inc:-ease Cacital 
3 .2 Issue of New Capitai and Ec~i~y Ser.Cs 
3 .. 3 Consolidation. Subdivisicr., anc Cance~~.:~:cn ;f 5hare Cac Ltal 
4 . CALLS ON SHARES 
4.1 Calls 
t.;.2 !iits:es~ c~ Col!~ 
4 .. 3 Sums Due on AlliJtme:i~ Are As ::~Es 
4.ti Liability of Joint Holder-$ 
4.5 Power to Differentiate Set·.-.,een '."""'c lc:e~ 
A.6 Payment of Call in Ac:va~c~ 
A. 7 Proof of Liability 
ti.8 Time Call Made 
5. GENERAL MEETtNCS 
5.1 Annual General Meetir.i;s 
5.2 E:.xtraordinary Genera! Meet:nc;s 
6. NOTtCE OF GENERAL MEETINGS 
0• l Method of Notice 
o.2 Omission of Notice 
0.3 Form of Proxy to be Included with Notice of Meeting 
7. PROCEEDINGS AT GENERAL MEETtNGS 
7. l All Business Speciai 
7.2 Quorum 
7.3 Chairman 
7 .4 Powe!:" to Adjourn Meeting 
7. S Attendance 
i .6 Corooratior:s acting by Re::::-ese:-:tatives at Mee tin<; 
7.7 Appointment of Attorney 
8. VOTING 
8. l Met.hod of Voting 
8.2 Votes 
;:,:.RT !'..' - OtRECTCP,S A~D SECRET ARY 
9. D!PECTORS 
' ... l u. 
9.i 
9.2 
<: -,.) 
9.4 
Q ' , . ., 
Numbe: of Directors 
Gualiflcation of Directors 
Appointment of Directors , 
Dlsqualification of Directors 
Remwne!:"~tion of Directors 
OtRECTORS tNTER.ESTS 
10. l Directors Declaration of Interests 
l0.2 Prohibition on Interested Director Votinc; 
l0.3 Director may Contract with Company 
lO.A Adjudication on !nterest 
10.S Relaxation of Interested Director Provisions 
l i. PROCEEDINGS OF DIRECTORS 
l l. l Meetings of D~rectors 
ll.l.l 
l l. l.2 
l t. l.3 
l l. l.ll 
Votes 
Convening of Meetings 
Notice of Meetings 
Quorum 
l l .2 Resolution Assented to by all Directors 
l l.3 Teleconference Meeting of Directors 
l l. 3.l 
I l.3.2 
l l.3.3 
Power to Meet by Telephone 
Restriction on Leaving Teleconference 
Minutes at Teleconference 
r: 
12. AL TERNA TE DIRECTORS 
12.1 
12.2 
/ 12.3 
L 2.A 
Appointment of Alternate Director 
Termination of Appointment 
Powen of Alternate Director 
Qualification 
13. COMMtTTEES OF DIRECTORS 
l ). t Power to Delegate to Commit~ees 
L 3.2 Proceecinc;s of Committees 
14-, POWERS ANO DUTIES OF' DtRECTORS 
14. l Borrowing ~owers 
l 4. l. l 
l i.. t. 2 
Cenerai Power to Borrow 
u:icalled Capital tMe Subject of a Charge 
i .:;.2 Overs~as Seal ar:C: 8rar.c~ Rec;~ste:--s 
tu .3 .Mana<;e~~nc of Company 
l ii. 3. '. 
l ii. 3 .2 
81..siness of Company 
Pcwer to Sign Cheques 
t .:i .~ ?o·.ve:- t::: ::::ay C:~tw~ties and P~nsions 
1 ,, ; , • 
L •.-. • 
14.4.2 
l ii.~ . 3 
l 0:. . 4 .~ 
?¼yr:ie!'lt of Cratw i t, c:i Ret~:er.ient of Emo loyee 
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